Democracy and the peaceful settlement of international conflict
In: FIB papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, 93,301
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In: FIB papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, 93,301
World Affairs Online
In: FIB papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, 92,304
World Affairs Online
In: PS: political science & politics, Band 38, Heft 3, S. 433-433
Conrad Joyner, an astute observer, gifted teacher, and effective
practitioner of the art of politics, passed away February 8, 2005,
in Tucson, Arizona. Born October 21, 1931, he graduated from Earlham
College in 1953 and received his Ph.D. from the University of
Florida in 1957. He taught political science at West Virginia
University and the University of Southwestern Louisiana before
arriving at the University of Arizona in 1961 for what would turn
out to be a long and colorful career. He retired from the University
of Arizona in 1992.
In: PS: political science & politics, Band 38, Heft 3, S. 433
ISSN: 0030-8269, 1049-0965
In: International studies review, Band 5, Heft 3, S. 364-366
ISSN: 1468-2486
In: International studies review, Band 5, Heft 3, S. 364-366
ISSN: 1521-9488
In: American political science review, Band 90, Heft 3, S. 703-704
ISSN: 1537-5943
In: International organization, Band 50, S. 653-681
ISSN: 0020-8183
Examines effectiveness of seven different strategies used to manage conflict in nearly 700 interstate security disputes, 1945-84. Strategies: public appeals, communication, mediation, observation, intervention, humanitarian aid, and adjudication; parties include the UN and other international organizations, individual or coalitions of states, ad hoc commissions, and individuals or groups with international standing.
In: International organization, Band 50, Heft 4, S. 653-679
ISSN: 0020-8183
Obwohl Vermittler sich einer ganzen Reihe von Arten des Konfliktmanagements bedienen, haben Wissenschaftler nur einige davon bisher zu bewerten versucht. Eine weitere vollständig empirische Analyse von Funktionen und Verfahrensweisen Dritter im interrnationalen Krisenmanagement kommt zum Ergebnis, daß vor allem zwei Ansätze als besonders effizient zu bezeichnen sind: die unmittelbare Vermittlerrolleund der Versuch, bestehende Kommuniationslinien zwischen den Konfliktparteien zu erhalten und neue zu eröffnen. Dabei ist es nötig, Konflikte als dynamischen evolutionären Prozeß zu begreifen, der aus verschiedenen Phasen besteht, die in ihrer Abfolge wiederum eine spezifische Ausgestaltung von Konfliktmanagementmethoden Dritter bewirken. Diese Methoden haben sich im Kalten Krieg bewährt. Sie werden im neuen post-bipolaren Umfeld möglicherweise zu ähnlichen Erfolgen führen. (SWP-zss)
World Affairs Online
In: International organization, Band 50, Heft 4, S. 653-681
ISSN: 1531-5088
Although agents employ a wide range of conflict management techniques in practice, scholars have evaluated only a few of these. A more complete empirical analysis of the spectrum of third-party procedures used to manage international crises reveals that two techniques in particular are most effective: mediation efforts and third-party activities to open or maintain lines of communication. The endpoints of preventing escalation and promoting peaceful settlement take into account the notion of conflict as a dynamic evolutionary process, consisting of several phases, which in turn affect the outcome of third-party management. Crisis management methods that have proved successful in a bipolar world may be similarly successful in the post-cold war environment, an issue future work must address.
In: American political science review, Band 89, Heft 1, S. 253-254
ISSN: 1537-5943
In: American political science review, Band 88, Heft 1, S. 14-32
ISSN: 1537-5943
The research reported here develops an explanation for the often-noted absence of international war between democratic states. This explanation is derived from a theoretical rationale centered on universal democratic norms for reconciling competing values and interests. I argue that democratic states locked in disputes are better equipped than others with the means for diffusing conflict situations at an early stage before they have an opportunity to escalate to military violence. Not only is this explanatory logic consistent with the published findings on democracy and war, but it also entails the novel empirical proposition that disputes between democracies are more amenable than are other disputes to peaceful settlements, the hypothesis I examine here. Analyses of contemporary interstate disputes reveal that even when potentially confounding factors are controlled, democratic opponents are significantly more likely to reach peaceful settlements than other types of disputants.
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 38, Heft 2, S. 329-331
ISSN: 0020-8833, 1079-1760
In: American political science review, Band 88, Heft 1, S. 14-32
ISSN: 0003-0554
Demokratisch organisierte Staaten stoßen nicht seltener konflikthaft mit den Interessen anderer Staaten zusammen als anders verfaßte politische Systeme. Jedoch: Die Erfahrung zeigt, daß demokratisch organisierte Systeme sich fast nie gewaltsam begegnen. Ein größerer Krieg zwischen Demokratien ist nicht festzustellen. Mit Hilfe der von Alker und Sherman 1986 publizierten Daten über 250 zwischenstaatliche Sicherheitsverhandlungen von 1945 bis 1979 versucht Dixon seine Hypothese zu testen, daß demokratisch verfaßte Staaten infolge ihrer Fähigkeit, Konflikte in begrenzter Form auszutragen, auch in der Lage sind, entsprechend zwischenstaatliche Konflikte letztlich friedlich zu lösen. Ein erster Daten- und Indikatoren-begrenzter empirischer Test bestätigt die These. Dieses Resultat gibt Anlaß zu weiterer Forschung. (AuD-Nar)
World Affairs Online
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 37, Heft 1, S. 42-68
ISSN: 1552-8766
The research reported here extends investigation of the democracy-war hypothesis by focusing on the norms of dispute resolution integral to the democratic process. If we extend these norms to the international arena, then it becomes reasonable to expect democratic states to adopt compromise solutions to international problems. One implication of this logic is that democracies are likely to be more amenable than others to efforts of third parties to resolve or ameliorate interstate disputes. This hypothesis is examined in the present study. A sample of strictly interstate disputes acquired from the Alker-Sherman disaggregated conflict set provide the basis for this inquiry. Democracy is assessed for each disputant party with the composite index from the Polity II data collection. In order to control for extraneous effects on the probability of management, the author develops a baseline model consisting of prior management activity, the costs of conflict, and the power of the disputants. Because the dependent variable in this analysis is a binary indicator, the author employs probit regression to estimate the effects of democracy while partialling out the controls. The empirical results show that democracy does carry the systematic positive influence on the probability of conflict management expected of it.