Suchergebnisse

We construct a two‐period model of industry‐specific quid pro quo direct foreign investment (DFI) which occurs with the view to increasing the level of a future voluntary export restraint (VER). The wage and the VER are determined through Nash bargaining.We identify the conditions which generate quid pro quo DFI and examine its effects on profits, the utility of the union and welfare. In the absence of political‐economy considerations, more DFI increases the degree of endogenous protection.

The paper analyzes the phenomenon of industry‐specific direct foreign investment (DFI) which occurs with the view to defusing the threat of future protection by the host country (quid pro quo), under alternative imperfectly competitive market structures. It is established that, even in the absence of government intervention, firms in imperfectly competitive markets change the level of trade and DFI in response to future protectionist threats.

AbstractThis study proposes a simple theory of trade with endogenous firm productivity, occupational choice and income inequality. Individuals with different managerial talent choose to become entrepreneurs or workers. Entrepreneurs enhance firm productivity by investing in managerial capital. The model generates three income classes: low‐income workers facing the prospect of unemployment, middle‐income entrepreneurs managing domestic firms and high‐income entrepreneurs managing global firms. Trade liberalization policies raise unemployment and improve welfare. A reduction in per‐unit trade costs raises top incomes and generates labour‐market polarization. A reduction in fixed exporting costs has an ambiguous effect on top incomes and personal income distribution. Policies reducing labour‐market frictions or the costs of managerial‐capital acquisition create more jobs and improve welfare. The income distributional effects of labour‐market policies depend on which policy is implemented.

This paper presents a dynamic general equilibrium model of R&D-based trade between two structurally identical countries in which both innovation and skill acquisition rates are endogenously determined. Trade liberalization increases R&D investment and the rate of technological change. It also reduces the relative wage of unskilled workers and results in skill upgrading within each industry when R&D is the skilled-labor intensive activity relative to manufacturing of final products. Time-series evidence from the United States and simulation analysis support the empirical relevance of the model, which offers a North–North trade explanation for increasing wage inequality. (JEL F10, F12, F13, D32, D41)