Suchergebnisse

AbstractThe management of forest resources in developing countries is often inefficient and this is particularly the case when forests are a public good managed by the state. These inefficiencies are generally the result of both externalities and free‐riding behaviour. The solution usually considered is to change the property rights structure of the resource, that is, privatisation of forests. It appears, however, that privatisation also has inefficiencies of its own, particularly when it is imposed on local populations. The aim of our contribution is to go beyond the usual state management versus privatisation debate, and to propose instead a property rights structure and related co‐ordination scheme which take into account the specific institutional circumstances of the economic setting in which the natural resources are being exploited. The purpose is to suggest solutions based on the need to attain coherence between the external institutional structure and the behaviour of local players. In others words, the challenge is to establish the conditions necessary for an induced—rather than imposed—institutional change. A property rights structure of a resource must consequently be analysed from two perspectives. The first, and more traditional one, sees property rights as an efficient institutional structure of production enabling a reduction in transaction costs. The second proposes to evaluate any given property rights structure from the standpoint of its ability to offer a solution to the issue of an effective link between the legal framework and the behaviour of the players. Our analysis will make use of our knowledge of the forest of Tiogo in Burkina Faso based on a survey organised in 12 riverside villages, and using a sample of 300 households. The case of the Tiogo Forest suggests that institutional change needs to follow an incremental and path‐dependent process within which the state is invited to play a major role together with the local communities. Indeed the institutional choices of the Tiogo Forest households indicate that they favour an inclusion of the local population in resource management and co‐administration of forestry resources with the state. Such an institutional structure favours a negotiated rather than an imposed scheduling of measures, and seeks a minimum of consensus to ensure the adhesion of actors and users to the new institutional arrangements, whilst limiting the number of bad players. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Philippe Dulbecco and Bertrand Laporte. — The financing of international trade security for developing countries : An approach in terms of « global public good » The aim of this article is to identify the modalities of financing international trade security, more specifically for developing countries. It characterises security using a global public good framework, before studying the conditions of financing the supply of the global public good security. A critical analysis of the various sources and instruments for financing allows the authors to propose different financing scenarios, based on specific allocations of responsibilities among the actors involved in security. The article concludes by considering the role of international institutions as managers of the financing and implementation of security in international trade.

Résumé Après des décennies d'ignorance mutuelle et de rivalité tacite, on assiste depuis quelques années à une multiplication des tentatives de rapprochement des approches autrichiennes et institutionnalistes. La question de la nature et du rôle du marché représente dans cette perspective un terrain de confrontation sans doute fructueux mais qui n'a pas jusqu'à aujourd'hui donné lieu à un traitement systématique. L'objet de notre article est de révéler les termes d'un dialogue entre économie autrichienne et institutionnaliste en ce qui concerne la notion de marché, les approches institutionnalistes étant de nature à compléter utilement les analyses autrichiennes modernes des processus de marché. Il s'agit pour nous de poser les bases d'une théorie générale de la dynamique du changement institutionnel des marchés conçus en termes de processus.

A close examination of the organisation of the clothing industry in Thailand exhibits a rather paradoxial situation: although the structural features of the sector - breaking down of the production process, high labour intensity, low asset specificity, unskilled labour - seem to legitimise a market co-ordination mechanism, it is a close, durable and multiform co-operation which cements the relations between contractors and subcontractors, as well as between the subcontractors themselves. (DSE/DÜI)

Résumé L'objet de cette contribution est de fondre dans un même cadre analytique les apports autrichiens dans le domaine de l'étude de la structure de la production et dans le domaine de la dynamique de la connaissance que les individus en ont ; et ce, dans la perspective de produire une théorie renouvelée de la firme et plus généralement de l'analyse de la coordination des activités entre les firmes. Dans le débat relatif au développement des nouvelles théories de la firme, il s'agit pour nous de souligner tout l'intérêt qu'il y a de considérer de très près ce que nous sommes convenus d'appeler une théorie autrichienne de l'entreprise qui, en réconciliant la dimension processuelle de la production et de la connaissance, propose une analyse minutieuse de la coordination dans le temps des plans des entreprises.

International audience ; The conditionality employed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in its lending policy is one of the main themes of controversy in the debate on the new international financial architecture. The purpose of this paper is to propose an analytical framework integrating the diverse explanations of the failure of IMF conditionality. Our analysis is based on the idea that the IMF is a key player in the running of markets in a global economy. More precisely, we explain that most of the criticisms concerning conditionality should be analyzed through what we agree to call the institutional failures of IMF conditionality. These institutional failures must be appreciated at two complementary levels: the first level refers to the intrinsic bureaucratic bias of the IMF while the second deals with the inability of the IMF to manage the institutional change required for the development of market processes and hence to maintain the institutional order in recipient countries. Although the first level failures have been particularly well studied via the international public choice approach, those of the second are, at best, often reduced to a simple statement. However, analyzing both levels of institutional failure of the IMF together is not without implications for the way in which the reforms of conditionality are conceived. Indeed, by including an analysis of the second level of failures, i.e. those relating to the relationship between conditionality and domestic institutional change, the recommendation of ex-ante conditionality emanating from the public choice approach, which tackles the first level of failures, will be invalidated. Instead a new approach will be proposed that suggests the separation of the role of the IMF as financial backer from its role as adviser to countries confronted by the globalization process.

International audience ; The conditionality employed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in its lending policy is one of the main themes of controversy in the debate on the new international financial architecture. The purpose of this paper is to propose an analytical framework integrating the diverse explanations of the failure of IMF conditionality. Our analysis is based on the idea that the IMF is a key player in the running of markets in a global economy. More precisely, we explain that most of the criticisms concerning conditionality should be analyzed through what we agree to call the institutional failures of IMF conditionality. These institutional failures must be appreciated at two complementary levels: the first level refers to the intrinsic bureaucratic bias of the IMF while the second deals with the inability of the IMF to manage the institutional change required for the development of market processes and hence to maintain the institutional order in recipient countries. Although the first level failures have been particularly well studied via the international public choice approach, those of the second are, at best, often reduced to a simple statement. However, analyzing both levels of institutional failure of the IMF together is not without implications for the way in which the reforms of conditionality are conceived. Indeed, by including an analysis of the second level of failures, i.e. those relating to the relationship between conditionality and domestic institutional change, the recommendation of ex-ante conditionality emanating from the public choice approach, which tackles the first level of failures, will be invalidated. Instead a new approach will be proposed that suggests the separation of the role of the IMF as financial backer from its role as adviser to countries confronted by the globalization process.

International audience ; The conditionality employed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in its lending policy is one of the main themes of controversy in the debate on the new international financial architecture. The purpose of this paper is to propose an analytical framework integrating the diverse explanations of the failure of IMF conditionality. Our analysis is based on the idea that the IMF is a key player in the running of markets in a global economy. More precisely, we explain that most of the criticisms concerning conditionality should be analyzed through what we agree to call the institutional failures of IMF conditionality. These institutional failures must be appreciated at two complementary levels: the first level refers to the intrinsic bureaucratic bias of the IMF while the second deals with the inability of the IMF to manage the institutional change required for the development of market processes and hence to maintain the institutional order in recipient countries. Although the first level failures have been particularly well studied via the international public choice approach, those of the second are, at best, often reduced to a simple statement. However, analyzing both levels of institutional failure of the IMF together is not without implications for the way in which the reforms of conditionality are conceived. Indeed, by including an analysis of the second level of failures, i.e. those relating to the relationship between conditionality and domestic institutional change, the recommendation of ex-ante conditionality emanating from the public choice approach, which tackles the first level of failures, will be invalidated. Instead a new approach will be proposed that suggests the separation of the role of the IMF as financial backer from its role as adviser to countries confronted by the globalization process.