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In: Studies in comparative international development: SCID, Band 41, Heft 1, S. 53-75
ISSN: 1936-6167
In: APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper
SSRN
Working paper
In: Political research quarterly: PRQ ; official journal of the Western Political Science Association and other associations, Band 60, Heft 3, S. 401-414
ISSN: 1938-274X
This article examines the counterpoint to recent economic reform programs: policies that potentially defy the reform process. Policy "reversal" is particularly evident in the area of trade liberalization where nations reduced tariffs while simultaneously introducing nontariff barriers (NTB), particularly the widespread antidumping (AD) measure. This research seeks to identify the determinants of these new "postliberalization" trade policies by combining dominant interest group approaches with more state-centered explanations in an examination of two vigorous NTB users, South Africa and Mexico. The results of nested probit analyses suggest that private interests dominate the process in Mexico, while both interests and the state's overall strategic development objectives shape trade policy outcomes in South Africa.
In: Political research quarterly: PRQ ; official journal of Western Political Science Association, Pacific Northwest Political Science Association, Southern California Political Science Association, Northern California Political Science Association, Band 60, Heft 3, S. 401-414
ISSN: 1065-9129
In: Studies in comparative international development, Band 41, Heft 1, S. 53-75
ISSN: 0039-3606
Utilising a data set of non-tariff trade disputes from 1992 to 2001, the analysis employs probit maximum likelihood techniques to asses the relationship between trade policy outputs and economic and political factors. The findings suggest that economic factors, including import flows, and political factors such as the breadth of representation appear to condition trade policy decisions in Argentina. The results also suggest that overall macroeconomic context affects policy outputs. (InWent/GIGA)
World Affairs Online
In: Business and politics: B&P, Band 16, Heft 3, S. 453-479
ISSN: 1469-3569
Over time and across countries, researchers have noted frequent and mostly unexplained gender differences in the levels of support for policies of free or freer trade: according to aggregate results from many surveys, women tend to be less favorable toward policies of liberalizing trade than men. Positing an economic security explanation based largely on a mobile factors approach, we ask if it is women generally who are more negative toward trade or rather women who are more economically vulnerable – i.e., women from the scarce labor factor. We utilize data from two recent surveys on individuals' attitudes toward different facets of trade and its effects to examine this hypothesis empirically. Rejecting a monolithic definition of "women," we find that disaggregating by education level illuminates to some extent what underlying characteristics might be helping to drive some of these findings. Lower-skilled women in the US are much less likely to support free trade compared to higher-skilled women and this may largely explain previous negative findings. The low versus high-skill dynamic is, however, much less clear in the findings using survey data from a small sample of developing countries.
There has been growing tension at the intersection of health and economic policymaking as global governance has increased across sectors. This tension has been particularly evident between tobacco control and trade policy, as the international norms that frame them – particularly the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control and the World Trade Organization (WTO) – have continued to institutionalize. Using five case studies of major tobacco-related trade disputes from the principal multilateral system of trade governance – the WTO/General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade – we trace the evolution of these interacting norms over nearly 25 years. Our analytic framework particularly focuses on the actors that advance, defend and challenge these norms. We find that an increasingly broad network, which includes governments, intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations and members of the epistemic community, is playing a more active role in seeking to resolve these tensions. Moreover, key economic actors are beginning to incorporate health more actively in their messaging and activities. We also demonstrate that the most recent resonant messages reflect a more nuanced integration of the two norms. The tobacco control example has direct relevance to related policy areas, including environment, safety, access to medicines, diet, and alcohol.
BASE
SSRN
Working paper
In: William Davidson Institute Working Paper No. 1067
SSRN
Working paper
The tobacco industry has developed an extensive array of strategies and arguments to prevent or weaken government regulation. These strategies and arguments are well documented at the domestic level. However, there remains a need to examine how these arguments are reflected in the challenges waged by governments within the World Trade Organization (WTO). Decisions made at the WTO have the potential to shape how countries govern. Our analysis was conducted on two novel tobacco control measures: tobacco additives bans (Canada, United States and Brazil) and plain, standardized packaging of tobacco products (Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, EU and UK). We analyzed WTO documents (i.e. meeting minutes and submissions) (n=62) in order to identify patterns of argumentation and compare these patterns with well-documented industry arguments. The pattern of these arguments reveal that despite the unique institutional structure of the WTO, country representatives opposing novel tobacco control measures use the same non-technical arguments as those that the tobacco industry continues to use to oppose these measures at the domestic level.
BASE
In: Political research quarterly: PRQ ; official journal of the Western Political Science Association and other associations, Band 62, Heft 2, S. 303-316
ISSN: 1938-274X
Group theorists led by Olson have observed that common interests do not produce collective action, except under conditions that overcome the free-rider incentive. While collective action theories have captured the imagination of the discipline, there has been surprisingly little examination of the relationship between business collective action and patterns of market structures. Research has instead focused more on firm-level political activity. Accordingly, this research addresses the original theoretical propositions by examining industry associations' political activity nationally. Some forty years after the formulation of the theoretical argument, we find evidence supporting the logic of collective action. More concentrated industries are likelier to have politically active associations than more competitive industries. Adapted from the source document.
In: Political research quarterly: PRQ ; official journal of Western Political Science Association, Pacific Northwest Political Science Association, Southern California Political Science Association, Northern California Political Science Association, Band 62, Heft 2, S. 303-316
ISSN: 1065-9129
In: Business and politics: B&P, Band 10, Heft 3, S. 1-23
ISSN: 1469-3569
While there is a strong theoretical foundation for the relationship between business sectors' political spending and the policy benefits that they receive, the empirical support for it is mixed. We use the logic of this exchange to examine a policy area that directly and significantly affects all businesses, and is thus a most likely case, taxation. Using principally firm-level tax rates of a large random sample of U.S. corporations for the 1998–2005 time period, we determine whether lobbying has measurable effects on firm-level tax rates. Contrary perhaps to popular belief, or at least anecdotal illustration, we find after controlling for firm size and industry-level tax rates, among other controls, that there is no discernible effect of political spending on firm-level taxation: firms that spend more in an effort to affect policy generally or tax policy specifically are no more likely to benefit from lower tax rates. We also examine the possibility that firms in the same industry coordinate efforts to affect tax rates. While we find limited evidence that firms occasionally coordinate within industries – or at least lobby simultaneously – to affect tax rates, perhaps more importantly, we determine that free-riding by smaller firms at the expense of the largest firms is rampant.