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This paper focusses on the use of technology to improve democracy, comparing the cases of Estonia and Catalonia. Both examples are closely related in their use of technology to further democratize the decision-making processes, but have opposite starting points. Estonia's internet voting system is an offshoot of the comprehensive e-governance system developed by the Estonian government. It is meant to make it more convenient for people to vote and, thus, easier for them to take part in elections. In Catalonia, the online participation system Decidim, initially set up in the city of Barcelona, represents a bottom-up project that emerged from the 15 May protests and aims to make the representa-tive democratic system more direct and participatory. In our comparison we approach both paradigmatic cases from a theoretical reflection on the ideal types of democracy in relation to how decisions are made and by whom. Both projects have evolved and integrated new features that draw them together. First, internet voting is able to reach wider portions of society and digitally transform the Public Administration. Second, online participation platforms increase the potential for collecting citizens' proposals and enriching discussions. These features make them more like a mixed model which, in the current model of representative democracy, creates spaces for a more direct and deliberative democracy.

Intro -- Preface -- Organization -- Contents -- An Analysis of the Security and Privacy Issues of the Neovote Online Voting System -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Legal and Regulatory Constraints in France -- 3 Claims and Transparency -- 4 Code Re-use from Asmcrypto -- 4.1 General Copy -- 4.2 RSAES-PKCS -- 5 Publishing the Tally -- 6 Vote Verification -- 6.1 Availability of the Verification Process -- 6.2 Attacking the Ballot Box -- 6.3 Deanonymising the Votes -- 7 Discussion -- 8 Conclusion -- References -- Time, Privacy, Robustness, Accuracy: Trade-Offs for the Open Vote Network Protocol -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Preliminaries -- 2.1 Notations -- 2.2 Open Vote Network (OV-Net) -- 2.3 Denial of Service -- 3 Parallel OV-Net -- 4 Parallel OV-Net DoS Resilience -- 5 Tally-Combining Algorithms -- 5.1 Comparing Tally-Combining Algorithms -- 6 Privacy of Parallel OV-Net -- 6.1 Definitions and Assumptions -- 6.2 Basic Cases: M=k=1 and M 1, k=1 -- 6.3 General Case -- 7 Conclusions and Further Research -- References -- Review Your Choices: When Confirmation Pages Break Ballot Secrecy in Online Elections -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background and Related Work -- 3 Research Question and Scope -- 3.1 Vendor Demo Access Requests -- 4 Description of Simply Voting's System -- 4.1 Ballot Casting Process -- 4.2 Potential Side-channel Attacks in the Ballot Casting Process -- 5 Methodology -- 5.1 Testing a Length-Based Side-channel Attack -- 5.2 Technical Implementation of the Client Application -- 5.3 Technical Implementation of the Server Application -- 6 Experiment 1 (Single Contest): Township of Selwyn, Ward Lakefield -- 6.1 Data Collection -- 6.2 Data Analysis -- 7 Additional Experiments -- 7.1 Experiment 2 (Two Contests): Township of Selwyn, Ward Ennismore -- 7.2 Experiment 3 (Three Contests): Town of Ajax, Ward 1 -- 8 Mitigations.

This open access book LNCS 13353 constitutes the proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Electronic Voting, E-Vote-ID 2022, held in Bregenz, Austria, in October 2022. The 10 full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 39 submissions. The conference collected the most relevant debates on the development of Electronic Voting, from aspects relating to security and usability through to practical experiences and applications of voting systems, also including legal, social, or political aspects, amongst others.

Intro -- Preface -- Organization -- Contents -- Provably Improving Election Verifiability in Belenios -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Preliminaries -- 2.1 Introduction to Belenios -- 2.2 Election Verifiability and Attacks on Belenios -- 3 Towards Improved Election Verifiability -- 3.1 Protection Against Ballot Reordering -- 3.2 Protection Against a Corrupted Registrar -- 3.3 Putting the Labels Together -- 4 Specification and Verification -- 4.1 Specifying Protocols in Tamarin -- 4.2 Specification and Verification of Belenios+ -- 5 Conclusion and Future Work -- References -- Improving the Accuracy of Ballot Scanners Using Supervised Learning -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Related Work -- 3 Methods -- 3.1 Data -- 3.2 Baseline Model -- 3.3 CNN Model -- 3.4 Differences for Pueblo Dataset -- 4 Evaluation and Results -- 4.1 Baseline Model Performance -- 4.2 CNN Model Performance -- 4.3 Computational Costs -- 4.4 Hybrid Models -- 4.5 Optimized Baseline Model -- 4.6 Pueblo Test Results -- 5 Discussion -- 5.1 Future Work -- 6 Conclusion -- References -- STROBE-Voting: Send Two, Receive One Ballot Encoding -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Sample Methodology -- 3 Undervotes -- 4 A Detailed Example -- 5 Single-Ballot Variations -- 6 Usability -- 7 Hybrid Voting Systems -- 8 Attacks -- 9 Conclusions -- References -- Assertion-Based Approaches to Auditing Complex Elections, with Application to Party-List Proportional Elections -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Assertion-Based Auditing: Properties and Challenges -- 1.2 Assorters -- 1.3 Risk-Limiting Audits Using SHANGRLA: Pulling It All Together -- 1.4 Party-List Proportional Representation Contests -- 1.5 Related Work and Our Contribution -- 2 Preliminaries -- 2.1 Nomenclature and Notation for Assertion-Based Election Audits -- 2.2 Assertion-Based Auditing: Definitions -- 2.3 Example Assertions and Assorters.

Intro -- Preface -- Organization -- Contents -- Shifting the Balance-of-Power in STV Elections -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Preliminaries -- 3 Finding n-Seat Senate Manipulations -- 3.1 Finding Manipulations with Local Search -- 3.2 Choosing a Best Combination of Manipulations -- 4 Case Studies -- 5 Conclusion -- References -- Random Errors Are Not Necessarily Politically Neutral -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background on STV Counting -- 2.1 The Single Transferable Vote (STV) Counting Algorithm -- 2.2 Australian Vote Digitisation in Practice -- 3 Experimental Design -- 3.1 Analysis Code -- 3.2 Error Models -- 4 What Is a Realistic Error Rate? -- 4.1 Using Data from the Australian Electoral Commission -- 4.2 Informal Experiment -- 4.3 What Is the State of the Art in Digit Recognition Error Rate? -- 4.4 Analysing the Election Data (NOT Simulations) to Infer the Error rate -- 5 Results -- 5.1 Results from Truncation and Digit Error Models -- 5.2 Pairwise Digit Error Model -- 5.3 Sharp Transitions -- 5.4 Why Random Errors Affect Different Candidates Differently (Tasmania 2016) -- 5.5 Varying the Formality Requirements -- 5.6 Truncation of Preferences -- 6 Concluding Remarks -- References -- Tripped at the Finishing Line: The Åland Islands Internet Voting Project -- 1 Introduction: Three Contextual Questions -- 1.1 What Are the Åland Islands and How Does Their Electoral System Operate? -- 1.2 Why Were the Åland Islands Attempting to Use Internet Voting? -- 1.3 Why Are We Writing This Paper? -- 2 Stakeholders and Models of Failure -- 3 Methodology -- 4 Data Analysis -- 5 Discussion and Conclusions -- References -- Revisiting Practical and Usable Coercion-Resistant Remote E-Voting -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Analysis of NV12: Attacks and Problems -- 2.1 The Scheme: -- 2.2 Attacks -- 2.3 Security Problems -- 3 Protocol Description -- 3.1 Paillier Instantiation.

Intro -- Preface -- Organization -- Contents -- E-Voting - An Overview of the Development in the Past 15 Years and Current Discussions -- Abstract -- 1 Looking Back in Time: A Network Analysis -- 2 Methodology -- 3 Analysis -- 4 Conclusions -- Acknowledgements -- References -- UnclearBallot: Automated Ballot Image Manipulation -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background -- 2.1 Ballot Images -- 2.2 Image Audits -- 3 Attack Scenarios -- 4 Methodology -- 4.1 Reading the Ballot -- 4.2 Changing Marks -- 4.3 UnclearBallot -- 5 Evaluation -- 5.1 Testing Across Ballot Styles -- 5.2 Testing with Real Voted Ballots -- 6 Discussion and Mitigations -- 7 Conclusion -- References -- Election Manipulation with Partial Information -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Preliminaries and Prior Work -- 2.1 Modifying an Election Outcome -- 2.2 DistanceTo with Side Constraints -- 2.3 Minimising Change to First Preference Counts -- 3 Manipulation Algorithms -- 4 Results and Conclusions -- References -- Online Voting in a First Nation in Canada: Implications for Participation and Governance -- Abstract -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background -- 3 Indigenous Governance, Digital Technology and Online Voting -- 3.1 Indigenous Governance -- 3.2 Digital Technology and Online Voting -- 4 Methodology -- 4.1 A Community-Engaged Approach -- 4.2 Data Collection -- 5 Wasauksing First Nation and Their Land Code Ratification -- 6 Findings -- 6.1 Innovation and Community Modernization -- 6.2 Improving Community Connectedness -- 6.3 Self-determination and Self-government -- 7 Conclusion -- Acknowledgement -- References -- Online Voting in Ontario Municipal Elections: A Conflict of Legal Principles and Technology? -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background -- 2.1 Online Voting in Ontario Municipalities -- 2.2 Legal Context -- 3 Election Statistics -- 3.1 Initial Survey of Available Data -- 3.2 Data Collection Methodology.

Intro -- Preface -- Organization -- Contents -- Computing the Margin of Victory in Preferential Parliamentary Elections -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Notation -- 1.2 Summary of Results -- 1.3 Auditing and Accuracy Testing in Elections -- 2 Background -- 2.1 Computing Margins for an IRV Election -- 3 Calculating the Number of Votes to Change a Parliamentary Election Outcome -- 4 Results -- 5 Conclusion -- A Full List of Margins for the NSW 2015 State Election -- B Modified margin-irv: Computing the MOVC -- B.1 The DISTANCETO MIP -- References -- Ballot-Polling Risk Limiting Audits for IRV Elections -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Related Work -- 3 Preliminaries -- 4 Ballot-Polling Risk-Limiting Audits for FPTP -- 5 Ballot-Polling Risk-Limiting Audits for IRV -- 5.1 Auditing a Particular Elimination Order -- 5.2 Simultaneous Elimination -- 5.3 Winner only Auditing -- 5.4 A General Algorithm for Finding Efficient RLAs for IRV -- 6 Computational Results -- 7 Conclusion -- References -- The Threat of SSL/TLS Stripping to Online Voting -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Motivation -- 3 The Threat of TLS Stripping to Online Elections -- 3.1 Role of TLS in Online Elections -- 3.2 TLS Stripping -- 3.3 HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) -- 3.4 HSTS Preload List -- 3.5 Communicating Voting Website URLs -- 4 Study of HSTS Preload Adoption in Election-Related Websites -- 4.1 Election Websites -- 4.2 Online Voting Vendor Websites -- 4.3 Election Agencies -- 4.4 Voter Registration Websites -- 5 Barriers to Adoption -- 6 Conclusion -- References -- Modular Formalisation and Verification of STV Algorithms -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Generic STV Machine -- 2.1 The Machine States and Transitions -- 2.2 The Small-Step Semantics -- 2.3 The Generic STV Machine -- 2.4 Progress via the Applicability Conditions -- 3 Formalisation of the Generic Machine in Coq.

This volume contains the papers presented at E-Vote-ID 2021, the Sixth International Joint Conference on Electronic Voting, held during October 5–8, 2021. Due to the extraordinary situation brought about by the COVID-19, the conference was held online for the second consecutive edition, instead of in the traditional venue in Bregenz, Austria. The E-Vote-ID conference is the result of the merger of the EVOTE and Vote-ID conferences, with first EVOTE conference taking place 17 years ago in Austria. Since that conference in 2004, over 1000 experts have attended the venue, including scholars, practitioners, authorities, electoral managers, vendors, and PhD students. The conference focuses on the most relevant debates on the development of electronic voting, from aspects relating to security and usability through to practical experiences and applications of voting systems, also including legal, social, or political aspects, amongst others, and has turned out to be an important global referent in relation to this ...

This open access book constitutes the proceedings of the 8th International Joint Conference on Electronic Voting held in Luxemburg in October 2023. The conference collected the most relevant debates on the development of Electronic Voting, from aspects relating to security and usability through to practical experiences and applications of voting systems, also including legal, social, or political aspects, amongst others. The 9 full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 38 submissions. The selected papers cover a wide range of topics connected with electronic voting, including experiences and revisions of the actual uses of E-voting systems and corresponding processes in elections.

This volume contains papers presented at E-Vote-ID 2021, the Sixth International Joint Conference on Electronic Voting, held during October 5-8, 2021. Due to the extraordinary situation provoked by Covid-19 Pandemic, the conference is held online for second consecutive edition, instead of in the traditional venue in Bregenz, Austria. E-Vote-ID Conference resulted from the merging of EVOTE and Vote-ID and counting up to 17 years since the _rst E-Vote conference in Austria. Since that conference in 2004, over 1000 experts have attended the venue, including scholars, practitioners, authorities, electoral managers, vendors, and PhD Students. The conference collected the most relevant debates on the development of Electronic Voting, from aspects relating to security and usability through to practical experiences and applications of voting systems, also including legal, social or political aspects, amongst others; turning out to be an important global referent in relation to this issue. Also, this year, the conference consisted of: · Security, Usability and Technical Issues Track · Administrative, Legal, Political and Social Issues Track · Election and Practical Experiences Track · PhD Colloquium, Poster and Demo Session on the day before the conference E-VOTE-ID 2021 received 49 submissions, being, each of them, reviewed by 3 to 5 program committee members, using a double blind review process. As a result, 27 papers were accepted for its presentation in the conference. The selected papers cover a wide range of topics connected with electronic voting, including experiences and revisions of the real uses of E-voting systems and corresponding processes in elections. We would also like to thank the German Informatics Society (Gesellschaft für Informatik) with its ECOM working group and KASTEL for their partnership over many years. Further we would like to thank the Swiss Federal Chancellery and the Regional Government of Vorarlberg for their kind support. EVote- ID 2021 conference is kindly supported through European Union's Horizon 2020 projects ECEPS (grant agreement 857622) and mGov4EU (grant agreement 959072). Special thanks go to the members of the international program committee for their hard work in reviewing, discussing, and shepherding papers. They ensured the high quality of these proceedings with their knowledge and experience.