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Community colleges have recently attracted great attention because of their important role in supplying employee training to many business establishments. But despite this major role, there is surprising variability in community colleges' supply of, and employers' demand for, employee training. While a few community colleges supply a lot of employee training, many provide little. Moreover, although large employers and ones in industries such as manufacturing tend to utilize the community college heavily, smaller employers and ones in industries such as retail trade use it much less. This article analyzes the causes of this variability in the demand for and supply of employee training and suggests policy responses. Public policy, while encouraging broader community college and industry partnership in employee training, must also move to counteract the harmful impacts of extensive employee training on other missions of the community college such as transfer preparation, remedial education, and general education.

Community colleges have recently attracted great attention because of their important role in supplying employee training to many business establishments. But despite this major role, there is surprising variability in community colleges' supply of, & employers' demand for, employee training. While a few community colleges supply a lot of employee training, many provide little. Moreover, although large employers & ones in industries such as manufacturing tend to utilize the community college heavily, smaller employers & ones in industries such as retail trade use it much less. This article analyzes the causes of this variability in the demand for & supply of employee training & suggests policy responses. Public policy, while encouraging broader community college & industry partnership in employee training, must also move to counteract the harmful impacts of extensive employee training on other missions of the community college such as transfer preparation, remedial education, & general education. 3 Tables, 1 Appendix, 84 References. [Copyright 2003 Sage Publications, Inc.]

Social scientists have long been interested in the development of education. Mustafa Emirbayer and Clyde Barrow, whose essays appear in this volume, have many illustrious predecessors including political scientists Ira Katznelson and Margaret Weir; economists Max Weber, Albert Fishlow, Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, and Martin Carnoy and Henry Levin; and sociologists Emile Durkheim, John Meyer, Martin Trow, Randall Collins, Joseph Ben David, Julia Wrigley, and Margaret Archer.

After first appearing in 1979 in Tennessee, performance funding for higher education went on to be adopted by another 26 states. This monograph reviews research on a multitude of states to address these questions: What impacts does performance funding have on institutional practices and, ultimately, student outcomes? What obstacles and unintended effects do performance funding encounter? This monograph finds considerable impacts on institutional practices, weak impacts on student outcomes, substantial obstacles, and sizable unintended impacts. Given this, the monograph

This report puts President Biden's proposed infrastructure bill in the context of other Democratic proposals for industrial policy coming from Bernie Sanders, Elizabeth Warren, and others and of Republican proposals for industrial policy emanating from Marco Rubio, Josh Hawley, Tom Cotton, and others. For the left, we defined eight categories of opinion leaders. Four involved political leaders: the Biden campaign and administration; Sen. Bernie Sanders; Sen. Elizabeth Warren; and other Democratic Congress members submitting legislative bills and resolutions that advocated one or another form of industrial policy. These other members included Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Sen. Edward Markey, Sen. Charles Schumer, Sen. Chris Coons, Sen. Jeff Merkley, Rep. Ro Khanna, Rep. Tim Ryan, and others. We also defined four categories of thinktanks or policy organizations that have advanced left-oriented industrial policy: the Brookings Institution; the Century Foundation; labor-oriented thinktanks (Economic Policy Institute and Alliance for American Manufacturing); and the Roosevelt Institute. For the right, we defined seven categories of opinion leaders. Four involved political leaders: . Sen. Marco Rubio, Sen. Josh Hawley, and Sen. Tom Cotton, and other Republican Congress members leaders (including Sen. Todd Young, Sen. John Cornyn, and others) espousing industrial policy beliefs in the form of legislation and resolutions sponsored. We also had three categories of think tanks and policy organizations that have come out in favor of a conservative version of industrial policy: American Compass; American Affairs; and the Niskanen Center. The report compares and contrasts the Democratic and Republican proposals on three heads: the problems they say call for industrial policy; the nature of the policy solutions offered; and the main targets they envision for such policy solutions. On all three, we find considerable convergences but also sizable divergences between the Democratic vision for industrial policy on the one hand and the Republican vision on the other. The report argues that the Democratic vision for industrial policy – with its emphasis on creating good jobs in the process of addressing climate change -- may be crucial to Democratic chances in 2022 and 2024 by allowing Democrats to successfully appeal to two key constituencies: voters concerned with climate change and working-class voters concerned about good jobs both for themselves and their children. However, Democratic chances could be enhanced if their industrial policy proposals can effectively counter and even coopt distinctive and popular elements of the Republican proposals, particularly their attention to the challenge posed by China and to popular concern about loss of community and meaningful work.

A hallmark of recent higher education policy in developed economies is the move towards quasi-markets involving greater student choice and provider competition, underpinned by cost-sharing policies. This paper examines the idealizations and illusions of student choice and marketization in higher education policy in England, although the overall conclusions have relevance for other countries whose higher education systems are shaped by neoliberal thinking. First, it charts the evolution of the student-choice rationale through an analysis of government commissioned reports, white papers, and legislation, focusing on policy rhetoric and the purported benefits of increasing student choice and provider competition. Second, the paper tests the predictions advanced by the student-choice rationale—increased and wider access, improved institutional quality, and greater provider responsiveness to the labour market—and finds them largely not met. Finally, the paper explores how conceptual deficiencies in the student-choice model explain why the idealization of student choice has largely proved illusionary. Government officials have narrowly conceptualized students as rational calculators primarily weighing the economic costs and benefits of higher education and the relative quality of institutions and programs. There is little awareness that student choices are shaped by several other factors as well and that these vary considerably by social background. The paper concludes that students' choices are socially constrained and stratified, reproducing and legitimating social inequality.

A hallmark of recent higher education policy in developed economies is the move toward quasi-markets involving greater student choice and provider competition, underpinned by cost-sharing policies. This paper examines the idealizations and illusions of student choice and marketization in higher education policy in England, although the overall conclusions have relevance for other countries whose higher education systems are shaped by neoliberal thinking. ; Social Sciences

"Nation-building enterprises by the United States and the broader international community have run the gamut of success and failure. Examining the history of America's experience in nation-building, this book describes the mechanisms behind what often appears to be a haphazard enterprise"--

Intro -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- 1 Introduction -- Conundrums of Performance Funding -- Research Questions and a Preview of Methods and Perspectives -- Chapter Contents and Preview of Findings -- 2 Putting U.S. Performance Funding in Context -- Conceptualizing Accountability -- Accountability to State Government -- State Finance of Higher Education as Accountability -- The Use of Performance Outcomes in State Funding -- Contextualizing U.S. Performance Funding -- Summary and Conclusions -- 3 The Varying Trajectories of Higher Education Performance Funding Programs -- How Many States Have Adopted Performance Funding? -- Two Waves of Performance Funding Adoption -- Different Stages of Performance Funding -- Varying Trajectories of Performance Funding -- Synopses of the Performance Funding Programs in Our Eight States -- Summary and Conclusions -- 4 Origins of the First Wave of State Performance Funding Adoptions -- Explaining the Rise of State Performance Funding -- Theoretical Perspectives -- Research Methods -- Broad-Based Social Forces Giving Rise to Performance Funding -- Supporters of Performance Funding and Their Motives -- Opponents and Their Beliefs -- Coalition Formation: The Role of Policy Entrepreneurs -- Identification of Policy Solutions -- Agenda Setting: Policy Windows and External Shocks -- Summary and Conclusions -- 5 Incremental Change in Florida, Ohio, and Tennessee -- Selection of Cases and Interviews -- Theoretical Framework -- Incremental Change in Funding Levels for Performance Funding -- Incremental Change in Performance Indicators -- Summary and Conclusions -- 6 Performance Funding Discontinued: Lessons from Florida, Illinois, Missouri, and Washington -- Research and Theoretical Perspectives -- Factors Contributing to Performance Funding Program Discontinuation.

Neoliberal ideas – whether the new public management, principal-agent theory, or performance management – have provided rationale for sweeping reforms in the governance and operation of higher education. Despite this, little attention has been devoted to how well neoliberal theory illuminates the policy process by which neoliberal policy is enacted and implemented. This paper expands our understanding of the origins, implementation, and impacts of neoliberal policies by examining the case of performance-based funding (PBF) for higher education in the United States, Europe, Canada, Australia, and elsewhere. With regard to policy origins, neoliberal theory anticipates the key role that top government officials play in the development of PBF but fails to anticipate the important roles of business and higher education institutions in the formation of neoliberal policies. Neoliberal theory notes the important role of monetary incentives as policy instruments and the obstacles posed by gaming on the part of agents, but the implementation of PBF also involves other policy instruments and faces additional obstacles to implementation. Policy outcomes fitting the neoliberal focus on organizational effectiveness and efficiency are only weakly produced by PBF, but PBF is associated with a host of unintended impacts that neoliberal theory ignores.

One of the key ways that state governments pursue better higher education performance is through performance funding. It ties state funding directly to specific indicators of institutional performance, such as rates of graduation and job placement. This report considers the ways that performance funding systems in states with long-lasting systems have changed over time and what political and social conditions explain the changes. We analyze the experiences of two states: Tennessee, which pioneered performance funding in 1979; and Florida, which launched it in 1994. Funding for Tennessee's system has steadily increased over the years, whereas Florida's funding history has been more volatile and now provides much fewer dollars than when it was at its peak. Both Tennessee and Florida have changed their performance indicators substantially. But Florida added nine and dropped two in 12 years, while Tennessee added only six and dropped four over 31 years. Moreover, in Tennessee, performance indicators are added at the end of a regular five-year review, whereas in Florida they have been added irregularly, with no tie to a cyclical process of program reappraisal. Overall, Tennessee's performance funding system has been considerably more stable than Florida's because its initial policy design delineated much more clearly how the system was to be governed and changed over time, and provided for regular and systematic evaluation. Moreover, Tennessee's state legislature has played a smaller role in the ongoing development of performance funding than Florida's. These differences in policy process carry important implications. A system where funding levels do not oscillate greatly and indicators change more gradually and systematically is more likely to allow institutions to plan effectively. Further, such a system will have a more secure base of consent from institutions if it comes under attack.

One of the key ways that state governments pursue better higher education performance is through performance funding. It ties state funding directly to specific indicators of institutional performance, such as rates of graduation and job placement. This study considers the ways that performance funding systems in states with long-lasting systems have changed over time and what political and social conditions explain the changes. We analyze the experiences of two states: Tennessee, which pioneered performance funding in 1979; and Florida, which launched it in 1994. Funding for Tennessee's system has steadily increased over the years, whereas Florida's funding history has been more volatile and now provides much fewer dollars than when it was at its peak. Both Tennessee and Florida have changed their performance indicators substantially. But Florida added nine and dropped two in 12 years, while Tennessee added only six and dropped four over 31 years. Moreover, in Tennessee, performance indicators are added at the end of a regular five-year review, whereas in Florida they have been added irregularly, with no tie to a cyclical process of program reappraisal. Overall, Tennessee's performance funding system has been considerably more stable than Florida's because its initial policy design delineated much more clearly how the system was to be governed and changed over time, and provided for regular and systematic evaluation. Moreover, Tennessee's state legislature has played a smaller role in the ongoing development of performance funding than Florida's. These differences in policy process carry important implications. A system where funding levels do not oscillate greatly and indicators change more gradually and systematically is more likely to allow institutions to plan effectively. Further, such a system will have a more secure base of consent from institutions if it comes under attack.

Performance funding in higher education ties state funding directly to institutional performance on specific indicators, such as rates of retention, graduation, and job placement. One of the great puzzles about performance funding is that it has been both popular and unstable. Between 1979 and 2007, 26 states enacted it, but 14 of those states later dropped it (though two recently reestablished it). To shed light on the causes of this unstable institutionalization of performance funding, we examined three states that have experienced different forms of program cessation—Illinois, Washington, and Florida. For our analysis of the factors leading these three states to abandon performance funding systems, we drew upon interviews and documentary analyses that we conducted in these states. Our interviews were with state and local higher education officials, legislators and staff, governors and their advisors, and business leaders. The documents we analyzed included state government legislation, policy declarations and reports, newspaper accounts, and analyses by other investigators. We inevitably found that factors unique to one or another state played a role in the demise of performance funding. Nonetheless, we also found several common features: A sharp drop in higher education funding (present in Florida and Illinois); A lack of support by higher education institutions for the continuation of performance funding (all three states); The loss of key supporters of performance funding (all three states); Weak support by the business community (Florida and Illinois); and The establishment of performance funding through a budget proviso rather than a statute (Illinois and Washington). The final section of this paper discusses the implications of these findings for advocates of performance funding.