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The Power of International Organizations and Its DeterminantsThe article examines the power of international organizations and factors that determine its resence and amount. It shows how international organizations are capable of using both the "classically" understood power, one that is aimed towards specific actors and causes its ffects directly, and different forms of "structural" power that either affect the behavior of objects that remain unspecified or influence their constitution as social beings of a particular kind. The factors that were identified as determining the power include knowledge, labor, financial resources and other material resources, acting as efficient causes, will, being the enabling cause, and authority, related to both types of causality.

In this article I argue that rationalist explanations which aspire to demonstrate why international security institutions develop, do not qualify as fully satisfactory arguments. Their limits become apparent particularly if one attempts to account on their basis for the diversity of types of institutions such as balance of power, collective security, hegemony, etc.The initial step in my analysis was to address the limitations of the three arguments which I referred to as materialist, functionalist, and evolutionist that individually make up either whole rationalist conceptions on the development of international security institutions or parts of them. Having done so, I also examined the possibilities to combine these arguments to explore whether the effort yields any extra explanatory power.The main reasons for why these explanations and their combinations fail to convincingly account for the diversity of international security institutions are threefold. First, the functionalist, evolutionist, and the functionalist-evolutionist arguments do not attempt to address the issue directly and provide only a general assertion on the factors influencing the formation of institutions instead of tackling the problem with respect to their particular types. Second, the materialist argument advances a logic of state action that justifies the creation of certain types of institutions and, at the same time, rules out the development of others. Third, it proves also incompatible with the other two arguments. The implication of this is that states would have to choose between mutually exclusive logics of action and, thus, behave in a way for which none of the arguments provides any explanation.Full text: http://bazhum.muzhp.pl/czasopismo/589/?idno=14760

In this article I argue that rationalist explanations which aspire to demonstrate why international security institutions develop, do not qualify as fully satisfactory arguments. Their limits become apparent particularly if one attempts to account on their basis for the diversity of types of institutions such as balance of power, collective security, hegemony, etc.The initial step in my analysis was to address the limitations of the three arguments which I referred to as materialist, functionalist, and evolutionist that individually make up either whole rationalist conceptions on the development of international security institutions or parts of them. Having done so, I also examined the possibilities to combine these arguments to explore whether the effort yields any extra explanatory power.The main reasons for why these explanations and their combinations fail to convincingly account for the diversity of international security institutions are threefold. First, the functionalist, evolutionist, and the functionalist-evolutionist arguments do not attempt to address the issue directly and provide only a general assertion on the factors influencing the formation of institutions instead of tackling the problem with respect to their particular types. Second, the materialist argument advances a logic of state action that justifies the creation of certain types of institutions and, at the same time, rules out the development of others. Third, it proves also incompatible with the other two arguments. The implication of this is that states would have to choose between mutually exclusive logics of action and, thus, behave in a way for which none of the arguments provides any explanation.Full text: http://bazhum.muzhp.pl/czasopismo/589/?idno=14760

Norway and Iceland are two states that are closely integrated with the European Union (EU) despite formally not being its members. Above all this is a result of them being bound by parts of EU law. On the one hand, as members of the European Economic Area, they apply EU laws that constitute its internal market as well as acts related to most of other EU policies once contained in its first pillar. On the other hand, being Schengen associated states, they are also required to apply EU border crossing and asylum rules and regulations. The article examines the mechanisms and procedures employed to enable the two states to apply EU law as well as ensure its proper application. It also investigates the range of EU laws that Norway and Iceland are obligated to follow and the degree to which they do so.

Power has been one of the key issues in the study of international relations since the famous words of Hans Morgentau that in world politics power is pitted against power for supremacy and survival. The attention given to its analysis within the last 65 years has been a product of such as Morthenthau's understandings of power which see it as the most important causal force in state interactions. However, despite the amount of research on the subject, there is little agreement among scholars as to what it is and where does it come.The author briefly examines various views on the determinants of power starting from a classical realist and strictly actor-based one to a dualist approach which emphasizes the importance of international structure. He finds that all share a similar idea that power — to some extent — comes from the material capabilities of states (material determinants). Building upon previous research conducted on the validity of the democratic peace theory he then argues that it may also stem from the political system of the state (systemic determinants).Subsequently the author analyzes the significance of various material and systemic power determinants to war outcomes using nine diff erent non-linear econometric models (polynomial logit) composed of various sets of variables relating to power determinants. He then examines the degree to which particular models explain war outcomes of interstate military conflicts between 1816 and 1991 and which of the variables seem statistically significant.The results clearly show that neither the advantage in military personnel numbers, nor in the amount of money spent on arms influences the state's chances of victory. In the case of the total value of imports the findings are similar. On the other hand the value of the states exports, as well as certain systemic parameters such as competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment and executive constraints prove to be of statistical importance.

Power has been one of the key issues in the study of international relations since the famous words of Hans Morgentau that in world politics power is pitted against power for supremacy and survival. The attention given to its analysis within the last 65 years has been a product of such as Morthenthau's understandings of power which see it as the most important causal force in state interactions. However, despite the amount of research on the subject, there is little agreement among scholars as to what it is and where does it come.The author briefly examines various views on the determinants of power starting from a classical realist and strictly actor-based one to a dualist approach which emphasizes the importance of international structure. He finds that all share a similar idea that power — to some extent — comes from the material capabilities of states (material determinants). Building upon previous research conducted on the validity of the democratic peace theory he then argues that it may also stem from the political system of the state (systemic determinants).Subsequently the author analyzes the significance of various material and systemic power determinants to war outcomes using nine diff erent non-linear econometric models (polynomial logit) composed of various sets of variables relating to power determinants. He then examines the degree to which particular models explain war outcomes of interstate military conflicts between 1816 and 1991 and which of the variables seem statistically significant.The results clearly show that neither the advantage in military personnel numbers, nor in the amount of money spent on arms influences the state's chances of victory. In the case of the total value of imports the findings are similar. On the other hand the value of the states exports, as well as certain systemic parameters such as competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment and executive constraints prove to be of statistical importance.

Located in the South Pacific, for many years New Zealand has been an important part of a great power concert taking place within the region. The post- 1945 process which had given independence and the right to self-government to various states and territories formerly administered by the great powers, allowed them to shape their external relations with other states autonomously, and thus rendered the position of formal dominance previously held by the great powers obsolete. This included also New Zealand whose international position at that time was highly conditioned by trusteeship responsibilities performed pursuant to a UN mandate. Combining David A. Baldwin's contextual approach to power analysis with Ray S. Cline's resource-based power model, the author examines the presentday distribution of military and socio-economic potential within the South Pacific region and depicts the unilateral exercise of local preponderance by the Wellington government conducted in the last 10 years. He reaches a conclusion that, stemming either from individual actions conducive to an efficient exploitation of the social potential, or a close cooperative relationship with Australia, which gives rise to an asymmetrical great-power military tandem, in which the Wellington side plays a complementary role, New Zealand currently holds a position of a regional military and social power, whereas its capabilities predestine it obtain a similar status also with respect to economic matters.

Located in the South Pacific, for many years New Zealand has been an important part of a great power concert taking place within the region. The post- 1945 process which had given independence and the right to self-government to various states and territories formerly administered by the great powers, allowed them to shape their external relations with other states autonomously, and thus rendered the position of formal dominance previously held by the great powers obsolete. This included also New Zealand whose international position at that time was highly conditioned by trusteeship responsibilities performed pursuant to a UN mandate. Combining David A. Baldwin's contextual approach to power analysis with Ray S. Cline's resource-based power model, the author examines the presentday distribution of military and socio-economic potential within the South Pacific region and depicts the unilateral exercise of local preponderance by the Wellington government conducted in the last 10 years. He reaches a conclusion that, stemming either from individual actions conducive to an efficient exploitation of the social potential, or a close cooperative relationship with Australia, which gives rise to an asymmetrical great-power military tandem, in which the Wellington side plays a complementary role, New Zealand currently holds a position of a regional military and social power, whereas its capabilities predestine it obtain a similar status also with respect to economic matters.

Located in the South Pacific, for many years New Zealand has been an important part of a great power concert taking place within the region. The post- 1945 process which had given independence and the right to self-government to various states and territories formerly administered by the great powers, allowed them to shape their external relations with other states autonomously, and thus rendered the position of formal dominance previously held by the great powers obsolete. This included also New Zealand whose international position at that time was highly conditioned by trusteeship responsibilities performed pursuant to a UN mandate. Combining David A. Baldwin's contextual approach to power analysis with Ray S. Cline's resource-based power model, the author examines the presentday distribution of military and socio-economic potential within the South Pacific region and depicts the unilateral exercise of local preponderance by the Wellington government conducted in the last 10 years. He reaches a conclusion that, stemming either from individual actions conducive to an efficient exploitation of the social potential, or a close cooperative relationship with Australia, which gives rise to an asymmetrical great-power military tandem, in which the Wellington side plays a complementary role, New Zealand currently holds a position of a regional military and social power, whereas its capabilities predestine it obtain a similar status also with respect to economic matters.