Suchergebnisse

Working for the administration remains one of the most coveted career paths for young Chinese. Rejuvenating Communism: Youth Organizations and Elite Renewal in Post-Mao China seeks to understand what motivates young and educated Chinese to commit to a long-term career in the party-state and how this question is central to the Chinese regime's ability to maintain its cohesion and survive. Jérôme Doyon draws upon extensive fieldwork and statistical analysis in order to illuminate the undogmatic commitment recruitment techniques and other methods the state has taken to develop a diffuse allegiance to the party-state in the post-Mao era. He then analyzes recruitment and political professionalization in the Communist Party's youth organizations and shows how experiences in the Chinese Communist Youth League transform recruits and feed their political commitment as they are gradually inducted into the world of officials. As the first in-depth study of the Communist Youth League's role in recruitment, this book challenges the assumption that merit is the main criteria for advancement within the party-state, an argument with deep implications for understanding Chinese politics today.

Le Parti communiste chinois augmente le nombre de ses membres, comme son influence sur la société chinoise et à l'étranger. Mais l'appareil disciplinaire rend tout débat impossible, coupant la direction de sa base et favorisant l'immobilisme.

Le xx e Congrès national du Parti communiste chinois (PCC), prévu pour l'automne 2022, devrait être celui de l'immobilisme. La probable reconduction au pouvoir de Xi Jinping, au-delà de deux mandats, remet en cause les règles de succession en vigueur. Le PCC est une organisation vieillissante et de moins en moins transparente, où le culte du chef restreint les discussions internes, remettant en question sa capacité d'adaptation et sa survie à long terme.

While changes in Chinese Communist Party (CCP) recruitment are generally described as different phases focused on recruiting either "reds" or "experts," giving more or less weight to political or technical criteria, we instead stress the importance of changing understandings of political loyalty to examine these evolutions. By tracing these changes throughout the party's 100 years, we show that how the party understands loyalty is largely strategic, detached from a purely ideological approach. The CCP has alternatively approached loyalty in ascriptive terms, based on class background, and behavioural ones, looking at active displays of loyalty or passive obedience. The level and form of activism expected from party members and cadres have also dramatically changed over time. Relying on recruitment data, this article shows that it is paradoxically during periods of party expansion that the CCP becomes more politically demanding with its members. (JCCA / GIGA)

How can a weak organization be a path to power? The Chinese Communist Youth League (CYL) lacks autonomy and coherence yet it is seen as the cradle for one of the main factions within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). To understand this tension, I provide a novel account of the role played by the CYL in the recruitment of leading cadres since the 1980s. Against explanations based on factional struggles, I argue that the rise of CYL-affiliated cadres is a by-product of the organization's weakness. As the Party appoints CYL heads, CCP leaders, at various levels and at different points in time, have used the League to accelerate the promotion of their protégés. For years, there has been little incentive for Party bosses to dismantle this promotion path. However, in his bid to consolidate his power, Xi Jinping has weakened this channel so that it may not be used by potential rivals. (China Q/GIGA)

AbstractHow can a weak organization be a path to power? The Chinese Communist Youth League (CYL) lacks autonomy and coherence yet it is seen as the cradle for one of the main factions within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). To understand this tension, I provide a novel account of the role played by the CYL in the recruitment of leading cadres since the 1980s. Against explanations based on factional struggles, I argue that the rise of CYL-affiliated cadres is a by-product of the organization's weakness. As the Party appoints CYL heads, CCP leaders, at various levels and at different points in time, have used the League to accelerate the promotion of their protégés. For years, there has been little incentive for Party bosses to dismantle this promotion path. However, in his bid to consolidate his power, Xi Jinping has weakened this channel so that it may not be used by potential rivals.

The Communist Youth League has developed a network of sub-organisations to expand its reach at minimum cost. It exemplifies the low-cost corporatism model. Following this model, mass organisations maintain a corporatist relationship with the Party while diversifying their activities through structures they supervise. These structures also provide them with additional material and human resources. In this configuration, the Communist Youth League maintains an equilibrium between dependence on the Party and attractiveness to young people. However, reforms put forward under Xi Jinping challenge this fragile equilibrium by strengthening Party control over the League and its sub-organisations. (China Perspect/GIGA)

Résumé En l'absence d'élections compétitives et populaires pour sélectionner les dirigeants de l'État-parti, la politique chinoise est souvent réduite à son informalité. Nous remettons en question la valeur heuristique de la distinction entre politique formelle et politique informelle. En Chine, il est impossible de distinguer ces deux idéaux-types car le système de sélection politique place la partialité de ses chefs comme fondement institutionnel. En prenant l'exemple des cadres de la principale organisation de jeunesse du PCC, la Ligue des jeunesses communistes, nous entrons dans le détail des trajectoires politiques en Chine contemporaine pour saisir la complexité des liens interpersonnels qui lient les officiels entre eux. Contrairement à la vision répandue d'un État-parti organisé autour de groupes factionnels institués, nous avançons que la combinaison des liens, très forts, liés à la hiérarchie organisationnelle et de ceux, plus faibles et horizontaux, que les cadres développent tout au long de leur carrière place ceux-ci au centre de réseaux d'allégeances multiples et variés. C'est cette diversité des liens qui nourrit la loyauté individuelle des cadres au système dans son ensemble.

Since Xi Jinping took power in late 2012, analysts have puzzled over how best to define his political trajectory. Is he consolidating power and building a personality cult around himself, or is he strengthening the Party as an organisation? I tackle this issue by focusing on the transformation of personnel policies under Xi. I highlight an increasing concentration of power in the hands of Party leaders at all echelons. At the institutional level, the Party increasingly controls the management and disciplining of officials. At the level of the individual cadres themselves, promotion processes are increasingly managed behind closed doors and less importance is being given to objective criteria for cadre advancement. The age-based rules which structured the promotion of officials and ensured a high level of personnel turnover within the party state are also de-emphasised. I argue that these changes are paving the way for a more clientelist and aging party state (JJCA/GIGA)