In Iraq, the United States is facing its most challenging nation-building project since the 1940s. The authors draw lessons from seven case studies--Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan--then apply these to the Iraq case. The results suggest that nation-building will be difficult but possible. Success will, however, require investing sufficient financial, military, and political resources--and time
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China could become the most powerful adversary the United States has ever faced. How might a war with China begin, how might it proceed, how might it end, and how might it be prevented? (Survival / SWP)
The West has focused on how to prevent Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons, or what to do after it does. What we lack is a framework for dealing with Iran before, while and after it crosses the threshold. (Survival / SWP)
It is unlikely that American officials will again face decisions exactly like those required of the Coalition Provisional Authority in spring 2003. Formal occupations had largely fallen out of favour by the second half of the twentieth century, and the CPA experience is not likely to be replicated. But it is certain that the international community will again find itself assisting societies emerging from conflict to build an enduring peace and establish a representative government. Learning how to best prepare for such a challenge is the key to more-successful future operations. In this regard, the occupation of Iraq provides an object lesson of the costs and consequences of attempting nation building without adequate preparation. (Survival / SWP)
Despite continuing difficulties, European institutions for the management of civil-military operations have developed to the stage where more than brief, tentative experiments can be embarked upon with some confidence. The greatest challenges faced by the EU are not in the efficacious employment of armed force, but rather in formulating and applying the broader political-military strategy which must underlie it. Outside of Europe, the most efficient way for European governments to contribute to international peace operations will be to assign national contingents directly to UN peacekeeping missions. It is, thus, time for European governments, militaries and populations to get over the trauma of Srebrenica and related UN failures in the Balkans in the early 1990s, take on board the subsequent improvement in the UN's performance, and begin once again to do their share in manning, as they are already doing in paying for, these efforts. (Survival / SWP)