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Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- LIVING WITH CHINA -- Introduction -- 1. China's Rise: Getting Its House in Order -- 2. China as a Global Innovator? -- 3. Creating a Leading Financial System: A Work in Progress -- 4. China Invests Abroad: A New Era of Chinese Capital -- 5. The Belt and Road Initiative: China Reaches Out -- 6. Living with China: Canada Finds Its Way -- Acknowledgments -- Notes -- Index

1. Human capital formation and growth : microeconomic dimensions / Wendy Dobson and Muhammad Umar Boodoo -- 2. The skills of "tigers" / Emmanuel Jimenez and Elizabeth M. King -- 3. Investment in human capital accumulation and growth : analyzing policy effectiveness / Been-Lon Chen -- 4. Human capital in Japan's demographic transition : implications for other Asian countries / Naohiro Yashiro -- 5. Higher education financing and inequality : the critical role of student loan scheme design : illustrations from Indonesia, Vietnam and Thailand / Bruce Chapman -- 6. The changing demand for human capital at China's new stage of development / Cai Fang and Du Yang -- 7. Human capital and Indonesia's economic development / Umbu Reku Raya and Daniel Suryadarma -- 8. Human capital development and economic growth in Malaysia and Thailand : stuck in the middle? / Emmanuel Jimenez, Vy T. Nguyen and Harry Anthony Patrinos -- 9. Knowledge diffusion through good knowledge governance : the case of Singapore's marine cluster / Thomas Menkhoff and Hans-Dieter Evers -- 10. The quest for foreign skills : international recruitment strategies in the Asia-Pacific region / Kang Qing Zhang. [et al.] -- 11. Regional cooperation in education : issues for developing countries in the Asia-Pacific region / Josef T. Yap.

"Until the global financial crisis, China was thought to be decades away from overtaking the United States as the world's largest economy. But while the US skirted economic stagnation, China was able to successfully navigate the crisis, and its growth continues to accelerate. Has the time arrived to re-evaluate our assumptions about the current world order? Will China openly contest the United States' status, unchallenged since the Second World War, as a world leader? Will conflict be inevitable, or would its costs be unthinkable in a globalized world economy?"--Front flap

Why are they growing so fast? -- Developing human capital -- Finance: sharper scissors required -- From latecomers to technology titans? -- Sprints, spurts, and stumbling blocks -- As gravity shifts -- The new Asian powerhouses and the world economy in 2030

As Canada becomes more of a destination for Chinese outward foreign direct investment (FDI), Canada's review policies should incorporate international best practice based on an accurate understanding of the evolving regimes in China governing foreign direct investment FDI and its state-owned enterprises (which account for two-thirds of China's outward investment). This article focuses primarily on Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in both an international and a Chinese context. What is driving their outward investments and those in Canada in particular? Does Canada's policy response accurately account for the evolving regimes in China? This article concludes that China's regimes governing FDI and SOEs are becoming more transparent and market oriented whereas Canada's policies, until late in 2016, have remained opaque and interventionist. However, the investment hub proposal made recently portends some warming and greater transparency.

In December 2012, after Ottawa approved the takeover of Canada's Nexen by the state-owned Chinese oil giant, CNOOC Ltd., Prime Minister Stephen Harper offered an explanation to clarify the government's evolving position on takeovers from foreign state-owned enterprises. But rather than clarifying, the government succeeded instead in adding further ambiguity to an already opaque approvals process. Such takeovers would face "strengthened scrutiny" over the extent and nature of the foreign government's corporate control, he said, and would only be permitted in "exceptional circumstance." In other words, an approvals process already contingent on subjective judgment — thanks to the lack of transparency inherent in the pivotal "net-benefits test," and the onus it puts on the bidder to prove itself a worthy buyer — would now involve even more layers of subjective judgment. This is particularly ironic given that, as Canada's foreign-investment rules become cloudier and more prone to government interference, in China itself, regimes governing foreign direct investment (FDI) and state-owned enterprises are becoming increasingly transparent and market-oriented. The government's enhanced stringency may be a response to popular fears that China is "buying up" Canadian assets. Such fears are, for the time being at least, overblown: China's global outward FDI stocks are still lower than Canada's, and a fraction of those held by the U.S., the U.K. and Germany — although China will undoubtedly continue to expand its foreign investment portfolio. But China's investment strategies are little different these days than those of western investors: China's government has planned to reduce its role in commercial decision-making, and seems more comfortable with allowing both nationalized and (increasingly) private businesses to pursue growth based on maximizing shareholder value, rather than enhancing national security. Moreover, modern governance practices are now gradually being introduced to the Chinese corporate world, with boards becoming more independent from the state, and improved transparency in accounting and auditing practices. Whatever worries Canadians may have about Chinese state-owned enterprises investing in Canada, raising investment barriers is a blunt and flawed solution. Rather than block Chinese capital, Canadian regulators should monitor the behaviour of all firms to ensure standards are met for safety, environment, labour laws, transparency and national security. Closing off Canadian companies to Chinese bidders can hurt Canada's economy. It could increase risk for, and discourage, private-equity investors who often see foreign takeovers as a possible exit strategy, while potentially sheltering poorly managed firms from takeovers, dragging down our economic efficiency. Furthermore, Canada may well need access to Chinese capital in order for the oilsands to reach their full economic potential. The Canadian Energy Research Institute estimates that, to achieve full development, the oilsands will require $100 billion in capital investment to 2019. Currently, Chinese investment controls roughly two per cent of Canada's total FDI stocks. If that proportion remained constant, China could — based on the projected scale of its FDI by 2020 — provide 40 per cent of the estimated funding required to optimally develop the oilsands. If Canadian markets prove hostile, Chinese capital will, of course, find assets elsewhere. But as long as regulators enforce practices that safeguard Canadian interests, there is no reason for Canada to impede Chinese investment. Indeed, there is good reason to encourage it.