Abstract The Constitutional Court declared in its ruling 22/2016 (XII 5) that by exercising its competences, it can examine whether the joint exercise of competences under Article E) (2) of the Fundamental Law of Hungary infringes human dignity, other fundamental rights, the sovereignty of Hungary, or Hungary's self-identity based on its historical constitution.
Abstract This paper argues that what has happened with and led to the 4th amendment to the Fundamental Law of Hungary adopted in 2013 (and to the 5th amendment of the same year) is a reasonable and simple consequence of the technique of the political power that has been exercised in Hungary since 2010 in the course of amending the former Constitution and of the preparation and adoption of the new one. In order to understand why the change is so drastic and radical, it is inevitable to assess constitutional politics between 1989 and 2010 from a perspective of the constitution-changing and -making powers and the methods and techniques employed. The outcomes of constitutional politics between 1989 and 2010 gave rise to political criticism and the developments related to the Constitution (Act XX of 1949) were also surrounded by evident dissatisfaction. Yet, what has been happening since 2010 is far more problematic in the light of constitutionalism and democratic values.
The argumentation in this paper is based on the proposition that constitutions play a key role in defining the approach to women's social status, not just by determining ordinary legislation and public policy, but also through constitutional review. The focus is on Hungary, a country that is not famous in Europe for a high level of equality between men and women, surrounded by a (liberal) international political discourse which asserts a backlash and claims that women's equal rights are being curtailed even more during the era of Orbán's illiberal government. Against this discursive backdrop, the paper highlights a counterintuitive phenomenon: since the democratic transition (1989–1990) all the key constitutional disputes related to equality between the sexes have been initiated by men claiming instances of discrimination against men, as if women were too privileged in Hungary. A relevant contextual feature is that while equal legal standing for the sexes is guaranteed (due partly to the heritage of state socialism, then to efforts related to EU integration), affirmative measures for women are also constitutionally ensured. The Constitutional Court has deployed surprisingly poor-quality reasoning in these disputes, suggesting that it never considered equality between the sexes to be an important issue. This leads us to claim that certain persistent features have characterized this field since the 1990s, not the dynamics of reversal since the 2010s. With our empirical findings, we aim to contribute to the academic discourse in a way that challenges the backlash narrative regarding developments in Hungary from a specific perspective.
Constitutional identity, as enshrined in Article 4(2) TEU might theoretically open up the possibility for EU Member States to refuse fulfilling certain obligations under EU law by referencing certain, as if yet not clearly defined elements of constitutional identity. Member States' constitutional identity, which is to be respected by the EU does not appear in positive law. Having regard to multilevel constitutionalism, it may be assumed that national constitutional identity will be elaborated in dialogues between national (constitutional) courts and the Court of Justice of the European Union. Based on previous practice however, the national and European interpretations of identity differ significantly. To achieve necessary convergence, the Court of Justice and national courts must cooperate in interpreting the concept of constitutional identity. This raises the necessity of examining whether the procedural prerequisites of this cooperation are given in national and EU public law. The questions to be examined are 1) whether the preliminary ruling procedure has already been used in identity-related cases, 2) what the position of constitutional courts/supreme courts (courts engaged in constitutional interpretation) is regarding the preliminary ruling procedure and 3) whether this may be considered the appropriate procedure when applying Article 4(2) TEU or would it require modification?
In 2015, the Croatian Constitutional Court suspended the Family Act (2014) without a final decision in the judicial review proceedings and ordered the reenactment of a more than ten-year old regulation Family Act (2003). The article considers Croatian Constitutional Court's decision as an opportunity to examine the conditions for a re-enactment of formerly repealed law, and additionally the temporal effects of judgments of some European constitutional courts from a comparative law perspective. Thus, the article first deals with the (historical) legal situation in Austria and Germany and the criteria that would generally justify the re-enactment of former law in their legal systems. Finally, the development of these countries' legal systems has been reconsidered in the Croatian context. ; Godine 2015. Ustavni sud RH suspendirao je Obiteljski zakon (2014) i naložio primjenu prethodnog Obiteljskog zakona (2003), starog više od deset godina, a da nije proveo postupak i donio odluku o neustavnosti suspendiranog Zakona. Potaknuti ovom odlukom hrvatskog Ustavnog suda, u radu se komparativno ispituju uvjeti za vraćanje na snagu prijašnjeg propisa stavljenog izvan snage, kao i vremensko djelovanje odluka odabranih europskih ustavnih sudova. Stoga ovaj rad pruža priliku čitatelju da se upozna s praksom austrijskog i njemačkog ustavnog suda, kao i uvjetima na temelju kojih je moguće vratiti na snagu prijašnji propis u njihove pravne sustave, ukazujući na pravnopovijesne razloge postojanja ovakvog rješenja. Zaključno se u radu austrijski i njemački sustav razmatraju u aktualnom hrvatskom kontekstu.
Godine 2015. Ustavni sud RH suspendirao je Obiteljski zakon (2014) i naložio primjenu prethodnog Obiteljskog zakona (2003), starog više od deset godina, a da nije proveo postupak i donio odluku o neustavnosti suspendiranog Zakona. Potaknuti ovom odlukom hrvatskog Ustavnog suda, u radu se komparativno ispituju uvjeti za vraćanje na snagu prijašnjeg propisa stavljenog izvan snage, kao i vremensko djelovanje odluka odabranih europskih ustavnih sudova. Stoga ovaj rad pruža priliku čitatelju da se upozna s praksom austrijskog i njemačkog ustavnog suda, kao i uvjetima na temelju kojih je moguće vratiti na snagu prijašnji propis u njihove pravne sustave, ukazujući na pravnopovijesne razloge postojanja ovakvog rješenja. Zaključno se u radu austrijski i njemački sustav razmatraju u aktualnom hrvatskom kontekstu. ; In 2015, the Croatian Constitutional Court suspended the Family Act (2014) without a final decision in the judicial review proceedings and ordered the re-enactment of a more than ten-year old regulation Family Act (2003). The article considers Croatian Constitutional Court's decision as an opportunity to examine the conditions for a re-enactment of formerly repealed law, and additionally the temporal effects of judgments of some European constitutional courts from a comparative law perspective. Thus, the article first deals with the (historical) legal situation in Austria and Germany and the criteria that would generally justify the re-enactment of former law in their legal systems. Finally, the development of these countries' legal systems has been reconsidered in the Croatian context.
Illiberal Constitutionalism and the European Rule of Law / Tímea Drinóczi, Agnieszka Bień-Kacała -- The European values and the Rule of Law / Andrzej Madeja -- Where the laws do not govern, there is no constitution' : on the relationship between the Rule of Law and Constitutionalism / Wojciech Włoch -- The Rule of Law, Democracy and Human Rights in Hungary : tendencies from 1989 until 2019 / András Jakab and Eszter Bodná -- The Rule of Law : the Hungarian Perspective / Tímea Drinóczi -- The Rule of Law : the Polish perspective / Iwona Wróblewska -- Rule of Law in Hungary. What can law and politics do? / Lóránt Csink -- Safeguarding the European Union's core values : the EU Rule of Law Mission in Poland / Sylwia Majkowska-Szulc -- Are the EU member states still masters of the treaties? The European Rule of Law Concept as a means of limiting national authorities / Agnieszka Grzelak -- Illiberal legality / Tímea Drinóczi and Agnieszka Bień-Kacała.
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"This book theorizes illiberal constitutionalism by interrogation of the Rule of Law, democratic deterioration, and the misuse of the language and relativization of human rights protection, and its widespread emotional and value-oriented effect on the population. The work consists of seven Parts. Part I outlines the volume's ambitions and provides an introduction. Part II discusses the theoretical framework and clarifies the terminology adopted in the book. Part III provides an in-depth insight into the constitutional identity of Poles and Hungarians and argues that an unbalanced constitutional identity has been moulded throughout Polish and Hungarian history in which emotional traits of collective victimhood and collective narcissism, and a longing for a charismatic leader have been evident. Part IV focuses on the emergence of illiberal constitutionalism, and, based on both quantitative and qualitative analyses, argues that illiberal constitutionalism is neither modern authoritarianism nor authoritarian constitutionalism. This Part contextualizes the issue by putting the deterioration of the Rule of Law into a European perspective. Part V explores the legal nature of illiberal legality when it is at odds and in compliance with the European Rule of Law, illiberal democracy, focusing on electoral democracy and legislative processes, and illiberalization of human rights. Part VI investigates whether there is a clear pattern in the methods of remodeling, or distancing from constitutional democracy, how it started, consolidated, and how its results are maintained. The final part presents the author's conclusions and looks to the future"--
"The book begins from the general presumption that the Rule of Law, since its emergence, has been a universal European value, a political ideal and legal conception. It also acknowledges that the EU has been struggling in the area of value enforcement, even if the necessary mechanisms are available and, given an innovative outlook and more political commitment, could be successfully used. The authors appreciate the different approaches toward the Rule of Law, both as a concept and as a measurable indicator, and while addressing the core question of the volume, widely rely on them. Ultimately, the book provides a snapshot of how the Rule of Law ideal has been dismantled and offers a theory of the Rule of Law in illiberal constitutionalism. It discusses why voters keep illiberal populist leaders in power when they are undeniably acting contrary to the Rule of Law ideal"--
The international conference entitled 'Law – Regions – Development. Legal implications of local and regional development' was one of the events of the DUNICOP project (Deepening UNIversity Cooperation Osijek – Pécs project; HUHR/1101/2.2.1/005) managed by the two partner law faculties in Pécs and Osijek. DUNICOP is a one-year long common research and curriculum development project between the Universities in Osijek and Pécs in the field of law. The project is cofinanced and supported by the European Union through the Hungary- Croatia IPA Cross-border Co-operation Program and by the two participating law faculties. The DUNICOP project is operated in various interrelated areas and through various activities and is regarded as a successful continuation of the previous EUNICOP and SUNICOP projects.
