Suchergebnisse

This paper combines increasing marginal cost and depreciation in a continuous‐time model of a durable‐goods monopolist. In contrast to the case of increasing marginal cost but no depreciation (analysed by Kahn) and the case of depreciation with constant marginal cost (analysed by Bond and Samuelson), steady‐state output in this model is less than in the competitive case. A turnpike result shows that choice of a long enough time horizon can make the equilibrium path of output in a finite‐horizon game arbitrarily close to the path of the infinite‐horizon game.

Abstract
Stringent environmental taxes in high-income countries are assumed to drive dirty industries to low-income countries, but the empirical evidence for ``pollution havens" is surprisingly weak. We demonstrate that a government trying to prevent flight by a ``dirty" durable good monopolist can impose an effluent tax that is offset by a lump-sum subsidy so that both firm profits and host-country welfare are increased. The scheme exploits the Coase Conjecture insight: a durable goods monopolist has a time-consistency dilemma that limits its ability to restrict future output. In this environment the effluent tax provides a credible commitment that restricts future supply. We assert that the use of lump-sum subsidies in strategic location competition is consistent with this mechanism, and this paradigm may be an important piece of the ``pollution haven paradox."

Once unquestionably the world's leading economic and industrial power, the United States now views with growing dismay the impressive industrial efficiency, vigorous work ethics, and large American holdings of various other nations. Is the United States truly lagging in its ability to compete effectively in world markets? Concern over this question has been voiced in both the business and government sectors, as well as by academic economists. A recent conference, sponsored by the National Bureau of Economic Research, explored the effects of trade policies on a nation's ability to compete in international markets. In Trade Policies for International Competitiveness, Robert C. Feenstra collects seven papers from the conference, each accompanied by discussants' comments, and adds a helpful introduction. Some of the issues considered by contributors are effects of macroeconomic and strategic foreign policies on competitiveness; the recent influx of foreign direct investment in the United States, primarily from Japan; the extent to which Japanese trade patterns are a reflection of underlying factor and endowments rather than trade barriers; and the market structure of Canadian industries, including applications for ongoing U.S.-Canadian free trade negotiations. Topical and provocative, these papers will be of value to economists, policymakers, and those in the business world