Suchergebnisse

The idea of value-free economics is an old methodological issue. It has given rise to one of the most important controversies in the history of economic thought. The discussion was important because it had to do with the scientific nature of economics. One can still find a significant number of methodological works (e.g. Coddington 1972, Gordon 1977, Samuels 1977, Sugden 1981, Colander 1994) which echo this old controversy. Most economists today, though, would agree that the claim of an economic theory free from values is essential in establishing the scientific nature of the discipline. A positive, value-free economics, in the sense of not relying on any particular set of value judgments or on any philosophical or psychological framework, is generally seen as the ideal. This approach has crucially influenced important branches of economics such as microeconomic theory. The current established position was a product of a historical process which played a significant role in the formation of the body of economic theory. Furthermore, the idea of what is value-free economics has changed since its first introduction as a scientific ideal. The nature of this change is also important for understanding the present conception of the scientific character of economics.

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER IS TO SHOW THE TWO LEVELS OF HEDONISTIC INFLUENCE ON ECONOMIC THEORY (ESPECIALLY CONSUMER BEHAVIOUR THEORY), AND THEN IT OFFERS AN EXPLANTION FOR THIS PHENOMENON. THE CONTENTION IS THAT THE DESCREPANCY BETWEEN MODERN CONSUMER THEORY AND TEXTBOOK CONSUMER THEORY IS DUE TO THE NECESSITY OF THE FRAMEWORK OF EGOISTIC HEDONISM FOR THE COMPREHENSION OF CONSUMER THEORY, AND THIS MAY IN TURN IMPLY THAT, DESPITE THE ATTEMPTS OF HICKS AND SAMUELSON, HEDONISM IS STILL ONE OF ITS IMPORTANT UNDERLYING CHARACTERISTICS.

This book discusses key issues in economic policy in the context of the history of economic thought. Most of the current and past academic controversies in economics are, explicitly or implicitly, centred around the application and form of economic policy. This is particularly evident in the post-WWII period, with the appearance of economic policy as a distinguishable subfield, but important elements of various economic policy issues can be found throughout the history of economic thought. This book discusses various topics in economic policy - such as questions over state spending and taxation, income redistribution, and the role of money - with each chapter focusing on a particular period or major school of economic thought ranging from the prehistory' of economics up to the present day. Specific chapters of the volume cover the main schools of economic thought from different national and theoretical traditions, incorporating mercantilism, the Physiocratic School, the German Historical School, Marxism, the Austrian School, institutional economics, Keynesian economics, behavioural economics and more. This book will be of great interest to readers of the history of economic policy as well as the history of economic thought, macroeconomics and economic history more broadly.

One of the basic ideas underlying the established conception of rational behavior is the unlimited substitutability of preferences. Economic agents are assumed to compare and reduce everything to a common denominator: utility. The most obvious example of such preferences can be found in standard consumer theory where complete substitutability of every good is assumed in the sense that a loss of some units of one bundle can always be compensated by gain of some units of another commodity (such preferences are sometimes called Archimedian—see Borch 1968). This conception of preferences has a long history in economic thought and forms the basis of the standard rational choice theory (Hicks and Allen 1934, Samuelson 1938, Hicks 1946, Houthakker 1950).

In this paper imperfect meritocracy is defined as the appointment in the public sector of unsuitable (in the sense of merit) individuals for political reasons. After discussing the possible causes for the emergence of an imperfect meritocracy framework, the paper then sets the basis for an economic analysis of typical politicians' behaviour in such a framework. After deriving the demand for political appointments, the analysis verifies the intuitive insight that the number of political appointments falls when politicians are competent. Another main result is that the more votes an appointment carries through relatives and friends, the greater the demand for political appointments. Finally, it is shown that the demand for political appointments increases when taxation and the price index increase and that it falls when income increases.

This paper reviews important aspects of gender labour market inequalities in four European Union countries. It shows that individual countries differ in many aspects of gender discrimination. It seems that contributing factors to these differences are the national social and economic structures, the level of economic development, the legislative framework and the effectiveness of anti-discriminatory policies. It also shows that there are notable improvements in many gender gap indicators during the recent years and, at least part of the improvement should be attributed to the European commission's legislative and policy initiatives.