The Citizen's Militia and security apparatus functioned under a single ministry – the Ministry of Public Security. They had a different remit but worked together on many occasions. The article talks about the officers of the two institutions in a comparative perspective. The text is based on statistical summaries compiled by the Ministry of Public Security in the 1940s and 1950s. The Ministry of Public Security's own studies have shown little difference between the statistical militiaman and officer of the Security Office. In the 1950s, militiamen were characterized by much poorer education and a higher percentage of those declaring religious practices. There were also far fewer women in their ranks. Despite this, the security apparatus officers treated the militiamen as someone inferior, and regarded the transition to the Citizen's Militia as a demotion.
The article discusses the issue of the fulfillment of compulsory military service by officers of the security apparatus. The author analyzes documents issued by both the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Public Security and points out that exemption from military service may have encouraged some officers to join the security services in the 1940s.
W badaniach nad komunistycznym aparatem bezpieczeństwa brakuje refleksji nad specyfiką kobiecych karier. Podejmuję ten problem, przyglądając się grupie funkcjonariuszek, które w latach 1944–1956 osiągnęły najwyższe stanowiska w strukturach bezpieki. Pracowały głównie w administracji, pionach gospodarczych i technicznych, natomiast rzadko w operacyjnych.
The paper discusses the attitude of the leadership of the Delegacy of Armed Forces at Home (DSZ) and the "Freedom and Independence" organization (WiN) towards an agreement reached on 21 May 1945 near Ruda Różaniecka between former units of the Polish Home Army and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists "Bandera" (OUN-B) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). The agreement undoubtedly led to the cessation of hostilities that had been going on in the Lublin Region since spring 1944. Making use of previously unknown records, the author proves that contrary to what numerous testimonies of that period say, the DSZ leaders accepted this local non-aggression pact. Although the leadership of the Delegacy of Armed Forces at Home approved of the armistice from the very beginning, they did not, however, want to sign any treaties, closer cooperate with OUN-B and UPA or promote the Ukrainian cause on the international agenda. Following the establishment of the "Freedom and Independence" organization which advocated a model of civilian conspiracy and dissociated itself from the Polish Government in Exile, both the Polish and Ukrainian side began to show less and less interest in cooperation. ; Artykuł porusza problem stosunku kierownictwa Delegatury Sił Zbrojnych oraz I Zarządu Głównego WiN do lokalnego porozumienia zawartego między polskim poakowskim podziemiem a ukraińskim (OUN-B, UPA) podczas spotkania przedstawicieli obu stron, 21 maja 1945 r., w okolicach Rudy Różanieckiej. Bez wątpienia zawarte wówczas zawieszenie broni obejmujące obszar południowo-wschodniej Lubelszczyzny i rozszerzone następnie na teren Podlasia przyczyniło się do zaprzestania trwających od wiosny 1944 r. walk polsko-ukraińskich. Autorka wykorzystując nieznane do tej pory dokumenty pokazuje, że wbrew temu co niejednokrotnie pisali świadkowie tamtych wydarzeń, zostało one zaakceptowane przez kierownictwo DSZ w formie lokalnego paktu o nieagresji. Przywódcy polskiej konspiracji od początku godzili się na zawieszenie broni, choć jednocześnie nie chcieli zawierania umów i nie widzieli możliwości bliższej współpracy i współdziałania z OUN-UPA czy reprezentowania sprawy ukraińskiej na forum międzynarodowym. Powstanie zaś Zrzeszenia Wolność i Niezawisłość, które proponowało cywilny model konspiracji i odcinało się od zwierzchnictwa Rządu na Uchodźstwie, przyczyniło się do tego, że strona ukraińska jak i polska były coraz mniej zainteresowane współpracą.
In Poland, high concentrations of particulate matter (with a diameter smaller than 2.5 or 10 μm) exceeding the WHO threshold values are often measured in winter, while ozone (O3) concentrations are high in spring. In winter high PM2.5 and PM10 concentrations are linked to high residential combustion and road transport. The main objective of this study was to assess performance of the Weather Research and Forecasting model with Chemistry (WRF-Chem) model in reproducing observations for a period of 2017–2018 covering various meteorological conditions. We compare modelled and observed exposure metrics for PM2.5, PM10 and O3 for two sets of the WRF-Chem model runs: with coarse and fine resolution emission inventory (European Monitoring and Evaluation Programme (EMEP) and Chief Inspectorate of Environmental Protection (CIEP), respectively). CIEP run reduces the negative bias of PM2.5 and PM10 and improves the model performance for number of days with exceedance of WHO (World Health Organization) threshold for PM2.5 and PM10 24-h mean concentration. High resolution emission inventory for primary aerosols helps to better distinguish polluted urban areas from non-urban ones. There are no large differences for the model performance for O3 and secondary inorganic aerosols, and high-resolution emission inventory does not improve the results in terms of 8-h rolling mean concentrations of ozone. ; This work was supported by the Polish National Science Centre grant no UMO-2017/25/B/ST10/01041. The research was supported by the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under grant agreement No 856599.
