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AbstractThe article analyzes arguments, made by John J. Mearsheimer and others, that the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was largely caused by Western policy. It finds that these arguments rely on a partially false and incomplete reading of history. To do so, the article identifies a range of premises that are both foundational to Mearsheimer's claims and based on implied or explicit historical interpretations. This includes the varying policies of Ukraine toward NATO and the EU as well as the changing Russian perceptions thereof; the political upheavals in Ukraine in early 2014 that were immediately succeeded by the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbass; and the supposed absence of Russian 'imperialism' toward Ukraine prior to 2014. Finding that these interpretations do not hold up in light of relevant and available data, the article qualifies and contextualizes the validity of Mearsheimer's arguments, points to superior ones, and highlights the need for case-specific expertise when using explanatory theory to make sense of politically salient ongoing events.

Für große Teile der deutschen Politik und Politikwissenschaft kam der russische Angriff auf die Ukraine am 24. Februar 2022 als ein unerwarteter Schock. Gleichzeitig schien der Krieg realistische Kernaussagen zu bestätigen, beispielsweise durch Russlands erklärtes Ziel, gewaltsam eine zukünftige NATO-Mitgliedschaft der Ukraine zu verhindern. Infolgedessen beklagten prominente Kommentator*innen Vorurteile gegenüber dem Realismus in Deutschland. In der Tat ist im internationalen Vergleich der Realismus in der deutschen IB-Forschung unterrepräsentiert. Der Artikel argumentiert, dass eine idealtypische Unterscheidung zwischen realistischer Theorie und realistischer Heuristik weite Bereiche dieser Realismuskontroverse löst. Hierfür zeigt der Artikel beispielhaft auf, dass auch minimalistische Modelle realistischer Theorie für Kernfragen der ukrainisch-russisch-deutschen Sicherheitsbeziehungen wichtige Erklärungs­beiträge liefern können. Auch demonstriert der Artikel, inwiefern atheoretische realistische Heuristiken zu empirisch falschen, nur vermeintlich autoritativen und politisch problematischen Annahmen über die ukrainisch-russisch-deutschen Beziehungen führen können.

AbstractWith wavering US support and Brexit unfolding, cooperation between Germany, the EU's economic powerhouse, and the United Kingdom, Western Europe's prime military power, becomes crucial for Europe's overall ability to deal with a resurgent Russia. Does institutional and normative disintegration between states, such as the Brexit process, weaken bilateral security cooperation? This article argues that such cooperation persists if both states continue to jointly perceive a third actor as threatening while regarding each other as useful and reliable when it comes to ameliorating this shared threat. The argument is tested on a case of intrinsic theoretical, historical, and political importance: British-German cooperation towards Russia before and after the 2016 Brexit referendum. The article finds, against a wide pessimist consensus to the contrary, that cooperation strengthened during the Brexit process. As the Ukraine crisis had caused converging threat perceptions since 2014, Brexit incentivised both sides to signal ongoing reliability to each other and, consequently, to view each other as more capable allies. The article combines qualitative comparisons and congruence analysis, drawing data from British, German and Russian primary sources in their respective original languages, including foreign and security policy documents as well as interviews with stakeholders involved in policy formation.

AbstractThe Russian invasion of Ukraine in early 2022 and the ensuing EU–Russian clash over the fate of Ukraine highlight the importance of explaining the outcomes of EU–Russian crisis bargaining. Complementing existing accounts, we argue that favourable preference constellations are key: The more determined, united and focused side prevails over its less interested, divided or unfocused counterpart. We first establish the inferiority of Russia's influence assets (economic, military, normative and allies) relative to the EU. We then use congruence analysis to reverse‐engineer crisis bargaining outcomes in key cases of EU–Russian crisis bargaining, showing that favourable preference constellations allowed Russia, despite inferior assets and EU opposition, to ensure Syrian dictator Assad's political survival, finalize the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and keep Donbass out of Kyiv's control since then. Finally, we discuss the implications of these findings for related areas, as well as for current and future EU–Russian crisis bargaining, specifically over Ukraine.