Redistributive politics under ambiguity
In: Social choice and welfare, Band 62, Heft 3, S. 583-607
ISSN: 1432-217X
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In: Social choice and welfare, Band 62, Heft 3, S. 583-607
ISSN: 1432-217X
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In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 52, Heft 4, S. 945-994
ISSN: 1756-2171
AbstractI develop a structural model of urban travel to estimate long‐run gasoline price elasticities. I model the demand for transportation services using a dynamic discrete‐choice model with switching costs and estimate it using a panel dataset with public market‐level data on automobile and public transit use in Chicago. Long‐run own‐ (automobile) and cross‐ (transit) price elasticities are substantially more elastic than short‐run elasticities. Elasticity estimates from static and myopic models are downward biased. I use the estimated model to evaluate the response to several counterfactual policies. A gasoline tax is less regressive after accounting for the long‐run substitution behavior.
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In: The Antitrust bulletin: the journal of American and foreign antitrust and trade regulation, Band 68, Heft 1, S. 117-136
ISSN: 1930-7969
In 2020, an antitrust lawsuit was filed against the Pork Integrators alleging a §1 Sherman Act violation. At the center of the Lawsuit, there is an alleged exchange of atomistic information about the Pork integrators' operations using Agri Stats, Inc. as a clearinghouse. We use the Supreme Court benchmark in American Column & Lumber to discuss two questions that arise from the Lawsuit. The first is whether the association of Pork Integrators and Agri Stats, Inc., resulted in the restraint of interstate commerce, the main specific issue at stake in the pork Lawsuit. The second is whether information-exchange agreements using clearinghouses like Agri Stats, Inc., lessen competition and offend U.S. antitrust law, a more general issue beyond the pork Lawsuit. We find that there appears to be ample evidence in the Lawsuit to merit prosecution regarding both trade restraints and information-sharing agreements. We conclude by discussing the role of the Agencies in setting the standards in information-exchange agreements.
In: The journal of human resources, Band 57, Heft 6, S. 1915-1945
ISSN: 1548-8004
In: CESifo Working Paper No. 8725
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In: The economic history review, Band 74, Heft 3, S. 721-753
ISSN: 1468-0289
AbstractFor centuries, irrigation communities in south‐eastern Spain were socially stable and economically efficient. In this article, we show how these self‐governing institutions persisted by resolving conflicts over scarce resources with flexible punishment for water theft. We argue that variable penalties for violating irrigation rules provided social insurance to farmers during droughts. We develop a dynamic model in which judges trade off crime deterrence and social insurance, and test its predictions using a novel dataset on water theft in the self‐governed irrigation community of Mula, Spain, from 1851 to 1948. For the same offence, we show that recidivists were punished more harshly than first‐time offenders. When the defendant was wealthy, as indicated by the honorific title don, or the victim was poor, judgements were stricter.
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