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Research assessing the relationship between government health expenditure and development assistance for health channeled to governments (DAHG) has not considered that this relationship may depend on whether DAHG is increasing or decreasing. We explore this issue using general method of moments estimation and a panel of financial flows data spanning 119 countries and 16 years. Our primary concern is how DAHG affects government health expenditure as source (GHES). We disaggregate the average effect of DAHG and separately identify the effects of increases versus decreases in DAHG. We find that a $1 year-over-year increase in DAHG leads to a $0.62 (90% confidence interval (CI): 0.15, 1.09) decrease in GHES, whereas a $1 year-over-year decrease in DAHG does not have an effect on GHES that is statistically different from zero (CI: −0.67, 1.17). Simulation shows that the displacement of GHES between 1995 and 2010 reduced total government health expenditure by $152.8 billion (CI: 46.9, 277.6). Moreover, the irregular disbursement of DAHG reduced total government expenditure by $96.9 billion (CI: 0.5, 212.4). Thus, this research shows that health aid is fungible and highlights the cost of displacement and erratic aid disbursement.

Background The rapid spread of COVID-19 renewed the focus on how health systems across the globe are financed, especially during public health emergencies. Development assistance is an important source of health financing in many low-income countries, yet little is known about how much of this funding was disbursed for COVID-19. We aimed to put development assistance for health for COVID-19 in the context of broader trends in global health financing, and to estimate total health spending from 1995 to 2050 and development assistance for COVID-19 in 2020. Methods We estimated domestic health spending and development assistance for health to generate total health-sector spending estimates for 204 countries and territories. We leveraged data from the WHO Global Health Expenditure Database to produce estimates of domestic health spending. To generate estimates for development assistance for health, we relied on project-level disbursement data from the major international development agencies' online databases and annual financial statements and reports for information on income sources. To adjust our estimates for 2020 to include disbursements related to COVID-19, we extracted project data on commitments and disbursements from a broader set of databases (because not all of the data sources used to estimate the historical series extend to 2020), including the UN Office of Humanitarian Assistance Financial Tracking Service and the International Aid Transparency Initiative. We reported all the historic and future spending estimates in inflation-adjusted 2020 US$, 2020 US$ per capita, purchasing-power parity-adjusted US$ per capita, and as a proportion of gross domestic product. We used various models to generate future health spending to 2050. Findings In 2019, health spending globally reached $8. 8 trillion (95% uncertainty interval [UI] 8.7-8.8) or $1132 (1119-1143) per person. Spending on health varied within and across income groups and geographical regions. Of this total, $40.4 billion (0.5%, 95% UI 0.5-0.5) was development assistance for health provided to low-income and middle-income countries, which made up 24.6% (UI 24.0-25.1) of total spending in low-income countries. We estimate that $54.8 billion in development assistance for health was disbursed in 2020. Of this, $13.7 billion was targeted toward the COVID-19 health response. $12.3 billion was newly committed and $1.4 billion was repurposed from existing health projects. $3.1 billion (22.4%) of the funds focused on country-level coordination and $2.4 billion (17.9%) was for supply chain and logistics. Only $714.4 million (7.7%) of COVID-19 development assistance for health went to Latin America, despite this region reporting 34.3% of total recorded COVID-19 deaths in low-income or middle-income countries in 2020. Spending on health is expected to rise to $1519 (1448-1591) per person in 2050, although spending across countries is expected to remain varied. Interpretation Global health spending is expected to continue to grow, but remain unequally distributed between countries. We estimate that development organisations substantially increased the amount of development assistance for health provided in 2020. Continued efforts are needed to raise sufficient resources to mitigate the pandemic for the most vulnerable, and to help curtail the pandemic for all. ; For complete list of authors see http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(21)01258-7

Background Comprehensive and comparable estimates of health spending in each country are a key input for health policy and planning, and are necessary to support the achievement of national and international health goals. Previous studies have tracked past and projected future health spending until 2040 and shown that, with economic development, countries tend to spend more on health per capita, with a decreasing share of spending from development assistance and out-of-pocket sources. We aimed to characterise the past, present, and predicted future of global health spending, with an emphasis on equity in spending across countries. Methods We estimated domestic health spending for 195 countries and territories from 1995 to 2016, split into three categories-government, out-of-pocket, and prepaid private health spending-and estimated development assistance for health (DAH) from 1990 to 2018. We estimated future scenarios of health spending using an ensemble of linear mixed-effects models with time series specifications to project domestic health spending from 2017 through 2050 and DAH from 2019 through 2050. Data were extracted from a broad set of sources tracking health spending and revenue, and were standardised and converted to inflation-adjusted 2018 US dollars. Incomplete or low-quality data were modelled and uncertainty was estimated, leading to a complete data series of total, government, prepaid private, and out-of-pocket health spending, and DAH. Estimates are reported in 2018 US dollars, 2018 purchasing-power parity-adjusted dollars, and as a percentage of gross domestic product. We used demographic decomposition methods to assess a set of factors associated with changes in government health spending between 1995 and 2016 and to examine evidence to support the theory of the health financing transition. We projected two alternative future scenarios based on higher government health spending to assess the potential ability of governments to generate more resources for health. Findings Between 1995 and 2016, health spending grew at a rate of 4.00% (95% uncertainty interval 3.89-4.12) annually, although it grew slower in per capita terms (2.72% [2.61-2.84]) and increased by less than $ 1 per capita over this period in 22 of 195 countries. The highest annual growth rates in per capita health spending were observed in upper-middle-income countries (5.55% [5.18-5.95]), mainly due to growth in government health spending, and in lower-middle-income countries (3.71% [3.10-4.34]), mainly from DAH. Health spending globally reached $ 8.0 trillion (7.8-8.1) in 2016 (comprising 8.6% [8.4-8.7] of the global economy and $ 10.3 trillion [10.1-10.6] in purchasing-power parity-adjusted dollars), with a per capita spending of US$ 5252 (5184-5319) in high-income countries, $ 491 (461-524) in upper-middle-income countries, $ 81 (74-89) in lower-middle-income countries, and $ 40 (38-43) in low-income countries. In 2016, 0.4% (0.3-0.4) of health spending globally was in low-income countries, despite these countries comprising 10.0% of the global population. In 2018, the largest proportion of DAH targeted HIV/AIDS ($ 9.5 billion, 24.3% of total DAH), although spending on other infectious diseases (excluding tuberculosis and malaria) grew fastest from 2010 to 2018 (6.27% per year). The leading sources of DAH were the USA and private philanthropy (excluding corporate donations and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation). For the first time, we included estimates of China's contribution to DAH ($ 644.7 million in 2018). Globally, health spending is projected to increase to $ 15.0 trillion (14.0-16.0) by 2050 (reaching 9.4% [7.6-11.3] of the global economy and $ 21.3 trillion [19.8-23.1] in purchasing-power parity-adjusted dollars), but at a lower growth rate of 1.84% (1.68-2.02) annually, and with continuing disparities in spending between countries. In 2050, we estimate that 0.6% (0.6-0.7) of health spending will occur in currently low-income countries, despite these countries comprising an estimated 15.7% of the global population by 2050. The ratio between per capita health spending in high-income and low-income countries was 130.2 (122.9-136.9) in 2016 and is projected to remain at similar levels in 2050 (125.9 [113.7-138.1]). The decomposition analysis identified governments' increased prioritisation of the health sector and economic development as the strongest factors associated with increases in government health spending globally. Future government health spending scenarios suggest that, with greater prioritisation of the health sector and increased government spending, health spending per capita could more than double, with greater impacts in countries that currently have the lowest levels of government health spending. Interpretation Financing for global health has increased steadily over the past two decades and is projected to continue increasing in the future, although at a slower pace of growth and with persistent disparities in per-capita health spending between countries. Out-of-pocket spending is projected to remain substantial outside of high-income countries. Many low-income countries are expected to remain dependent on development assistance, although with greater government spending, larger investments in health are feasible. In the absence of sustained new investments in health, increasing efficiency in health spending is essential to meet global health targets.

Background: The amount of resources, particularly prepaid resources, available for health can affect access to health care and health outcomes. Although health spending tends to increase with economic development, tremendous variation exists among health financing systems. Estimates of future spending can be beneficial for policy makers and planners, and can identify financing gaps. In this study, we estimate future gross domestic product (GDP), all-sector government spending, and health spending disaggregated by source, and we compare expected future spending to potential future spending. Methods: We extracted GDP, government spending in 184 countries from 1980-2015, and health spend data from 1995-2014. We used a series of ensemble models to estimate future GDP, all-sector government spending, development assistance for health, and government, out-of-pocket, and prepaid private health spending through 2040. We used frontier analyses to identify patterns exhibited by the countries that dedicate the most funding to health, and used these frontiers to estimate potential health spending for each low-income or middle-income country. All estimates are inflation and purchasing power adjusted. Findings: We estimated that global spending on health will increase from US$9.21 trillion in 2014 to $24.24 trillion (uncertainty interval [UI] 20.47-29.72) in 2040. We expect per capita health spending to increase fastest in upper-middle-income countries, at 5.3% (UI 4.1-6.8) per year. This growth is driven by continued growth in GDP, government spending, and government health spending. Lower-middle income countries are expected to grow at 4.2% (3.8-4.9). High-income countries are expected to grow at 2.1% (UI 1.8-2.4) and low-income countries are expected to grow at 1.8% (1.0-2.8). Despite this growth, health spending per capita in low-income countries is expected to remain low, at $154 (UI 133-181) per capita in 2030 and $195 (157-258) per capita in 2040. Increases in national health spending to reach the level of the countries who spend the most on health, relative to their level of economic development, would mean $321 (157-258) per capita was available for health in 2040 in low-income countries. Interpretation: Health spending is associated with economic development but past trends and relationships suggest that spending will remain variable, and low in some low-resource settings. Policy change could lead to increased health spending, although for the poorest countries external support might remain essential. ; Funding Agency: Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation

Demographic and epidemiological changes are shifting the disease burden from communicable to noncommunicable diseases in lower-income countries. Within a generation, the share of disease burden attributed to noncommunicable diseases in some poor countries will exceed 80 percent, rivaling that of rich countries, but this burden is likely to affect much younger people in poorer countries. The health systems of lower-income countries are unprepared for this change. We examined the shift to noncommunicable diseases and estimated preparedness for the shift by ranking 172 nations using a health system capacity index for noncommunicable disease. We project that the countries with the greatest increases in the share of disease burden attributable to noncommunicable disease over the next twenty-five years will also be the least prepared for the change, as they ranked low on our capacity index and are expected to have the smallest increases in national health spending. National governments and donors must invest more in preparing the health systems of lower-income countries for the dramatic shift to noncommunicable diseases and in reducing modifiable noncommunicable disease risks.

OBJECTIVE: To assess the relation between autocratisation—substantial decreases in democratic traits (free and fair elections, freedom of civil and political association, and freedom of expression)—and countries' population health outcomes and progress toward universal health coverage (UHC). DESIGN: Synthetic control analysis. SETTING AND COUNTRY SELECTION: Global sample of countries for all years from 1989 to 2019, split into two categories: 17 treatment countries that started autocratising during 2000 to 2010, and 119 control countries that never autocratised from 1989 to 2019. The treatment countries comprised low and middle income nations and represent all world regions except North America and western Europe. A weighted combination of control countries was used to construct synthetic controls for each treatment country. This statistical method is especially well suited to population level studies when random assignment is infeasible and sufficiently similar comparators are not available. The method was originally developed in economics and political science to assess the impact of policies and events, and it is now increasingly used in epidemiology. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: HIV-free life expectancy at age 5 years, UHC effective coverage index (0-100 point scale), and out-of-pocket spending on health per capita. All outcome variables are for the period 1989 to 2019. RESULTS: Autocratising countries underperformed for all three outcome variables in the 10 years after the onset of autocratisation, despite some improvements in life expectancy, UHC effective coverage index, and out-of-pocket spending on health. On average, HIV-free life expectancy at age 5 years increased by 2.2% (from 64.7 to 66.1 years) during the 10 years after the onset of autocratisation. This study estimated that it would have increased by 3.5% (95% confidence interval 3.3% to 3.6%, P<0.001) (from 64.7 to 66.9 years) in the absence of autocratisation. On average, the UHC effective coverage index increased by 11.9% (from 42.5 to 47.6 ...

BACKGROUND: Previous analyses of democracy and population health have focused on broad measures, such as life expectancy at birth and child and infant mortality, and have shown some contradictory results. We used a panel of data spanning 170 countries to assess the association between democracy and cause-specific mortality and explore the pathways connecting democratic rule to health gains. METHODS: We extracted cause-specific mortality and HIV-free life expectancy estimates from the Global Burden of Diseases, Injuries, and Risk Factors Study 2016 and information on regime type from the Varieties of Democracy project. These data cover 170 countries and 46 years. From the Financing Global Health database, we extracted gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, also covering 46 years, and Development Assistance for Health estimates starting from 1990 and domestic health spending estimates starting from 1995. We used a diverse set of empirical methods—synthetic control, within-country variance decomposition, structural equation models, and fixed-effects regression—which together provide a robust analysis of the association between democratisation and population health. FINDINGS: HIV-free life expectancy at age 15 years improved significantly during the study period (1970–2015) in countries after they transitioned to democracy, on average by 3% after 10 years. Democratic experience explains 22·27% of the variance in mortality within a country from cardiovascular diseases, 16·53% for tuberculosis, and 17·78% for transport injuries, and a smaller percentage for other diseases included in the study. For cardiovascular diseases, transport injuries, cancers, cirrhosis, and other non-communicable diseases, democratic experience explains more of the variation in mortality than GDP. Over the past 20 years, the average country's increase in democratic experience had direct and indirect effects on reducing mortality from cardiovascular disease (−9·64%, 95% CI −6·38 to −12·90), other non-communicable diseases (−9·14%, −4·26 to ...

Despite dramatic growth between 1990 and 2010, development assistance for health from high-income countries and development agencies to low- and middle-income countries has stagnated, and proposed cuts make future funding uncertain. To further understand international financial flows for health, we examined international contributions from major donor countries. Our findings showed that the United States provided more development assistance for health than any other country, but it provided less than others relative to national population, government spending, and income. Norway, Denmark, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom stand out when the provision of health assistance is considered relative to these other factors. Seventeen of twenty-three countries did not reach a target that corresponds to an international goal. If all twenty-three countries had reached this goal, an additional $13.3 billion would have been available for global health in 2016. Systematic efforts are needed to encourage countries to meet these targets. Sustained health improvement in low- and middle-income countries will benefit greatly from ongoing international support.

BACKGROUND: Between 2012 and 2016, development assistance for HIV/AIDS decreased by 20·0%; domestic financing is therefore critical to sustaining the response to HIV/AIDS. To understand whether domestic resources could fill the financing gaps created by declines in development assistance, we aimed to track spending on HIV/AIDS and estimated the potential for governments to devote additional domestic funds to HIV/AIDS. METHODS: We extracted 8589 datapoints reporting spending on HIV/AIDS. We used spatiotemporal Gaussian process regression to estimate a complete time series of spending by domestic sources (government, prepaid private, and out-of-pocket) and spending category (prevention, and care and treatment) from 2000 to 2016 for 137 low-income and middle-income countries (LMICs). Development assistance data for HIV/AIDS were from Financing Global Health 2018, and HIV/AIDS prevalence, incidence, and mortality were from the Global Burden of Disease study 2017. We used stochastic frontier analysis to estimate potential additional government spending on HIV/AIDS, which was conditional on the current government health budget and other finance, economic, and contextual factors associated with HIV/AIDS spending. All spending estimates were reported in 2018 US$. FINDINGS: Between 2000 and 2016, total spending on HIV/AIDS in LMICs increased from $4·0 billion (95% uncertainty interval 2·9–6·0) to $19·9 billion (15·8–26·3), spending on HIV/AIDS prevention increased from $596 million (258 million to 1·3 billion) to $3·0 billion (1·5–5·8), and spending on HIV/AIDS care and treatment increased from $1·1 billion (458·1 million to 2·2 billion) to $7·2 billion (4·3–11·8). Over this time period, the share of resources sourced from development assistance increased from 33·2% (21·3–45·0) to 46·0% (34·2–57·0). Care and treatment spending per year on antiretroviral therapy varied across countries, with an IQR of $284–2915. An additional $12·1 billion (8·4–17·5) globally could be mobilised by governments of LMICs to finance the ...

BACKGROUND: Coverage rates for immunization have dropped in lower income countries during the COVID-19 pandemic, raising concerns regarding potential outbreaks and premature death. In order to re-invigorate immunization service delivery, sufficient financing must be made available from all sources, and particularly from government resources. This study utilizes the most recent data available to provide an updated comparison of available data sources on government spending on immunization. METHODS: We examined data from WHO/UNICEF's Joint Reporting Form (JRF), country Comprehensive Multi-Year Plan (cMYP), country co-financing data for Gavi, and WHO National Health Accounts (NHA) on government spending on immunization for consistency by comparing routine and vaccine spending where both values were reported. We also examined spending trends across time, quantified underreporting and utilized concordance analyses to assess the magnitude of difference between the data sources. RESULTS: Routine immunization spending reported through the cMYP was nearly double that reported through the JRF (rho = 0.64, 95% 0.53 to 0.77) and almost four times higher than that reported through the NHA on average (rho = 3.71, 95% 1.00 to 13.87). Routine immunization spending from the JRF was comparable to spending reported in the NHA (rho = 1.30, 95% 0.97 to 1.75) and vaccine spending from the JRF was comparable to that from the cMYP data (rho = 0.97, 95% 0.84 to 1.12). Vaccine spending from both the JRF and cMYP was higher than Gavi co-financing by a at least two (rho = 2.66, 95% 2.45 to 2.89) and (rho = 2.66, 95% 2.15 to 3.30), respectively. IMPLICATIONS: Overall, our comparative analysis provides a degree of confidence in the validity of existing reporting mechanisms for immunization spending while highlighting areas for potential improvements. Users of these data sources should factor these into consideration when utilizing the data. Additionally, partners should work with governments to encourage more reliable, comprehensive, and ...

BACKGROUND: Childhood immunisation is one of the most cost-effective health interventions. However, despite its known value, global access to vaccines remains far from complete. Although supply-side constraints lead to inadequate vaccine coverage in many health systems, there is no comprehensive analysis of the funding for immunisation. We aimed to fill this gap by generating estimates of funding for immunisation disaggregated by the source of funding and the type of activities in order to highlight the funding landscape for immunisation and inform policy making. METHODS: For this financial modelling study, we estimated annual spending on immunisations for 135 low-income and middle-income countries (as determined by the World Bank) from 2000 to 2017, with a focus on government, donor, and out-of-pocket spending, and disaggregated spending for vaccines and delivery costs, and routine schedules and supplementary campaigns. To generate these estimates, we extracted data from National Health Accounts, the WHO–UNICEF Joint Reporting Forms, comprehensive multi-year plans, databases from Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, and the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation's 2019 development assistance for health database. We estimated total spending on immunisation by aggregating the government, donor, prepaid private, and household spending estimates. FINDINGS: Between 2000 and 2017, funding for immunisation totalled US$112·4 billion (95% uncertainty interval 108·5–118·5). Aggregated across all low-income and middle-income countries, government spending consistently remained the largest source of funding, providing between 60·0% (57·7–61·9) and 79·3% (73·8–81·4) of total immunisation spending each year (corresponding to between $2·5 billion [2·3–2·8] and $6·4 billion [6·0–7·0] each year). Across income groups, immunisation spending per surviving infant was similar in low-income and lower-middle-income countries and territories, with average spending of $40 (38–42) in low-income countries and $42 (39–46) in ...

BACKGROUND: Estimates of government spending and development assistance for tuberculosis exist, but less is known about out-of-pocket and prepaid private spending. We aimed to provide comprehensive estimates of total spending on tuberculosis in low-income and middle-income countries for 2000–17. METHODS: We extracted data on tuberculosis spending, unit costs, and health-care use from the WHO global tuberculosis database, Global Fund proposals and reports, National Health Accounts, the WHO-Choosing Interventions that are Cost-Effective project database, and the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation Development Assistance for Health Database. We extracted data from at least one of these sources for all 135 low-income and middle-income countries using the World Bank 2019 definitions. We estimated tuberculosis spending by source and function for notified (officially reported) and non-notified tuberculosis cases separately and combined, using spatiotemporal Gaussian process regression to fill in for missing data and estimate uncertainty. We aggregated estimates of government, out-of-pocket, prepaid private, and development assistance spending on tuberculosis to estimate total spending in 2019 US$. FINDINGS: Total spending on tuberculosis in 135 low-income and middle-income countries increased annually by 3·9% (95% CI 3·0 to 4·6), from $5·7 billion (5·2 to 6·5) in 2000 to $10·9 billion (10·3 to 11·8) in 2017. Government spending increased annually by 5·1% (4·4 to 5·7) between 2000 and 2017, and reached $6·9 billion (6·5 to 7·5) or 63·5% (59·2 to 66·8) of all tuberculosis spending in 2017. Of government spending, $5·8 billion (5·6 to 6·1) was spent on notified cases. Out-of-pocket spending decreased annually by 0·8% (−2·9 to 1·3), from $2·4 billion (1·9 to 3·1) in 2000 to $2·1 billion (1·6 to 2·7) in 2017. Development assistance for country-specific spending on tuberculosis increased from $54·6 million in 2000 to $1·1 billion in 2017. Administrative costs and development assistance for global projects related to ...