Thedistribution of wealth with imperfect altruism
In: CORE discussion paper 9558
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In: CORE discussion paper 9558
In: Core discussion paper 9330
In: Journal of development economics, Band 28, Heft 3, S. 341-363
ISSN: 0304-3878
In: The international library of critical writings in economics 324
In: An Elgar research collection
In: NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics, Band 9, Heft 1, S. 292-297
ISSN: 2150-8372
We study the efficient allocation of spending and taxation authority in a federation in which federal politicians are exposed to electoral uncertainty. We show that centralization may, but need not, result in a loss of electoral accountability. We identify an important asymmetry between positive and negative externalities and show that centralization may not be efficient in economies with positive externalities even when regions are identical and centralization does not entail a loss of accountability. We also show that decentralization can only Pareto dominate centralization in economies with negative externalities.
BASE
We study the efficient allocation of spending and taxation authority in a federation in which federal politicians are exposed to electoral uncertainty. We show that centralization may, but need not, result in a loss of electoral accountability. We identify an important asymmetry between positive and negative externalities and show that centralization may not be efficient in economies with positive externalities even when regions are identical and centralization does not entail a loss of accountability. We also show that decentralization can only Pareto dominate centralization in economies with negative externalities.
BASE
In: Economics & politics, Band 20, Heft 3, S. 335-360
ISSN: 0954-1985
In: Frontiers of theoretical economics, Band 4, Heft 1
ISSN: 1935-1704
In a number of evolutionary models the presence of mutations, or random components of choice, serve to refine predictions of long-run behavior. We analyze the effects of mutation rates that vary because of the presence of imitation. A full characterization of long-run outcomes is provided for familiar coordination and congestion games, and also a number of other games not previously considered within the evolutionary framework. Our results are often quite distinct from those in the literature. We apply these tools to a series of economic applications, including market games, where imitation can explain excess volatility of prices, and location games, where it leads to greater uniformity in choices.
In: IMF Working Paper, S. 1-37
SSRN
In: Economica, Band 68, Heft 271, S. 293-316
ISSN: 1468-0335
We estimate a model of consumption and money holdings with multiple means of payment, using data for the United Kingdom. The model describes a technology for transactions, where money and credit are imperfect substitutes. It allows us to identify shocks to the transactions technology. We evaluate the value of long‐term changes in the payments systems to the representative consumer, as well as the welfare cost of inflation from 1977 to 1998. The estimates allow us to evaluate the welfare costs of inflation of this period. The model also has implications for consumption‐smoothing in response to monetary shocks.
In: Journal of economic dynamics & control, Band 20, Heft 8, S. 1395-1425
ISSN: 0165-1889
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3022
SSRN
In: Economics & politics, Band 20, Heft 3, S. 335-360
ISSN: 1468-0343
This paper evaluates the extent of regulation in a democracy with corruption. Elected politicians can restrict entry of firms in exchange for bribes from entrepreneurs. Full liberalization implies free entry and allocative efficiency. Voters re‐elect politicians based on observed performance. We demonstrate that voters agree to tolerate corruption and inefficient regulation; that efficient policies can be promoted by productivity growth; that productivity growth reduces the cost of providing wage incentives; and that corruption is procyclical and economic policy is countercyclical in a corrupt democracy.
In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 23, Heft 3, S. 734-753