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Consequentialism
In: New problems of philosophy
Consequentialism is the view that the rightness or wrongness of actions depend solely on their consequences. It is one of the most influential, and controversial, of all ethical theories. In this book, Julia Driver introduces and critically assesses consequentialism in all its forms. After a brief historical introduction to the problem, Driver examines utilitarianism, and the arguments of its most famous exponents, John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham, and explains the fundamental questions underlying utilitarian theory: what value is to be specified and how it is to be maximized. Driver also discusses indirect forms of consequentialism, the important theories of motive consequentialism and virtue consequentialism, and explains why the distinction between subjective and objective consequentialism is so important. Including helpful features such as a glossary, chapter summaries, and annotated further reading at the end of each chapter, Consequentialism is ideal for students seeking an authoritative and clearly explained survey of this important problem.
Uneasy virtue
In: Cambridge studies in philosophy
MORAL EXPERTISE: JUDGMENT, PRACTICE, AND ANALYSIS
In: Social philosophy & policy, Band 30, Heft 1-2, S. 280-296
ISSN: 1471-6437
AbstractThis essay defends moral expertise against the skeptical considerations raised by Gilbert Ryle and others. The core of the essay articulates an account of moral expertise that draws on work on expertise in empirical moral psychology, and develops an analogy between moral expertise and linguistic expertise. The account holds that expertise is contrastive, so that a person is an expert relative to a particular contrast. Further, expertise is domain specific and characterized by "automatic" behavior and judgment. Some disagreements in the literature regarding moral expertise are diagnosed as being due to failures to adequately distinguish different ways in which someone can be a moral expert. For example, expertise in action does not imply expertise in judgment or analysis.
Forgiveness from a Feminist Perspective. By Kathryn Norlock. Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2009.Making Amends: Atonement in Morality and Politics. By Linda Radzik. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009
In: Signs: journal of women in culture and society, Band 36, Heft 3, S. 759-762
ISSN: 1545-6943
IMAGINATIVE RESISTANCE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL NECESSITY
In: Social philosophy & policy, Band 25, Heft 1, S. 301-313
ISSN: 1471-6437
Some of our moral commitments strike us as necessary, and this feature of moral phenomenology is sometimes viewed as incompatible with sentimentalism, since sentimentalism holds that our commitments depend, in some way, on sentiment. His dependence, or contingency, is what seems incompatible with necessity. In response to this sentimentalists hold that the commitments are psychologically necessary. However, little has been done to explore this kind of necessity. In this essay I discuss psychological necessity, and how the phenomenon of imaginative resistance offers some evidence that we regard our moral commitments as necessary, but in a way compatible with viewing them as dependent on desires (in some way). A limited strategy for defending sentimentalism against a common criticism is also offered.
Consequentialism and Feminist Ethics
In: Hypatia: a journal of feminist philosophy, Band 20, Heft 4, S. 183-199
ISSN: 1527-2001
Consequentialism and Feminist Ethics
In: Hypatia: a journal of feminist philosophy, Band 20, Heft 4, S. 183-199
ISSN: 1527-2001
Ideal Decision Making and Green Virtues
In: Advances in the Economics of Environmental Resources; Perspectives on Climate Change: Science, Economics, Politics, Ethics, S. 249-264
Cosmopolitan Virtue
In: Social theory and practice: an international and interdisciplinary journal of social philosophy, Band 33, Heft 4, S. 595-608
ISSN: 2154-123X
Book reviews
In: The European legacy: the official journal of the International Society for the Study of European Ideas (ISSEI), Band 2, Heft 5, S. 886-951
ISSN: 1470-1316