Suchergebnisse

AbstractHow do policies in international organizations reflect the preferences of powerful institutional stakeholders? Using an underutilized data set on the conditions associated with World Bank loans, we find that borrower countries that vote with the United States at the United Nations are required to enact fewer domestic policy reforms, and on fewer and softer issue areas. Though U.S. preferences permeate World Bank decision making, we do not find evidence that borrower countries trade favors in exchange for active U.S. intervention on their behalf. Instead, we propose that U.S. influence operates indirectly when World Bank staff—consciously or unconsciously—design programs that are compatible with U.S. preferences. Our study provides novel evidence of World Bank conditionality and shows that politicized policies can result even from autonomous bureaucracies.

Cost-effective approaches to mitigating climate change depend on advances in clean energy technologies, such as solar and wind power. Given increased technology innovation in developing countries, led by China, we focus our attention on global patterns of renewable energy innovation. Utilizing highly valuable international patents as our indicator of innovation, we examine the economic and political determinants of energy innovation in 74 countries across the world, 1990-2009. We find that high oil prices and domestic renewable electricity generation capacity both increase innovation. There is no effect for corruption, but our findings suggest that democratic institutions may contribute to innovation. The main implication of our work for policymakers is that increasing renewable electricity capacity in developing countries could significantly contribute to global innovation in renewable energy.