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AbstractSome scholars have judged the Trump presidency to be an ineffective failure by applying theories of presidential power derived from the research of Richard Neustadt, who emphasized the need for presidents to master the task of bargaining with other stakeholders in the American political system to overcome what he saw as the limited potency of unilateral action. Such an approach, however, fails to account for two important considerations: (1) whether Trump's goals in office were similar to those of other presidents, and (2) whether the Trump presidency was instead organized around the principles of unitary executive theory, an increasingly popular conception of the presidency in conservative intellectual circles. Viewing the Trump presidency through this alternative lens emphasizes its successes in gaining political control over elements of the executive branch bureaucracy and resisting institutional checks by Congress, raising serious questions about whether Trump was indeed often effective in realizing his goals—and whether future presidents will follow in the same path.

"Based on an original, comprehensive dataset of every congressional reference to the commander-in-chief clause from the Founding through 1917, this study systematically analyzes the authority that members of Congress ascribe to the president as commander in chief, and the boundaries that they put around that authority. Commander in Chief: Partisanship, Nationalism, and the Reconstruction of Congressional War Powers shows that for more than a century, members of Congress defined the commander in chief's authority narrowly, as similar to that of any high-ranking military officer. But in a wave of nationalism during the Spanish American War, members of Congress began to argue that Congress owed deference to the commander in chief. Members of Congress also tended, throughout the history of the republic, to argue that a copartisan's presidential war powers should be defined broadly, while those of a president in the other party should be defined narrowly. Together, these two dynamics suggest that the conditions for presidentially dominated modern constitutional war powers were set at the turn of the twentieth century, far earlier than is often acknowledged"--

Abstract
Seth Masket's new book, Learning
From
Loss: The Democrats 2016–2020 (Cambridge University Press, 2020) asks how the modern Democratic party absorbed Hillary Clinton's 2016 defeat and responded to it while preparing to nominate its candidate in 2020. Masket makes a persuasive case that the Democratic party managed its coalition and made strategic adaptations to its rules to help it win the 2020 election. In particular, he shows how competing narratives about Hillary Clinton's 2016 loss to Donald Trump played an important role in activists' decision making in the lead-up to 2020.

Research suggests that endorsements should affect outcomes in low-information elections such as primaries, but that hypothesis has not yet been tested empirically. Based on a survey of 2002 congressional campaigns, this article describes the universe of individuals and groups that offer endorsements to primary candidates and analyzes their effects on primary election results. It finds that a primary candidate's share of the partisan endorsements issued in the race significantly affects the candidate's vote share, even controlling for campaign funds and candidate quality. Implications for theories of candidate emergence and success are discussed.

This paper considers whether President Obama won a mandate during the 2008 election, and whether he is experiencing the expected honeymoon with the press, public, and Congress in 2009. It finds that the electorate did instruct him to "fix" the economy, but that given his relatively narrow victory and the electorate's indecisive rejection of conservative principles, the limited mandate he won is not necessarily going to help him govern. This paper also argues that he is experiencing a normal first-year honeymoon with the press and public, while his partisan advantage in Congress overwhelms any Republican reluctance to be deferential to him. Between the limited mandate, high public approval ratings, and large partisan majorities in Congress, prospects for his first year in office look fairly good.