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Abstract
This article uses Marx's idea of commodity fetishism and subsequent theories of reification to understand the social construction of race. Race is typically defined as a socially-constituted category that is mischaracterised as a natural one. The goal of this article, in contrast, is to explain how this mischaracterisation arises. In addition to this main objective, the article uses this explanation of race to contest recent attempts that locate the 'persistent entanglement' of race and capital in their functional relationship. Finally, the article engages with related, commodity-based theories of race and racism and concludes with thoughts on what the socially-constructed category of race can teach us about the nature of value and capitalism.

Why do states fail? Why do failed states persist without collapsing into complete anarchy? This paper argues that in response to insurgency or weakened state capacity, the best way for rulers to sustain their rule may be, paradoxically, to reduce the amount of political protection they provide to clients or citizens. This behavior recognizes and helps explain a puzzling feature of failed states, namely that central government often functions even when political disorder prevails. To evaluate this argument, the paper analyzes the case of King Stephen's reign in medieval England. In response to a challenge to his succession, King Stephen dramatically decentralized government, a decision which has long puzzled historians. In addition, although far removed historically from contemporary cases, the reign of King Stephen exhibits just those characteristics of modern, failed states: insurgency, civil war, territorial fragmentation, increasing disorder and violence (even between adherents of the same side of the civil conflict), and yet the persistence of some amount of centralized rule.

Why do corporate governance law and practice differ across countries? This paper explains how wage-setting institutions influence ownership structures and investor protection laws. In particular, we identify a nonmonotonic relationship between the level of centralization in wage-bargaining institutions and the level of ownership concentration and investor protection laws. As wage setting becomes more centralized, ownership concentration within firms at first becomes more, and then less, concentrated. In addition, the socially optimal level of investor protection laws is decreasing in ownership concentration. Thus, as wage-setting institutions become more centralized, investor protection laws become less and then more protective. This explanation is consistent with the observable pattern of wage-setting structures, ownership concentration, and investor protection legislation across developed countries. While agreeing with recent research that highlights labor as an important corporate stakeholder in shaping corporate governance, a focus on bargaining structures can resolve an important puzzle this research confronts, namely, why Scandinavian countries with higher than average labor strength also have higher than average investor protection legislation.

This paper argues for the central role of risk aversion in shaping political ideology. We develop a political economy model, which makes explicit the link between risk aversion, the labor market, government policy, and ideology. Our model distinguishes the effects of risk aversion from unemployment risk and our evidence sheds light on debates over explanations for the welfare state. We test our model using a large-scale household panel with an experimentally validated measure of risk aversion. We find that risk aversion is a systematic and important determinant of political-economic attitudes and is at least as important as, if not more so, an individual's position in the income distribution.

Despite the increasing popularity of comparative work on other-regarding preferences, the implications of different models of altruism are not always fully understood. This article analyzes different theoretical approaches to altruism and explores what empirical conclusions we should draw from them, paying particular attention to models of redistribution preferences where inequality explicitly triggers other-regarding motives for redistribution. While the main contribution of this article is to clarify the conclusions of these models, we also illustrate the importance of their distinct implications by analyzing Western European data to compare among them. We draw on individual-level data from the European Social Survey fielded between September 2002 and December 2013.