The resource curse: a corporate transparency channel
In: Discussion paper series 6547
In: Development economics, financial economics and public policy
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In: Discussion paper series 6547
In: Development economics, financial economics and public policy
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In: Journal of Accounting and Economics, Forthcoming
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We propose a new channel through which expropriation risk reduces capital allocation efficiency and decreases firm growth. We build an agency model of corporate disclosure when companies face risks of expropriation. The model predicts that in countries with insecure property rights, corporations mitigate the risk of expropriation by reducing transparency. We test this channel by employing a difference-in-difference approach. Using a panel of over 16,000 firms from 84 countries, we find that transparency of companies prone to expropriation is lower in countries with insecure property rights. The reduced transparency has an adverse effect on the efficiency of capital allocation and corporate growth.
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We propose a new channel through which expropriation risk reduces capital allocation efficiency and decreases firm growth. We build an agency model of corporate disclosure when companies face risks of expropriation. The model predicts that in countries with insecure property rights, corporations mitigate the risk of expropriation by reducing transparency. We test this channel by employing a difference-in-difference approach. Using a panel of over 16,000 firms from 84 countries, we find that transparency of companies prone to expropriation is lower in countries with insecure property rights. The reduced transparency has an adverse effect on the efficiency of capital allocation and corporate growth.
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We analyze initial public offering (IPO) activity under political uncertainty surrounding gubernatorial elections in the United States. There are fewer IPOs originating from a state when it is scheduled to have an election. To establish identification, we develop a neighboring-states method that uses bordering states without elections as a control group. The dampening effect of elections on IPO activity is stronger for firms with more concentrated businesses in their home states, firms that are more dependent on government contracts (particularly state contracts), and harder-to-value firms. This dampening effect is related to lower IPO offer prices (hence, higher costs of capital) during election years.
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In: Pace University Finance Research Paper No. 2012/07
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In: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis (JFQA), Forthcoming
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In: Pace University Finance Research Paper No. 2012/04
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In: Pace University Finance Research Paper No. 2011/07
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In: NBER Working Paper No. w8093
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