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"This study offers a systematic theory of the institutional solutions to the dictator's dilemma, which arises from the incapacity to calibrate repression and concessions due to the lack of information about elite and popular discontent. Empirically, the book presents a detailed discussion of the types of information-gathering institutions created in autocracies, paying particular attention to the difference between standard mechanisms for the retrospective assessment of overt dissatisfaction and the more sophisticated channels for anticipatory evaluations of latent discontent. The book argues that the creation of institutions for the involuntary collection of information is straightforward, but that only certain regimes successfully promote the voluntary provision of information, which is essential for anticipatory governance. In ethnically heterogeneous countries, compactly settled ethnic minorities present a further obstacle for establishing a panoptical authoritarian vision. These problems notwithstanding, communist regimes are especially adept at developing sophisticated systems that mobilize the party, State Security, and internal journalism to assess levels of discontent. Methodologically, the book demonstrates that documents prepared for regime insiders are more likely to shed light on a secret activity like information collection than officially released materials. Theoretically, the book argues that although the dictator's dilemma can be solved and abundant information does extend authoritarian lifespans, information cannot ensure the indefinite survival of dictatorships. The book is based on detailed analysis of the origins and evolution of information-gathering systems in communist Bulgaria (1944-1991) and in China (1949-present), supplemented by eight case studies of information collection in the complete range of authoritarian regimes"--

This volume brings together a distinguished group of scholars working to address the puzzling durability of communist autocracies in Eastern Europe and Asia, which are the longest-lasting type of non-democratic regime to emerge after World War I. The volume conceptualizes the communist universe as consisting of the ten regimes in Eastern Europe and Mongolia that eventually collapsed in 1989–91, and the five regimes that survived the fall of the Berlin Wall: China, Vietnam, Laos, North Korea and Cuba. The essays offer a theoretical argument that emphasizes the importance of institutional adaptations as a foundation of communist resilience. In particular, the contributors focus on four adaptations: of the economy, of ideology, of the mechanisms for inclusion of potential rivals, and of the institutions of vertical and horizontal accountability. The volume argues that when regimes are no longer able to implement adaptive change, contingent leadership choices and contagion dynamics make collapse more likely

On March 14, 2008,Granmastarted publication of a new section entitledCartas a la dirección, which printed letters to the editor containing complaints, criticisms, and suggestions. The section rapidly grew in popularity and became the most closely read portion of the Friday paper. This essay engages with three related questions that have theoretical relevance beyond the specific case of Cuba. First, why would the flagship newspaper in a communist regime solicit citizen letters? Second, why would some of these letters be printed? And third, why would news media seek out responses to the letters and comment on unsatisfactory responses? This essay argues that in Cuba, as in other communist regimes, published complaint letters have two functions: the simple printing of select letters facilitates the collective letting off of steam, whereas the publication of responses to the letters by the authorities that were responsible for the infractions outlined in the initial complaint allows the regime to demonstrate that it takes popular input seriously. Therefore,Cartas a la direcciónserves as a nonelectoral mechanism of accountability.

Internal assessments of the quality of governance allow authoritarian regimes to identify and address public discontent before it threatens regime stability. This article provides a theory of how the information necessary to produce such assessments is collected, processed, and utilized to guide policy. The empirical focus of the article is on China, which is used to illustrate how information-gathering channels in communist autocracies differ from those used in electoral autocracies. The theoretical argument of the article is that petitions rather than elections function as the main channel for gathering information on popular perceptions about governance problems in communist autocracies. Information compiled through the analysis of petitions is valued because it allows the leadership to identify problems with policy implementation; to track corruption; and to monitor the level of popular trust in the regime. Although protests provide similar information, they can threaten stability. Therefore, the advantage of petitions from the perspective of the regime is that they allow for routine information transfer without compromising stability maintenance. This study is based primarily on previously unavailable archival sources and on a systematic analysis of internal-circulation (neibu) materials, which provide insight into internal government understandings of governance problems in China. Adapted from the source document.