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In: Oxford scholarship online
In: Economics and Finance
'The Foundation of Complex Evolving Systems' seeks to offer an integrated analysis of the anatomy and physiology of the capitalist engine of generation and exploitation of technological organisational and institutional innovations - from the drivers of knowledge accumulation, to the modes in which such knowledge is incorporated into business firms, all the way to the processes of innovation-driven 'Schumpeterian competition' and macroeconomic growth. In that, it advances the interpretation of such patterns, in terms of economies seen as complex evolving systems.
This article discusses the medical/therapeutical responses to the COVID-19 pandemic and their political economy context. First, the very quick development of several vaccines highlights the richness of the basic knowledge waiting for therapeutical exploitation. Such knowledge has largely originated in public or non-profit institutions. Second, symmetrically, there is longer-term evidence that the private sector (essentially big pharma) has decreased its investment in basic research in general and has long been uninterested in vaccines in particular. Only when flooded with an enormous amount of public money did it become eager to undertake applied research, production scale-up and testing. Third, the political economy of the underlying public-private relationship reveals a profound dysfunctionality with the public being unable to determine the rates and direction of innovation, but at the same time confined to the role of payer of first and last resort, with dire consequences for both advanced, and more so developing countries. Fourth, on normative grounds, measures like ad hoc patent waivers are certainly welcome, but this will not address the fundamental challenge, involving a deep reform of the intellectual property rights regimes and their international protection.
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This note discusses the medical/therapeutical responses to the COVID-19 pandemic and their 'political economy' context. First, the very quick development of several vaccines highlights the richness of the basic knowledge waiting for therapeutical exploitation. Such knowledge has largely originated in public or non-profit institutions. Second, symmetrically, there is longer-term evidence that the private sector (essentially Big Pharma) has decreased its investment in basic research in general, and has long been uninterested in vaccines in particular. Only when flooded with an enormous amount of public money it became eager to undertake applied research, production scale-up and testing. Third, the 'political economy' of the underlying public-private relationship reveals a profound dysfunctionality with the public being unable to determine the rates and direction of innovation, but at the same time confined to the role of payer of first and last resort, with dire consequences for both advanced, and more so, developing countries. Fourth, on normative grounds, measures like ad hoc patent waivers are certainly welcome, but this will not address the fundamental challenge, involving a deep reform of the Intellectual Property Rights regimes and their international protection (TRIPS Agreements).
BASE
This article discusses the medical/therapeutical responses to the COVID-19 pandemic and their political economy context. First, the very quick development of several vaccines highlights the richness of the basic knowledge waiting for therapeutical exploitation. Such knowledge has largely originated in public or non-profit institutions. Second, symmetrically, there is longer-term evidence that the private sector (essentially big pharma) has decreased its investment in basic research in general and has long been uninterested in vaccines in particular. Only when flooded with an enormous amount of public money did it become eager to undertake applied research, production scale-up and testing. Third, the political economy of the underlying public-private relationship reveals a profound dysfunctionality with the public being unable to determine the rates and direction of innovation, but at the same time confined to the role of payer of first and last resort, with dire consequences for both advanced, and more so developing countries. Fourth, on normative grounds, measures like ad hoc patent waivers are certainly welcome, but this will not address the fundamental challenge, involving a deep reform of the intellectual property rights regimes and their international protection.
BASE
In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 107, Heft 444, S. 1530-1547
ISSN: 1468-0297
In: Research Policy, Band 22, Heft 2, S. 102-103
In: Science and public policy: journal of the Science Policy Foundation, Band 18, Heft 6, S. 353-361
ISSN: 1471-5430
In: The Manchester School, Band 56, Heft 2, S. 119-146
ISSN: 1467-9957