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Text kriticky reaguje na článek Marka Káčera Načo sa trápiť s otázkou existencie ľudských práv? (ČPVP 4/2020). Argumentuji, že autorova snaha o vyhnutí se filosofickým kontroverzím spojeným s pojmem lidských práv narazí na stejný typ problémů, s nimiž se potýkají přístupy, jež chce pragmatickým obratem překonat. Nosným neshledávám ani justifikační opření pragmatismu o údajný celosvětový překrývající se konsenzus stran praxe lidských práv. Poukazem na neúplnost právně-centralistického pohledu na lidská práva a zdůrazněním jejich sociálně-morálního podhoubí pak zpochybňuji i související tezi, že jako lidstvo jsme se pro lidská práva díky jejich všeobecné užitečnosti již "rozhodli", a tudíž není více důvod hledat jejich hlubší ospravedlnění.

The article deals with a pivotal conceptual distinction used in philosophical discussions about global justice. Cosmopolitans claim that arguing from the perspective of moral cosmopolitanism does not necessarily entail defending a global coercive political authority, or a 'world-state', and suggest that ambitious political and economic (social) goals implied in moral cosmopolitanism may be achieved via some kind of non-hierarchical, dispersed and/or decentralized institutional arrangements. I argue that insofar as moral cosmopolitans retain 'strong' moral claims, this is an untenable position, and that the goals of cosmopolitan justice, as explicated by its major proponents, require nothing less than a global state-like entity with coercive powers. My background ambition is to supplement some existing works questioning the notion of 'governance without government' with an argument that goes right to the conceptual heart of cosmopolitan thought. To embed my central theoretical argument in real-world developments, I draw on some recent scholarship regarding the nature of international organizations, European Union, or transnational democratization. Finally, I suggest that only after curbing moral aspirations in the first place can a more self-consciously moderate position be constructed, one that will carry practical and feasible implications for institutional design.

The article represents a contribution to discussions about the basis, motives, and goals of European integration stimulated by the recent "normative turn" in EU studies. My aim is threefold: By addressing the issue of internal legitimacy in EU decision-making, I wish to show that the European Union is in need of a public "story" of European integration; however, a closer analysis suggests that there is much normative disagreement on the values and principles that are supposed to define such "Europeanness." This is also relevant for Europe's role within the scene of international or global politics, where the EU aspires to become a leading actor or is supposed to do so by cosmopolitan-minded authors. Lastly, the text defends the usefulness of the traditional conceptual apparatus of political theory, which has -- in relation to European integration -- in recent times come under attack. Adapted from the source document.

Contemporary normative debates about justice increasingly revolve around the problem of extending the principles of justice (and corresponding theories) beyond the level of the nation-state, to which they have been for a long time confined. The article below discusses several authors from the wide and heterogenous politico-philosophical current of liberal egalitarianism, which can be considered one of the leading contemporary schools of thought, or the mainstream. There are two interrelated goals in this enterprise: First, to show how varied and cross-cutting the normative landscape of justice is, even within this specific current. Second, since I concentrate on the problem of extending the principles and theories of justice to supra-state levels, the universality (or the "cosmopolitan reach") of these ideas stands out as one of the most interesting features of these discussions. The work of Brian Barry, David Miller, Onora O'Neill and John Rawls exemplify many crucial issues that any theory of justice with cosmopolitan ambitions must cope with. The article concludes that the concept of (universal) human rights seems to be the only value that can buttress any cosmopolitan theories of justice; however, the normative debate over (1) their grounding, scope and corresponding obligations and (2) their connection to a comprehensive account of a good society, i.e. liberal democracy -- and therefore, the acknowledged danger of ethnocentrism -- is still far from being resolved. Adapted from the source document.