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In a recent article in Australian Journal of Political Science, Dale and Goldfinch present 'standard' journal-based publication and citation rankings of Australasian political science departments designed to complement what they characterise as the multidisciplinary, historical, qualitative and humanistic political science of the region. However, the 'highly cited' articles in their top-ranked political science department belong to quantitative psychology. Through unravelling why their study favours the opposite of that which it was meant to detect, this paper alerts political scientists to the hidden perils of accepting 'standard' Institute of Scientific Information-based approaches to citation counting as valid measures of research 'quality'. It exposes the veiled bibliometric assumption that the 'best' social science is quantitative research, notes that incongruous citation scores may inform the distribution of block funding and departmental appointment processes, and warns against using 'standard' data to unintentionally self-police the future shape of Australasian political science.

Research on the governance of publicly funded research does not recognize that social science and 'science' are distinct activities. Neither does it recognize that regulating research policy in purely science and technology terms has undesirable consequences for the social sciences - intended or otherwise. This paper seeks to correct these omissions and considers the governance of social science through the example of regulating 'everyday epistemology' at the science policy level. The British research council system is used in order to demonstrate how social science has been politically constructed as a legitimate enterprise for public funding. We find that social science is in fact regulated by non-social scientists. The result is that social science, seen as a square peg, is forced into the round hole of natural scientific thinking. When this policy is translated into governance structures it creates a 'slave social science' and subverts the role of social science as social science.

In a recent article in Australian Journal of Political Science, Dale and Goldfinch present 'standard' journal-based publication and citation rankings of Australasian political science departments designed to complement what they characterise as the multidisciplinary, historical, qualitative and humanistic political science of the region. However, the 'highly cited' articles in their top-ranked political science department belong to quantitative psychology. Through unravelling why their study favours the opposite of that which it was meant to detect, this paper alerts political scientists to the hidden perils of accepting 'standard' Institute of Scientific Information-based approaches to citation counting as valid measures of research 'quality'. It exposes the veiled bibliometric assumption that the 'best' social science is quantitative research, notes that incongruous citation scores may inform the distribution of block funding and departmental appointment processes, and warns against using 'standard' data to unintentionally self-police the future shape of Australasian political science.

Research on the governance of publicly funded research does not recognize that social science and 'science' are distinct activities. Neither does it recognize that regulating research policy in purely science and technology terms has undesirable consequences for the social sciences - intended or otherwise. This paper seeks to correct these omissions and considers the governance of social science through the example of regulating 'everyday epistemology' at the science policy level. The British research council system is used in order to demonstrate how social science has been politically constructed as a legitimate enterprise for public funding. We find that social science is in fact regulated by non-social scientists. The result is that social science, seen as a square peg, is forced into the round hole of natural scientific thinking. When this policy is translated into governance structures it creates a 'slave social science' and subverts the role of social science as social science.

This article employs an interpretive approach, and in the light of contributions to this symposium by Butler and McAllister, and McLean et al., holds that metrics of research 'quality' are socially constructed and hence are as 'subjective' as peer review. Thus it rejects the use of stand-alone metrics as an 'objective' basis to inform funding allocations. Rather, the optimum method of 'quality' assessment is a panel-based exercise with expert judgement informed by a range of discipline-sensitive metrics and peer review of publications. The article maintains that the politics of metrics of political science conceals interests about the foundations of social scientific knowledge, and so the dispute over metrics and peer review is a metaphor for the conflicting epistemological preferences of UK political scientists. It is also argued that metrics-led assessment subjects political science to 'Gradgrinding' on two fronts: that political science departments amount to less than the sum of their parts, and the audit culture strips the discipline of its humanism.

AbstractThe author regards development of Australia's ill‐fated Research Quality Framework (RQF) as a "live experiment" in determining the most appropriate approach to evaluating the extra‐academic returns, or "impact," of a nation's publicly funded research. The RQF was at the forefront of an international movement toward richer qualitative, contextual approaches that aimed to gauge the wider economic, social, environmental, and cultural benefits of research. Its construction and implementation sent mixed messages and created confusion about what impact is, and how it is best measured, to the extent that this bold live experiment did not come to fruition. © Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Cultural policy has become dominated by questions of how to account for the intangible value of government investments. This is as a result of longstanding developments within government's approaches to policy making, most notably those influenced by practices of audit and accounting. This paper will outline these developments with reference to Peter Miller's concept of calculative practices, and will argue two central points: first, that there are practical solutions to the problem of measuring the value of culture that connect central government discourses with the discourses of the cultural sector; and second, the paper will demonstrate how academic work has been central to this area of policy making. As a result of the centrality of accounting academics in cultural policy, for example in providing advice on the appropriate measurement tools and techniques, questions are raised about the role academia might take vis-à-vis public policy. Accounting professionals and academics not only provide technical expertise that informs state calculative practices, but also play a surveillance role through the audit and evaluation of government programmes, and act as interpreters in defining terms of performance measurement, success and failure. The paper therefore concludes by reflecting on recent work by Phillip Schlesinger to preserve academic integrity whilst allowing accounting scholars and academics influence and partnership in policy.

We reflect on the reasons why there is not a greater and more fruitful relationship between those who seek to understand policy and the political process from academia and those with a similar task in 'practical politics'. We attribute this lack of engagement to three core factors: (1) from without, instrumental government visions of political science perpetuate the view that the discipline exists to serve those with power; (2) from within, scientism and abstraction diminish the discipline's stock of 'usable' product for 'practical politics'; and (3) where relevant research exists, its uptake is hampered by limited communication between these spheres.