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The public good game is a popular model of cooperation problems. Rational egoism predicts that in finitely repeated public good games no contributions are made. At least 4 observations are inconsistent with this prediction: contributions (i) are frequently positive, (ii) increase in the marginal rate of return of the public good, (iii) increase in the expected contributions of others, and (iv) decrease as the public good game is repeated. I build a rational choice model that explains these observations, extending and formalizing the social exchange heuristic. The model does not assume a specific utility function. I assume that total utility is a strictly increasing function of monetary and social utility, and then show that concave utility functions and a positive cross-partial derivate of total utility to monetary and social utility are sufficient conditions to arrive at a model compatible with the 4 observations. Directions for future (experimental) research are discussed.

In a well-functioning democracy voters should elect parties and representatives with whom they agree on policy issues. The current paper investigates the extent to which Dutch voters in the 2017 parliamentary election had accurate information about parties' policy positions. We elicit the extent to which voters think they vote for parties with whom they maximally agree (subjective congruence) and the extent to which this is actually true (objective congruence). Results show voters in our sample to have accurate information about approximately half of the policy positions of a random large party. Only 21.5 percent voted for a party with whom they were maximally objectively congruent. Objective congruence does not increase with information accuracy. Voters appear to consciously accept losses in terms of subjective congruence, as only 34.7 percent votes for a party with whom they think to be maximally congruent. These results are compatible with the interpretation of voters first choosing a party, and then (to some degree) adapting their personal policy positions to those of the chosen party.

Explaining cooperation in social dilemmas is a central issue in behavioral science, and the prisoner's dilemma (PD) is the most frequently employed model. Theories assuming rationality and selfishness predict no cooperation in PDs of finite duration, but cooperation is frequently observed. We therefore build a model of how individuals in a finitely repeated PD with incomplete information about their partner's preference for mutual cooperation decide about cooperation. We study cooperation in simultaneous and sequential PDs. Our model explains three behavioral regularities found in the literature: (i) the frequent cooperation in one-shot and finitely repeated N-shot games, (ii) cooperation rates declining over the course of the game, and (iii) cooperation being more frequent in the sequential PD than in the simultaneous PD.

AbstractWe develop a model of strategic network formation of collaborations to analyze the consequences of an understudied but consequential form of heterogeneity: differences between actors in the form of their production functions. We also address how this interacts with resource heterogeneity, as a way to measure the impact actors have as potential partners on a collaborative project. Some actors (e.g., start-up firms) may exhibit increasing returns to their investment into collaboration projects, while others (e.g., established firms) may face decreasing returns. Our model provides insights into how actor heterogeneity can help explain well-observed collaboration patterns. We show that if there is a direct relation between increasing returns and resources, start-ups exclude mature firms and networks become segregated by types of production function, portraying dominant group architectures. On the other hand, if there is an inverse relation between increasing returns and resources, networks portray core-periphery architectures, where the mature firms form a core and start-ups with low-resources link to them.

In collective decision making bilateral deals can increase or decrease the likelihood of finding compromises, depending on whether such deals have externalities. Positive externalities mean third actors profit from bilateral deals, whereas negative externalities mean bilateral deals hurt third actors. We develop the first model of collective decision making that takes externalities into account. The model computes the expected outcomes of the issues to be decided and construes four coalitions of actors on each pair of issues. Then it searches for a set of alternative expected outcomes, such that no coalition can further increase the payoffs of one of its members, either (i) without decreasing the payoffs of one of its members, or (ii) without decreasing the payoffs of any actor. The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution is used to pick a single outcome. The model is tested on data from decisions in the European Union.

In collective decision making bilateral deals can increase or decrease the likelihood of finding compromises, depending on whether such deals have externalities. Positive externalities mean third actors profit from bilateral deals, whereas negative externalities mean bilateral deals hurt third actors. We develop the first model of collective decision making that takes externalities into account. The model computes the expected outcomes of the issues to be decided and construes four coalitions of actors on each pair of issues. Then it searches for a set of alternative expected outcomes, such that no coalition can further increase the payoffs of one of its members, either (i) without decreasing the payoffs of one of its members, or (ii) without decreasing the payoffs of any actor. The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution is used to pick a single outcome. The model is tested on data from decisions in the European Union. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright 2008.]

In collective decision making bilateral deals can increase or decrease the likelihood of finding compromises, depending on whether such deals have externalities. Positive externalities mean third actors profit from bilateral deals, whereas negative externalities mean bilateral deals hurt third actors. We develop the first model of collective decision making that takes externalities into account. The model computes the expected outcomes of the issues to be decided and construes four coalitions of actors on each pair of issues. Then it searches for a set of alternative expected outcomes, such that no coalition can further increase the payoffs of one of its members, either (i) without decreasing the payoffs of one of its members, or (ii) without decreasing the payoffs of any actor. The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution is used to pick a single outcome. The model is tested on data from decisions in the European Union. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright 2008.]

In collective decision making bilateral deals can increase or decrease the likelihood of finding compromises, depending on whether such deals have externalities. Positive externalities mean third actors profit from bilateral deals, whereas negative externalities mean bilateral deals hurt third actors. We develop the first model of collective decision making that takes externalities into account. The model computes the expected outcomes of the issues to be decided and construes four coalitions of actors on each pair of issues. Then it searches for a set of alternative expected outcomes, such that no coalition can further increase the payoffs of one of its members, either (i) without decreasing the payoffs of one of its members, or (ii) without decreasing the payoffs of any actor. The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution is used to pick a single outcome. The model is tested on data from decisions in the European Union.