From Arrow's Theorem to 'Dark Matter'
In: British journal of political science, Band 46, Heft 1, S. 1
ISSN: 0007-1234
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In: British journal of political science, Band 46, Heft 1, S. 1
ISSN: 0007-1234
In: Springer eBook Collection
A surprise is how the complexities of voting theory can be explained and resolved with the comfortable geometry of our three-dimensional world. This book is directed toward students and others wishing to learn about voting, experts will discover previously unpublished results. As an example, a new profile decomposition quickly resolves two centuries old controversies of Condorcet and Borda, demonstrates, that the rankings of pairwise and other methods differ because they rely on different information, casts series doubt on the reliability of a Condorcet winner as a standard for the field, makes the famous Arrow`s Theorem predictable, and simplifies the construction of examples. The geometry unifies seemingly disparate topics as manipulation, monotonicity, and even the apportionment issues of the US Supreme Court
Basic Geometry of Voting -- Copyright -- PREFACE -- CONTENTS -- CHAPTER I FROM AN ELECTION FABLE TO ELECTION PROCEDURES -- CHAPTER II GEOMETRY FOR POSITIONAL AND PAIRWISE VOTING -- CHAPTER III THE PROBLEM WITH CONDORCET -- CHAPTER IV POSITIONAL VOTING AND THE BC -- CHAPTER V OTHER VOTING ISSUES -- NOTES -- REFERENCES -- INDEX.
In: Studies in Economic Theory Series v.3
In: Theory and decision: an international journal for multidisciplinary advances in decision science
ISSN: 1573-7187
AbstractFeatures of graphs that hinder finding closed paths with particular properties, as represented by the Traveling Salesperson Problem—TSP, are identified for three classes of graphs. Removing these terms leads to a companion graph with identical closed path properties that is easier to analyze. A surprise is that these troubling graph factors are precisely what is needed to analyze certain voting methods, while the companion graph's terms are what cause voting theory complexities as manifested by Arrow's Theorem. This means that the seemingly separate goals of analyzing closed paths in graphs and analyzing voting methods are complementary: components of data terms that assist in one of these areas are the source of troubles in the other. Consequences for standard decision methods are in Sects. 2.5, 3.7 and the companion paper (Saari in Theory Decis 91(3):377–402, 2021). The emphasis here is on paths in graphs; incomplete graphs are similarly handled.
In: Public choice, Band 179, Heft 1-2, S. 133-144
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: British journal of political science, Band 46, Heft 1, S. 1-9
ISSN: 1469-2112
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and Sen's Minimal Liberalism example impose 'impossibility' roadblocks on progress. A reinterpretation explained in this article exposes what causes these negative conclusions, which permits the development of positive resolutions that retain the spirit of Arrow's and Sen's assumptions. What precipitates difficulties is surprisingly common, and it affects most disciplines. This insight identifies how to analyze other puzzles such as conflicting laws or controversies over voting rules. An unexpected bonus is that this social science issue defines a research agenda to address the 'dark matter' mystery confronting astronomers.
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 69, S. 1-11
In: Power, Voting, and Voting Power: 30 Years After, S. 615-644
In: Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, S. 897-945
In: American political science review, Band 95, Heft 2, S. 415-433
ISSN: 1537-5943
We develop a geometric approach to identify all possible profiles that support specified votes for separate initiatives or for a bundled bill. This disaggregation allows us to compute the likelihood of different scenarios describing how voters split over the alternatives and to offer new interpretations for pairwise voting. The source of the problems—an unanticipated loss of available information—also explains a variety of other phenomena, such as Simpson's paradox (a statistical paradox in which the behavior of the "parts" disagrees with that of the "whole") and Arrow's theorem from social choice.
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Working paper
In: Basic Geometry of Voting, S. 29-44
In: Basic Geometry of Voting, S. 45-100