Suchergebnisse

Concepts referring to sectoral policy subsystems are abundant. However, few efforts are made to clarify the frequently used term 'policy field'. This paper is determined to move this notion into a more analytical direction. The central aim is to substantiate the dimensions of policy fields, their presumed effects on policy actors, and to provide an explanatory framework for stability or change. Therefore, concepts such as iron triangles and policy networks are reconsidered in order to specify the essential dimensions of policy fields. Policy fields emerge if a group of strategic actors who face a new problem generate a semi-autonomous sphere of interaction. The policy field is completed if a specific institutional setting and a set of policy ideas are added. This process is based on functional differentiation and politicization. Finally, a comparison of science, agricultural, and health policy is used to illustrate how stability and change of policy fields could be explained. Especially the perforation of policy boundaries, which allows external interests to gain influence, and a destabilization of previously homogeneous coalitions prove to be crucial variables. Adapted from the source document.

It has been accepted for a long time that ministries use external support during the lawmaking process. When the Ministry of Economics delegated the drafting of an entire bill to a private law firm, concerns about governmental capacity and an intransparent route of access for special interests have been raised. The empirical analysis of delegated law drafting and temporary employment of experts, seconded from business firms and interest groups to ministries, shows that both phenomena remain small in scale and therefore of limited impact. By looking at the reasons why there is a "law drafting by contract" at all, it is revealed that not all German ministries are sufficiently staffed with qualified personnel to deal with more complex and innovative subjects of legislation. Given the high expectations which are addressed at government sovereignty during the lawmaking process, this appears as an unresolved problem of policy-making in the German political system. Adapted from the source document.

Although the delegation of government functions to non-majoritarian bodies such as independent agencies has accelerated throughout the OECD, Germany has followed a different path so far. In particular, administration agencies have only rarely been granted autonomy from direct political control. The main argument is that a genetic code, inherent to the system of government institutions, has routinely auto-piloted choices that involved the design & control of agencies away from principal-agent-like considerations. The elements of this genetic code are outlined & the likelihood of their future persistence is assessed. Even if the pressure to create new agencies at arms length from government has increased, there are still strong incentives to keep them in a subordinate position. Adapted from the source document.