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Working paper
Anti-terrorism policies and the risk of provoking
In: Journal of Theoretical Politics, Band 26, Heft 3, S. 405-441
Tough anti-terrorism policies are often defended by focusing on a fixed minority of dangerous people who prefer violent outcomes, and arguing that toughness reduces the risk of terrorism from this group. This reasoning implicitly assumes that tough policies do not increase the group of 'potential terrorists', i.e. of people with violent preferences. Preferences and their level of violence are treated as stable, exogenously fixed features. To avoid this unrealistic assumption, I formulate a model in which policies can 'brutalise' or 'appease' someone's personality, i.e. his preferences. This follows the endogenous preferences approach, popular elsewhere in political science and economics. I formally decompose the effect of toughness into a (desirable) deterrence effect and an (undesirable) provocation effect. Whether toughness is overall efficient depends on which effect overweighs. I show that neglecting provocation typically leads to toughness exaggeration. This suggests that some tough anti-terrorism policies observable in the present and past can be explained by a neglect of provocation. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]
Anti-terrorism policies and the risk of provoking
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 26, Heft 3, S. 405-441
ISSN: 0951-6298
Anti-terrorism policies and the risk of provoking
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 26, Heft 3, S. 405-441
ISSN: 1460-3667
Tough anti-terrorism policies are often defended by focusing on a fixed minority of dangerous people who prefer violent outcomes, and arguing that toughness reduces the risk of terrorism from this group. This reasoning implicitly assumes that tough policies do not increase the group of 'potential terrorists', i.e. of people with violent preferences. Preferences and their level of violence are treated as stable, exogenously fixed features. To avoid this unrealistic assumption, I formulate a model in which policies can 'brutalise' or 'appease' someone's personality, i.e. his preferences. This follows the endogenous preferences approach, popular elsewhere in political science and economics. I formally decompose the effect of toughness into a (desirable) deterrence effect and an (undesirable) provocation effect. Whether toughness is overall efficient depends on which effect overweighs. I show that neglecting provocation typically leads to toughness exaggeration. This suggests that some tough anti-terrorism policies observable in the present and past can be explained by a neglect of provocation.
Dynamically rational judgment aggregation
In: Social choice and welfare
ISSN: 1432-217X
AbstractJudgment-aggregation theory has always focused on the attainment of rational collective judgments. But so far, rationality has been understood in static terms: as coherence of judgments at a given time, defined as consistency, completeness, and/or deductive closure. This paper asks whether collective judgments can be dynamically rational, so that they change rationally in response to new information. Formally, a judgment aggregation rule is dynamically rational with respect to a given revision operator if, whenever all individuals revise their judgments in light of some information (a learnt proposition), then the new aggregate judgments are the old ones revised in light of this information, i.e., aggregation and revision commute. We prove an impossibility theorem: if the propositions on the agenda are non-trivially connected, no judgment aggregation rule with standard properties is dynamically rational with respect to any revision operator satisfying some basic conditions. Our theorem is the dynamic-rationality counterpart of some well-known impossibility theorems for static rationality. We also explore how dynamic rationality might be achieved by relaxing some of the conditions on the aggregation rule and/or the revision operator. Notably, premise-based aggregation rules are dynamically rational with respect to so-called premise-based revision operators.
Reasoning in attitudes
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 200, Heft 6
ISSN: 1573-0964
Dynamically Rational Judgment Aggregation
SSRN
Working paper
Decision under Normative Uncertainty
In: Economics & Philosophy, Cambridge University Press
SSRN
Reasons for (prior) belief in Bayesian epistemology
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 190, Heft 5, S. 787-808
ISSN: 1573-0964
Reason-Based Rationalization
SSRN
Working paper
A model of non-informational preference change
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 23, Heft 2, S. 145-164
ISSN: 1460-3667
According to standard rational choice theory, as commonly used in political science and economics, an agent's fundamental preferences are exogenously fixed, and any preference change over decision options is due to Bayesian information learning. Although elegant and parsimonious, such a model fails to account for preference change driven by experiences or psychological changes distinct from information learning. We develop a model of non-informational preference change. Alternatives are modelled as points in some multidimensional space, only some of whose dimensions play a role in shaping the agent's preferences. Any change in these 'motivationally salient' dimensions can change the agent's preferences. How it does so is described by a new representation theorem. Our model not only captures a wide range of frequently observed phenomena, but also generalizes some standard representations of preferences in political science and economics.
Un bilan interprétatif de la théorie de l'agrégation logique
In: Revue d'économie politique, Band 120, Heft 6, S. 929-972
ISSN: 2105-2883
La théorie de l'agrégation des jugements, ou, comme elle est ici conçue, de l'agrégation logique, généralise celle du choix social en faisant porter la règle d'agrégation sur des jugements quelconques au lieu des seuls jugements de préférence. Elle procède du paradoxe doctrinal de Kornhauser et Sager et du dilemme discursif de Pettit, que l'article réexpose en soulignant leurs différences. Après ce préalable conceptuel, il reproduit les grandes étapes techniques de la théorie, depuis son premier théorème d'impossibilité, chez List et Pettit, jusqu'aux résultats entièrement généraux de Dietrich et Mongin. Il met en relief la réalisation collective du théorème canonique – par Dietrich et List, Dokow et Holzman, Nehring et Puppe – qui a donné sa méthode d'analyse à la théorie : elle consiste à caractériser mathématiquement les agendas d'impossibilité d'un agrégateur donné, c'est-à-dire les ensembles de propositions tels qu'il n'existe pas de fonction de jugement collectif vérifiant une certaine liste de conditions axiomatiques. La présentation est ici unifiée par l'emploi de la logique formelle, dont on défend la pertinence aux différentes étapes, et par la distinction précédente du paradoxe doctrinal et du dilemme discursif, que l'on réélabore techniquement.
A model of non-informational preference change
In: Journal of Theoretical Politics, Band 23, Heft 2, S. 145-164
According to standard rational choice theory, as commonly used in political science and economics, an agent's fundamental preferences are exogenously fixed, and any preference change over decision options is due to Bayesian information learning. Although elegant and parsimonious, such a model fails to account for preference change driven by experiences or psychological changes distinct from information learning. We develop a model of non-informational preference change. Alternatives are modelled as points in some multidimensional space, only some of whose dimensions play a role in shaping the agent's preferences. Any change in these 'motivationally salient' dimensions can change the agent's preferences. How it does so is described by a new representation theorem. Our model not only captures a wide range of frequently observed phenomena, but also generalizes some standard representations of preferences in political science and economics. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]