Suchergebnisse

Rational choice (RC) is currently the dominant research programme in political science. This contribution briefly presents this research programme and then tackles criticisms concerning 1.) the empirical plausibility of the rationality assumption, 2.) the results of empirical RC research and 3.) the supposedly lacking ability of RC to prescribe action. Partly the criticisms are shown to be mistaken, partly the argument put forward is that the alternative approaches advocated by the critics are highly problematic in several respects. The contribution ends with a brief discussion of four strengths of the RC approach that together explain why this approach has turned out to be a progressive research programme that manages to offer important insights in all areas of political science. Adapted from the source document.

Rational choice (RC) is currently the dominant research programme in political science. This contribution briefly presents this research programme and then tackles criticisms concerning 1.) the empirical plausibility of the rationality assumption, 2.) the results of empirical RC research and 3.) the supposedly lacking ability of RC to prescribe action. Partly the criticisms are shown to be mistaken, partly the argument put forward is that the alternative approaches advocated by the critics are highly problematic in several respects. The contribution ends with a brief discussion of four strengths of the RC approach that together explain why this approach has turned out to be a progressive research programme that manages to offer important insights in all areas of political science. Adapted from the source document.

I argue that the intra-European integration of services trade, even if it threatens to impose costs on third countries in the short run, on average makes the European Union (EU) more open to foreign service providers. The reasoning is that third countries are likely to respond to discrimination in ways that ensure continued openness of the EU. This may be achieved by (a combination of) concessions that entice a change in the EU's policies, unilateral policy changes, or threats that force EU policy adjustments. Regional integration in the service sector thus does not result in Fortress Europe but in Open Door Europe. I show the plausibility of this argument by analysing the external consequences of three steps towards completing the Single Market in the area of financial services. Adapted from the source document.

How much influence do interest groups have on policy outcomes in the European Union (EU)? This question is highly relevant for both debates on the democratic legitimacy of the EU and our understanding of policy-making processes in this entity. Nevertheless, because of the difficulties inherent in measuring interest group influence, it has been addressed by only a small number of studies. The purpose of this research note is to stimulate further research by clearly identifying the methodological problems and suggesting ways of how to overcome them. In doing so, I distinguish three broad approaches to measuring interest group influence: process-tracing, assessing 'attributed influence' and gauging the degree of preference attainment. Although the review reveals that all three approaches have their shortcomings, I conclude that the difficulty of measuring influence should not be exaggerated either. Methodological triangulation, 'method-shopping' and larger-scale data collection should allow us to improve on the state of the art. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright 2008.]

Shortly after the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC, 1958), European countries accepted a far-reaching liberalization of their previously fairly protectionist external trade relations. I provide an explanation of this astonishing development that builds on the argument that the establishment of a customs union increases the bargaining power of its member countries in international trade negotiations. When facing discrimination from a customs union, exporters in excluded countries have an incentive to become politically active and lobby their governments for relief. This increase in exporter lobbying, in turn, weakens the negotiating position of excluded countries in international trade negotiations by making them more eager to achieve a negotiated agreement that lowers the external barriers of the customs union. The evidence presented backs this argument by showing that the EEC member countries accepted external trade liberalization in the 1960s because they could gain disproportionate concessions for European exporting interests in international trade negotiations. [Reprinted by permission; copyright 2008 Sage Publications Ltd. & ECPR-European Consortium for Political Research.]

Studies of EU trade policy-making often suggest that delegation of trade authority from the national to the European level strengthened the autonomy of public actors in formulating trade policies. Little empirical research, however, has been undertaken to corroborate this contention. To improve on this situation, I carry out two case studies of the EU's participation in the multilateral trade negotiations known as the Kennedy Round (1964 -67) and the Doha Development Agenda (2001 onwards). The analysis reveals that in both cases the EU's negotiating position was largely in line with the demands voiced by economic interests. Although this finding is no proof of economic interests actually determining EU trade policies, it casts some doubt on the autonomy thesis. I also discuss some factors that indicate that interest group influence may be the most plausible explanation for the finding. Adapted from the source document.

The question of interest group influence is central for both scholars interested in studying policy-making in the EU and those concerned with the legitimacy of decision-making in that entity. Many hypotheses exist that stress a series of factors possibly shaping interest group influence. Nevertheless, only few studies have tried empirically to examine these hypotheses for the case of the EU. What is more, existing empirical studies report contradictory findings. To help researchers advance upon this state of the art, three obstacles that impede research dealing with interest group influence in the EU are discussed: defining the terms 'power' and 'influence'; accounting for different pathways to influence; and measuring influence. In addition to this, several ways to address these obstacles are advanced: by taking a pragmatic approach with respect to defining influence and power; by being conscious that actors may use different pathways to influence when drawing conclusions about interest group influence; and by combining different methods when measuring influence. Adapted from the source document.

Recently, the EU concluded trade agreements with emerging markets in different regions of the world. What explains the EU's pursuit of these agreements? I present an argument that suggests that exporters in the EU mobilize in response to discrimination abroad and push the EU to conclude trade agreements to protect their foreign market access. In two case studies, I show that this protection-for-exporters argument offers a plausible account for the EU's agreements with Mexico and Chile. Adapted from the source document.

Current research suggests that changes in societal demands or in political institutions propelled the far-reaching reduction of American external trade barriers since the mid-1930s, yet is unable to account for the exact pattern or timing of trade liberalization. I argue instead that exporters lobby more against losses than in favor of gains of foreign market access. Whenever foreign countries inhibit access to their markets by establishing a discriminatory trading arrangement, negatively affected exporters mobilize in defense of their interests. This lobbying then prompts excluded countries' governments to engage in policies aimed at the protection of exporter interests. Applying this argument to U.S. trade policies from the 1930s to the 1960s, I demonstrate that American exporters repeatedly mobilized in response to discrimination in Europe. The resulting peaks in exporter mobilization explain the passage of the important trade bills known as the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (1934) & Trade Expansion Act (1962). Tables, Figures, Graphs, References. Adapted from the source document.

A review essay on the following books: Vinod K. Aggarwal and Edward A. Fogarty (eds.)EU Trade Strategies: Between Regionalism and Globalism(Houndmills: Palgrave, 2004), Manfred Elsig The EU's Common Commercial Policy: Institutions, Interests and Ideas(Aldershot: Asgate, 2002), Patrick A. Messerlin Measuring the Costs of Protection in Europe: European Commercial Policy in the 2000s(Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2001), Sophie Meunier Trading Voices: The European Union in International Commercial Negotiations(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), and Alasdair Young Extending European Cooperation: The European Union and the 'New' International Trade Agenda(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002).

Large variation exists in the extent to which national interest groups focus on European Union (EU) legislation and carry out their political activities in Brussels and Strasbourg. What explains this variation? We propose a series of hypotheses that suggest that business groups, and groups active in policy areas with high EU competence, are more Europeanized than other groups. The effect of group type, moreover, is conditional on the material resources a group possesses: we expect the difference between business and non-business groups to be largest for actors that are well endowed with material resources. Using novel data on 880 national associations, gained from a survey of interest groups in five European countries, we find support for these hypotheses. The article has implications for the literatures on lobbying, Europeanization, and theories of European integration. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), which envisages stricter standards for the transnational enforcement of intellectual property rights, received strong support from business groups. Nevertheless, a campaign against the agreement that was initiated by a small number of citizen groups was successful in stopping its ratification in the European Union (EU). This result is puzzling because the anti-ACTA side controlled few material resources and should have found it difficult to have its voice heard on an issue negotiated at the international level. We explain the success of the anti-ACTA campaign by showing how interest groups managed to increase the public salience of the issue; how the increasing public salience motivated a growing number of interest groups to mobilize; and how the resulting dynamic made decision-makers opt against ratification of the agreement. The article advances scholarly understanding of the interaction between lobbying and public opinion and sheds light on the defeat of ACTA. Adapted from the source document.