Suchergebnisse
Filter
15 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
SSRN
How Clear Is "Clear" Enough?
In: U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 720
SSRN
Working paper
Can a Statute Have More Than One Meaning?
In: New York University Law Review, Band 94
SSRN
SSRN
The Scrivener's Error
In: Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 110, Pg. 811, 2016
SSRN
Go Big or Go Home: The Constitutionality of Recess Appointments Following Pro Forma Sessions of the Senate
In: Administrative Law Review, Band 65, Heft 4
SSRN
Mead as (Mostly) Moot: Predictive Interpretation in Administrative Law
In: 36 Cardozo L. Rev. 499 (2014)
SSRN
The Scrivener's Error
It is widely accepted that courts may correct legislative drafting mistakes, i.e., so-called scrivener's errors, if and only if such mistakes are "absolutely clear." The rationale is that if a court were to recognize a less clear error, it might be "rewriting" the statute rather than correcting a technical mistake. This Article argues that the standard is much too strict. The current rationale ignores that courts can "rewrite," i.e., misinterpret, a statute both by recognizing an error and by failing to do so. Accordingly, because the current doctrine is designed to protect against one type of mistake (false positives) but not the other (false negatives), it systematically underrecognizes errors and results in systematic misinterpretation of the law. Using the example of King v. Burwell, this Article shows that the overly strict scrivener's error doctrine threatens dramatic real-world harm. In King, opponents of the Affordable Care Act exploited a likely, but less than absolutely clear, scrivener's error to nearly bring down the most significant health reform legislation of the past half century. More still, the challenge only failed because six Justices were willing to accept an implausible textual argument. Furthermore, King is far from sui generis. Recent challenges to ambitious executive branch action, for example, try to take similar advantage of the current doctrine.
BASE
We Are Already Defying the Supreme Court
In: Dissent: a quarterly of politics and culture, Band 70, Heft 4, S. 108-116
ISSN: 1946-0910
ABSTRACT: The idea of disregarding the U.S. Supreme Court—simply ignoring its decisions—has become a flash point. "Americans will not tolerate defiance of the institution and the rule of law," remarked one conservative law professor, irate about the possibility that President Joe Biden or other political officials might engage in such behavior. Who has defied the Supreme Court in the past? If leading examples include Andrew Jackson the ethnic cleansing populist or George Wallace the Southern segregationist, the answer has to be: no one good.
After Courts: Democratizing Statutory Law
In: Michigan Law Review, Forthcoming
SSRN
We Are Already Defying the Supreme Court
In: Dissent: a quarterly of politics and culture, Band 71, Heft 1, S. 108-116
ISSN: 1946-0910
ABSTRACT: The idea of disregarding the U.S. Supreme Court—simply ignoring its decisions—has become a flash point. "Americans will not tolerate defiance of the institution and the rule of law," remarked one conservative law professor, irate about the possibility that President Joe Biden or other political officials might engage in such behavior. Who has defied the Supreme Court in the past? If leading examples include Andrew Jackson the ethnic cleansing populist or George Wallace the Southern segregationist, the answer has to be: no one good.
SSRN
SSRN
SSRN
The (Not So) Plain Meaning Rule
In: 84 University of Chicago Law Review 539 (2017)
SSRN