Suchergebnisse

Recent studies have found that the European Parliament (EP) had limited substantive influence on the European Union's response to the European debt crisis. It has been argued that Parliament compensated this loss by expanding its oversight powers over executive bodies in the implementation of crisis legislation. This article systematically assesses the conditions under which the EP has been successful in increasing its account-holding powers, using new data on the accountability provisions included in economic and financial legislation put forward between 2009 and 2014. It is found that Parliament has indeed been more likely to gain oversight powers in crisis legislation. Levels of accountability are also higher in package deals and more salient legislation. The findings here provide a more nuanced picture of Parliament's inter-institutional gains and losses in recent years and give more insight into the EP's account-holding role.

ABSTRACTRecent studies have found that the European Parliament (EP) had limited substantive influence on the European Union's response to the European debt crisis. It has been argued that Parliament compensated this loss by expanding its oversight powers over executive bodies in the implementation of crisis legislation. This article systematically assesses the conditions under which theEP has been successful in increasing its account-holding powers, using new data on the accountability provisions included in economic and financial legislation put forward between 2009 and 2014. It is found that Parliament has indeed been more likely to gain oversight powers in crisis legislation.Levels of accountability are also higher in package deals and more salient legislation. The findings here provide a more nuanced picture of Parliament's inter-institutional gains and lo

AbstractIn this article, we examine the reasons behind national parliamentary engagement in the political dialogue with the Commission. We do so through a qualitative content analysis of over 200 national parliamentary opinions submitted to the Commission in recent years and interviews with national parliamentary representatives and Commission officials. We demonstrate that national parliaments' engagement with the Commission is not simply a story about venue shopping in which parliaments seek to compensate for their domestic weaknesses. Their activity is driven by a rich repertoire of institutional actions, where parliaments simultaneously act as institutional lobbyists, traditionalists and communicators. They follow three main strategies, including attempts to control their government, influencing EU legislation directly, and engaging in parliamentary branding. Direct parliamentary lobbying of the Commission does not, however, render parliaments' traditional role of controlling their government redundant as it improves domestic scrutiny methods.