Suchergebnisse

Abstract. The European Commission and the EU Council Secretariat support the Member States in the conduct of European foreign policy, yet they have not always been able to get along. This article gives an overview of their inter-institutional relations across history, foreign policy instruments (declarations, crisis management joint actions and representation) and regions. The main argument is that the relationship between both institutions is generally cooperative, but that tensions do arise in a limited number of cases where the roles of the Commission and the Council Secretariat are unclear, perceived to overlap or in competition. In these instances, they have generally found a modus vivendi and their inter-institutional relations have subsequently improved. Such informal arrangements do not address, however, the underlying structural problems – that the Council Secretariat challenges the Commission's political and informational role in the context of foreign policy. Differences between both institutions are therefore still regularly displayed. This continues to undermine EU consistency and its effectiveness in international relations.

The Council Secretariat, under the leadership of Javier Solana, has become an indispensable actor in the context of the CFSP. This article gives a comprehensive overview of this institution's development path since the beginning of European Political Cooperation (1970). It argues that with the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty and the parallel Cologne European Council (both 1999), the Secretariat received at once a political and a military dimension. This has been the basis for a significant expansion during the last decade. From a wider perspective it shows that the Council Secretariat fills the political absence of the European Commission in the field of the CFSP. The Council Secretariat is basically strong in areas where the Commission is weak. These inter–institutional dynamics are important with a view to the Lisbon Treaty, which will see a partial merger of the CFSP services in both institutions. Lastly this article argues on a theoretical level that while these developments are significant, the rationale behind the Council Secretariat is different from the role of the Commission in the first pillar and this limits its potential.

Abstract
Various international organizations have recently faced legitimacy crises, but many have demonstrated resilience and relegitimated their rule. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is an exception. It is clearly an organization in decline and is on the brink of irrelevance. The closure of its Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine in April 2022 in the wake of the Russian attack is only the latest manifestation of the organization's long-term legitimacy crisis. Based on the case of the OSCE, this article contributes to the study of legitimacy crises to better understand when such crises can lead to decline. Drawing on twenty interviews with senior officials, the analysis suggests that the OSCE's failure to (re)legitimate has two interrelated causes: (1) the organization's institutional weaknesses and impeded leadership have prevented OSCE actors from engaging in effective legitimation practices, and (2) the heterogeneous and largely zero-sum preferences of the OSCE participating states have made them unwilling audiences for (re)legitimation practices. In doing so, the article contributes to our comprehension of the consequences of legitimacy crises.