Over-investment in marriage-specific capital
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 67, S. 34-43
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In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 67, S. 34-43
In: Revue économique, Band 58, Heft 3, S. 535
ISSN: 1950-6694
In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 117, Heft 516, S. 94-119
ISSN: 1468-0297
In: The Canadian journal of economics: the journal of the Canadian Economics Association = Revue canadienne d'économique, Band 39, Heft 1, S. 124-144
ISSN: 1540-5982
Abstract. In this paper, we present a collective model of household demand based on Pareto‐efficiency. In addition, we suppose that (a) each household member is egoistic and consumption is purely private, (b) there is a set of distribution factors and (c) there is one exclusive good. Then we derive the testable restrictions that are implied by this theoretical setting and show how welfare comparisons at the individual level can be performed. JEL classification: D11
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 2137
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In: CIRPEE Working Paper No. 06-20
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In: Economica, Band 81, Heft 321, S. 48-62
ISSN: 1468-0335
Using a collective model of consumption, we characterize optimal commodity taxes aimed at targeting specific individuals within the household. The main message is that distortionary indirect taxation can circumvent the agency problem of the household. Essentially, taxation should discourage less the consumption of a certain group of goods—those for which the slope of the Engel curves is larger for the targeted person.
There is a large empirical literature on policy measures targeted at children but surprisingly very little theoretical foundation to ground the debate on the optimality of the different instruments. In the present paper, we examine the merit of targeting children through two general policies, namely selective commodity taxation and cash transfer to family with children. We consider a household that comprises an adult and a child. The household behavior is described by the maximization of the adult's utility function, which depends on the child's welfare, subject to a budget constraint. The relative effects of a price subsidy and of a cash benefit on child welfare are then derived. In particular, it is shown that 'favorable' distortions from the price subsidies may allow to redistribute toward the child. The framework is extended to account for possible paternalistic preferences of the State. Finally, it is shown that, in contrast to the traditional view, well-chosen subsidies can be more cost effective than cash transfers in alleviating child poverty.
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In: The journal of human resources, Band XLII, Heft 1, S. 214-246
ISSN: 1548-8004
In: The Geneva papers on risk and insurance - issues and practice, Band 22, Heft 4, S. 523-535
ISSN: 1468-0440
In: Annals of public and cooperative economics, Band 64, Heft 3, S. 419-438
ISSN: 1467-8292
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 5608
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 4654
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 4944
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