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AbstractEconomic sanctions, and the suspension of budget support in particular, are supposed to pressure target governments into complying with sanction demands by putting spending commitments at risk. In this article we argue that this is too simplistic since governments have more fiscal levers at their disposal. The case of Burundi illustrates this argument. Following Burundi's 2015 political crisis, donors imposed economic sanctions on the country and suspended all budget support to the national government. Using monthly data on the government's fiscal position between 2005 and 2017, we present evidence from a time series analysis showing that aid does not affect spending and that aid shortfalls are instead systematically compensated with domestic borrowing. It appears that the Burundian government has been able to withstand the sanctions and to fulfil its spending commitments by substituting domestic debt for aid. Thus, the economic costs of sanctions do not necessarily translate directly into political costs but are mitigated by the government's fiscal response.

Economic sanctions, and the suspension of budget support in particular, are supposed to pressure target governments to comply with donors' demands by putting spending commitments at risk. We argue that this is too simplistic since governments have more fiscal levers at their disposal. The case of Burundi illustrates this argument. Following Burundi's 2015 political crisis, donors imposed economic sanctions on the country and suspended all budget support to the national government. Using monthly data on the government's fiscal position between 2005 and 2017, we present evidence from a time series analysis showing that aid does not affect spending and that aid shortfalls are instead systematically compensated with domestic borrowing. It appears that the Burundian government has been able to withstand the sanctions and to fulfill its spending commitments by substituting domestic debt for aid. Thus, the economic costs of sanctions do not necessarily translate directly into political costs but are mitigated by the government's fiscal response.

Intro -- Front Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- Foreword -- Acknowledgments -- About the Authors -- Abbreviations -- Chapter 1. Introduction -- Tax Compliance: A Persistent Challenge -- Traditional Approaches to Tax Reform -- Toward a Holistic Tax Reform Framework: Integrating Tax Morale and Trust -- Organization of This Report -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 2. Direct Taxes on Individuals and Households -- The Tax Compliance Challenge -- Barriers to Reform -- Reform Progress-and Future Options -- Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 3. Taxing High-Net-Worth Individuals -- The Tax Compliance Challenge -- Barriers to Reform -- Reform Progress-and Future Options -- Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 4. Taxing Corporate Income -- The Tax Compliance Challenge -- Barriers to Reform -- Reform Progress-and Future Options -- Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 5. Taxing SMEs -- The Tax Compliance Challenge -- Barriers to Reform -- Reform Progress-and Future Options -- Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 6. Taxing at the Local Level -- The Tax Compliance Challenge -- Barriers to Reform -- Reform Progress-and Future Options -- Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 7. The Tax and Technology Challenge -- The Tax and Technology Challenge -- Barriers to Reform -- Reform Progress-and Future Options -- Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 8. Conclusion -- A Framework for Tax Reform -- Navigating the Politics of Reform -- Building Trust to Underpin Successful Reform -- Tailoring Reform to Local Contexts: Binding Constraints Analysis -- Conclusion -- Note -- References -- Boxes -- Figures -- Tables -- Back Cover.

Recent decades have seen important progress in strengthening country tax systems. Yet many areas of reform have remained stubbornly resistant to major improvements. Overall, revenue collection still falls short of that needed for effective governance and service delivery. Tax collection is too often riddled with high rates of evasion among large corporations and the rich and by disproportionate, though often hidden, burdens on lower-income groups. As countries around the world deal with the large debt burdens induced by COVID-19, an in-depth look at how to strengthen tax systems is especially timely. Innovations in Tax Compliance: Building Trust, Navigating Politics, and Tailoring Reform takes a fresh look at tax reform. The authors draw on recent research and experience for their new conceptual framework to guide more effective approaches to reform. Building on the achievements of recent decades, they argue for a greater emphasis on the overlapping goals of building trust, navigating political resistance, and tailoring reform to unique local contexts—an emphasis achieved by identifying the most binding constraints on reform. This focus not only can lead to greater compliance, a fairer system, and higher revenues, but also can contribute to building state capacity, sustained political support for further reforms, and a stronger fiscal contract between citizens and governments.

This paper presents a conceptual framework for developing more effective approaches to tax reform and compliance. The framework proposes that by combining complementary investments in enforcement, facilitation, and trust, reformers can not only strengthen enforced compliance but can also (a) encourage quasi-voluntary compliance, (b) generate sustainable political support for reform, and (c) create conditions that are more conducive to the construction of stronger fiscal contracts. A key challenge for governments lies in finding the right combination of these three measures -- enforcement, facilitation, and trust—to achieve revenue and broader development goals. The framework proposes greater reliance on locally grounded binding constraints analysis, coupled with careful attention to understanding politics and the drivers of trust in particular contexts, to guide analysis of how best different investments may be combined, prioritized, or sequenced. This framework can help policy makers to think about the right combination of strategies in specific contexts, and thus to allocate resources most effectively.