Suchergebnisse

PART ONE OF THIS PAPER (LAST ISSUE) OUTLINED 4 ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO THE ANALYSIS OF NONCLASS PRODUCTION CLEAVAGES. IN THIS PAPER, SECTORAL ANALYSIS IS APPLIED TO THE ANALYSIS OF INFLUENCES ON POLITICAL ALIGNMENT, AND TO CLEAVAGE STRUCTURES UNDERLYING PARTY DIFFERENTIATION IN BRITAIN - PARTICULARLY UNION-NONUNION AND PUBLIC /PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT DIVISIONS IN THE WORKFORCE.

Developed is a systems analytic framework for analyzing power on single distributive issues, centering on the notion of measuring favorability, ie, the simultaneous favorableness of potential outcomes for two or more participants at each stage of the political process. This framework is applied to major themes in the community power literature to show how necessary distinctions can be made between the effects of power & nonpower factors, & between power exertion by participants & others, such as gatekeepers, with other reasons for involvement. Conventional political science approaches are criticized for disregarding the close connection between the definition of issues & of interests, & a radical political science approach is developed centering on the use of favorability scales derived from a concept of feedback effects from policy outcomes to input points, participants' power resources, the mobilization of bias in the issue system, & similar variables in other issue systems. 4 Figures. AA.

THIS ARTICLE APPLIES FOUR THEORIES OF THE STATE TO THE ANALYSIS OF A MAJOR POLICY CRISIS, THE WESTLAND AFFAIR OF 1985-6. THE PLURALIST GOVERNMENTAL POLITICS MODEL OFFERS A NARROWLY POLITICAL ACCOUNT STRESSING THAT MULTIPLE ACTORS WERE INVOLVED, AND THAT POLICY EMERGED FROM A COMPLEX SEQUENCE OF INDIVIDUAL DECISIONS, WITH PLENTY OF ROOM FOR MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND SLIP-UPS. THE INSTRUMENTAL MARXIST VIEW BY CONTRAST EMPHASIZES THE PENETRATION OF GOVERNMENT BY BUSINESS INTERESTS AND THE CLOSED, ELITE CHARACTER OF DECISION MAKING. THE POLICY ENTREPRENEUR EXPLANATION OFFERS A 'NEW RIGHT' ACCOUNT: THE AFFAIR WAS BORN FROM A CLASH BETWEEN A SPENDING MINISTER USING PUBLIC MONIES TO PURSUE PERSONAL INTERESTS, AND CENTRAL ACTORS AND AGENCIES SEEKING TO LIMIT THE COMMITMENT OF STATE EXPENDITURE. FINALLY, THE 'SYMBOLIC POLITICS' INTERPRETATION ANALYSES THE CRISIS AS THE INTERACTION OF FOUR IDEOLOGICALLY RESONANT 'GAMES' - ABOUT LEADERSHIP CHALLENGES, LEAKING OF GOVERNMENT 'SECRETS', EXECUTIVEPARLIAMENT RELATIONS, AND MASS MEDIA 'BATTLES'.

Applies 4 theories of the state to the analysis of a major policy crisis, the Westland affair of 1985-6. The pluralist governmental politics model offers a narrowly political account; the instrumental Marxist-view emphasizes the penetration of government by business interests and the closed, elite character of decision making. The policy entrepreneur explanation offers a 'new right' account; and the 'symbolic politics' interpretation analyses the crisis as the interaction of 4 ideologically resonant 'games'. (Abstract amended)

A number of ways for improving the state of the art are identified, focusing on a renewal of theoretical input, the correction of some 'system biases', greater methodological pluralism and more integration of demand-side and supply-side studies. (Abstract amended)

Draws an analytic picture of the contemporary structure of the British central state. The first section is concerned with the theoretical rationale for the project. The second section recaps the usefulness of the previously developed bureau-shaping model of bureaucracy, and extends it. The third section explains how the model's categories have been operationalized here. (Abstract amended)

Demonstrates that the bureau-shaping model is highly effective in systematising and extending knowledge of how Whitehall and directly attached agencies are structured. The main types of organisations identified share many similarities, so that the model's categories have a clear intuitive meaning. (Abstract amended)

THIS ARTICLE FORMS PART OF A LONGER-TERM PROJECT DEALING WITH THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC CHOICE THEORIES IN POLITICAL SCIENCE. THE FOCUS HERE IS ON ECONOMIC MODELS OF BUREAUCRACY, WHICH DESPITE THEIR INCREASING THEORETICAL SIGNIFICANCE AND INFLUENCE ON PRACTICAL POLITICS HAVE HERETOFORE BEEN LITTLE ANALYSED, EXCEPT BY THEIR EXPONENTS. DURLEARY ARGUES THAT AMONGST EXISTING PUBLIC CHOICE ACCOUNTS THERE ARE TWO SEMINAL WORKS, ANTONY DOWNS'S PLURALIST TREATMENT IN INSIDE BUREAUCRACY AND WILLIAM NISKANEN'S NEW RIGHT THESIS IN BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT. THE CENTRAL INNOVATION OF ECONOMIC APPROACHES IS THEIR STRESS ON RATIONAL OFFICIALS' ATTACHMENT TO BUDGET MAXIMIZATION STRATEGIES, IN DOWN'S CASE THIS IS A FINITE MAXIMAND LIMITED BY BUREAUCRATS CONSERVATISM AND OTHER MOTIVATIONS. BUT IN NISKANEN'S CASE BUDGET MAXIMIZATION IS AN OPEN-ENDED PROCESS, CONSTRAINED ONLY BY EXTERNAL LIMITS ON AGENCIES ABILITIES TO PUSH ON THEIR BUDGETS. NONE THE LESS, DESPITE THEIR DISPARATE APPROACHES AND CONCLUSIONS, BOTH THESE BOOKS SHARE FAILINGS COMMON TO ALMOST ALL OTHER PUBLIC CHOICE WORK IN THE FIELD: (1) THEY OPERATE WITH VAGUE AND ILL-DEFINED DEFINITIONS OF BUREAUCRATS' UTILITY FUNCTIONS. (2) THEY ASSUME THAT ALL BUREAUCRACIES ARE HIERARCHICAL LINE AGENCIES.

E-government is about making the full range of government activities - internal processes, the development of policy and services to citizens - available electronically. Despite the bursting of the over-inflated dot com bubble, electronic interactions have rapidly shown astonishing potential for transforming the internal activities of all kinds of organisations and dramatically altering the relationships between organisations and those who use them - in particular, firms and their customers. As a Dutch parliamentary committee put it, 'Information and Communication Technology (ICT) is not a supporting technology, but coincides with the primary process and touches government at its core' (ICT and Government Advisory Committee, 2001: 9). Yet (in the UK in particular) the potential of web-based technologies are taking much longer to be realised in government. Why? What are the obstacles to the development of e-government - do they come from within government organisations themselves, or from society? Are they ingrained in organisational structures and societal interactions - or can they be overcome and if so, how? This short paper reviews and categorises the cultural barriers to e-government, drawing on experiences from overseas and the private sector; cultural theory; social psychological research into societal use of information and communication technologies; and organisational research into the relationship between such technologies and organisational change. It goes on to consider how these barriers can be overcome. Appendix one provides - for the supply side - a short quiz that a civil servant in charge of the development of e-government should consider undertaking to identify the cultural barriers within their own organisational unit.