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This article extensively reviews and evaluates international regime theory and the importance of noncompliance. It uses international foreign aid, specifically official development assistance (ODA), to test regime theory and compliance levels. Many scholars have argued that states tend to comply fully with regime tenets based upon rationality, common values, and other reasons. TheODAcase study presents a strong argument against past claims, as it demonstrates that regimes can have large‐scale violations from the beginning and over the long term. This study measures the limits and effectiveness of regime theory and develops a more comprehensive and current perspective. I propose a new definition of international regimes and offer a concise description of the purposes and characteristics of regimes. This is the first major study emphasizing noncompliance as a key theoretical and real‐world issue. It hopes to encourage the continued search to improve understanding of international regimes and their operations.Related ArticlesNisley,Thomas.2013. "."Politics & Policy41():536‐562.http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/polp.12027/abstractHarris,Paul G.2008. "."Politics & Policy36():914‐943.http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2008.00145.x/abstractDannehl,Charles R.andRogerRose.1999. "."Southeastern Political Review27():491‐524.http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.1999.tb00547.x/abstract

The current situation in Iran bodes poorly for the US. A more hostile and skeptical Iraqi government is in place, which presumably will not strongly support US interests in the region. Baghdad is unlikely to allow US military forces to return if needed for a possible attack against Iran and is now more supportive of Tehran and Iranian interests in the region. This state of affairs is the culmination of nearly a decade of Washington's failures and lost opportunities. Though the claimed objectives and results were commendable, the actual conduct of the war and its consequences were sub-par. These mistakes began before the outbreak of hostilities with a minimalist military strategy, followed by the self-restrained operations during the occupation and surge phases, and finally by the embarrassingly inept political behavior before and after the 2010 Iraqi elections. These missteps were all indicative of a major disconnect between US leaders' once very powerful and aggressive military doctrine and a new breed of timid and inexperienced leaders forwarding incoherent policies. Adapted from the source document.