Suchergebnisse

Reciprocity can be a powerful motivation for human behaviour. Scholars argue that it is relevant in the context of private provision of public goods. We examine whether reciprocity can resolve the associated coordination problem. The interaction of reciprocity with cost-sharing is critical. Neither cost-sharing nor reciprocity in isolation can solve the problem, but together they have that potential. We introduce new network notions of reciprocity relations to better understand this. Our analysis uncovers an intricate web of nuances that demonstrate the attainable yet elusive nature of a unique outcome.

Parce que les revues préfèrent des résultats clairs, les chercheurs peuvent être tentés de s'engager dans des pratiques non éthiques, allant de la collecte de données supplémentaires pour atteindre un seuil de significativité jusqu'à la création de fausses données. Pour redresser les incitations des chercheurs, nous proposons un mécanisme par lequel les soumissions sont proposées sous enveloppe scellée. Les évaluations des éditeurs et des rapporteurs ne sont fondées que sur l'intérêt de la question de recherche et la méthode empirique proposée. Nous soutenons que les chercheurs honnêtes ne seront pas lésés par ce mécanisme, mais seront plutôt aidés par une meilleure protection. JEL Codes: A19, B49

We show experimentally that whether and how communication achieves beneficial social outcomes in a hidden-information context depends crucially on whether low-talent agents can participate in a Pareto-improving outcome. Communication is effective (and pat terns of lies and truth quite systematic) when this is feasible, but otherwise completely ineffective. We examine the data in light of two potentially relevant behavioral models: cost-of-lying and guilt-from-blame. (JEL D82, D83, Z13)

We study a class of deceptively similar games, which however have different player sets and predictions that vary with their cardinality. The economic, biological, political, and psychological applications are many. The game-theoretic principles involved are compelling as predictions rely on weaker and less controversial epistemic foundations than needed to justify backward inductions more generally. Is the account empirically relevant? We design and report results from a relevant experiment.