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Clearly and accessibly written, Dixon provides a lively introduction to the nature and politics of the Northern Ireland conflict and of successive attempts to resolve it. The comprehensively revised 2nd edition has been updated to take account of new information and an entirely new chapter has been added on implementing the Good Friday Agreement

AbstractPresident George W. Bush required only symbolic British participation in the invasion of Iraq, so why did the Labour government deploy their maximum military effort when this was unnecessary and considerably increased the political risk to Prime Minister Tony Blair? The Chilcot Report (2016) provides considerable evidence of the military elite's role, in pursuit of their perceived organisational interests, not only lobbying but also manipulating the Labour government into a maximum military role. Shortly after the invasion, the military elite began to pursue their next war, again pressuring and manipulating the government into Britain's deployment to Helmand, Afghanistan, in 2006. While fighting wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the military elite were overstretched and in crisis, yet they successfully empowered themselves by deflecting responsibility onto the Labour government. Consequently, it is argued that the lack of democratic control over the military makes Britain particularly disposed to belligerence and fighting further unnecessary wars.

AbstractConsociationalists have traditionally embraced sectarian authoritarianism combined with a very limited form of democracy as the only democratic way of managing plural conflicts. New Generation consociationalists, by contrast, believe their theory is compatible with opposing sectarian authoritarianism in places like Iraq and the Lebanon. Traditional consociationalists have tended to claim that all power‐sharing is consociational, whereas revisionist and liberal consociationalists claim that consociationalism does not require power‐sharing and that the Iraqi Constitution of 2005 is therefore a consociational success. This paper argues that 'classic' consociationalism has constantly been revised to deflect criticism and capture apparently successful cases of conflict management. Consociationalists have deployed a 'Wonderland' definition which allows them to make such contradictory claims. Paradoxically, this definitional ambiguity and incoherence allows consociationalism to be 'all things to all people', resulting in its successful domination of the academic debate.

This article argues that Theo Farrell's book Unwinnable is a semi-official British Army history of the Afghan war and reflects the 'dominant military narrative'. The book's argument is contradictory, it suggests that NATO was 'learning, adapting and winning' the war but the politicians stabbed the military in the back by withdrawing just as a turning point had been reached in 2009-11. This was Farrell's optimistic analysis when the war was ongoing. But Unwinnable also argues that the war was unwinnable from 2001. This implies that it was the military elite that blundered because of their enthusiasm for the escalation of Britain's involvement in an unwinnable and, therefore, futile war. Unwinnable tries to rescue 'counterinsurgency' by trying to claim, implausibly, that it was only properly implement during 2009-11. Farrell champions the empowerment of the military elite and is unconcerned that the politicians struggled to exert democratic control over the military.

AbstractThe 'Dominant Military Narrative' (DMN) on the Iraq and Afghan wars defends the effectiveness of the British military and its use of force by deflecting responsibility for failure onto the politicians and 'Whitehall'. The politicians are blamed for over-stretching the military by fighting two wars, resulting in a shortage of equipment, inadequate troop numbers and without a clear 'Strategic Narrative'. This article critiques the DMN and provides evidence to suggest that it was the military elite that sought maximum involvement in the Iraq and Afghan wars. The problem is that the military has too much rather than too little power to shape policy.