Search results

Immigration has become one of the most discussed and controversial topics in recent public and political debates. This is true not just in the United Kingdom (UK), but also elsewhere in Europe, as well as in many other advanced economies, most notably the United States (US). For example, immigration became a major discussion point during the recent general election campaign in the UK, in spite of what appeared to have been an initial reluctance of some participants to engage in such debates. The importance of immigration is demonstrated by the strong attitudes that are displayed by the public. For instance, race and immigration has consistently been viewed as one of the most important issues facing Britain in recent years according to IPSOS/Mori's monthly Issues Index. Typically, more than 30 per cent of those questioned since 2002 have considered race and immigration to be the most important issue. This peaked at over 40 per cent in late 2007 and early 2008, which corresponds with the time when migration from Central and Eastern Europe to the UK was at its highest. This made it the top ranked issue for the British public, since when it has been replaced by concerns over the economy. Attitudes have also been found to vary by skill group, with Scheve and Slaughter (2001) reporting a significantly greater preference for limiting immigrant flows to the US amongst less skilled workers.

AbstractIn this paper we examine three forms of regret in relation to the UK's hugely significant referendum on EU membership that was held in June 2016. They are: (i) whether 'leave' voters at the referendum subsequently regretted their choice (in the light of the result), (ii) whether non-voters regretted their decisions to abstain (essentially supporting 'remain') and (iii) whether individuals were more likely to indicate that it is everyone's duty to vote following the referendum. We find evidence in favor of all three types of regret. In particular, leave voters and non-voters were significantly more likely to indicate that they would vote to remain given a chance to do so again; moreover, the probability of an individual stating that it was everyone's duty to vote in a general election increased significantly in 2017 (compared to 2015). The implications of the findings are discussed in the context of the referendum's outcome.

This paper examines UK migration policy and recent migration flows from Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries to the UK. Although inflows of migrant workers were relatively large in the mid-2000s, especially amongst Ukrainians, these have fallen following changes to UK immigration policy, especially the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme and the introduction of the Points Based System. As a result, the stock of migrants from EaP countries resident in the UK is small, especially in comparison to migrants from the new member states that joined the EU in 2004 (EUA8 countries). Migrants from the EaP countries also have an older age profile then EUA8 migrants. Employment rates are lower for migrants from EaP countries but they have fairly similar occupational attainment to other European migrants. This may be due to the high average levels of education amongst migrants since a relatively large proportion of migrants to the UK from EaP countries are highly educated. The paper is completed by a discussion of the skill needs of the UK economy. Our conclusions suggest that despite there being scope for increased migration from the EaP countries to help fill skill gaps, it seems very unlikely that the UK will allow large numbers of migrants from the EaP countries to enter the UK in the near future. This is because of the continued sluggish performance of the UK economy and the attitudes towards (increased) immigration displayed by political parties/the current government, as well as the general public.

International audience ; Our paper analyses people's willingness to move (WTM) using data from the 1995 British Social Attitudes Survey and International Social Survey Programme. We identify the personal characteristics and sub-regional indicators that are important in explaining the WTM within Britain. We also find that the WTM is only higher in a few other countries, including the United States. The equivalent desire to move is found to be much lower in Eastern European countries and in several other European Union member states. Compositional effects, such as age and education, are generally important in explaining differences in attitudes towards migration in comparison to other Western economies. However, structural effects such as institutions, history and culture tend to play a more dominant role in explaining differences compared to countries in Central and Eastern Europe.