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Current research has argued that direct legislation makes democracies better by helping to encourage better democratic citizenship. In this study, the author tests whether these effects are conditional on the diversity of the electorate. Theoretically, he argues that policy making by majority rule will create conflict because of the perceived threat of large numerical minorities by majority groups. The author hypothesizes that in areas of greater diversity, democratic citizenship socialization effects can be mitigated, especially as it relates to trusting strangers. Using pooled data from the American National Election Study, the author demonstrates the diversity conditional effects of ballot initiative context on generalized trust. Adapted from the source document.

Current research has argued that direct legislation makes democracies better by helping to encourage better democratic citizenship. In this study, the author tests whether these effects are conditional on the diversity of the electorate. Theoretically, he argues that policy making by majority rule will create conflict because of the perceived threat of large numerical minorities by majority groups. The author hypothesizes that in areas of greater diversity, democratic citizenship socialization effects can be mitigated, especially as it relates to trusting strangers. Using pooled data from the American National Election Study, the author demonstrates the diversity conditional effects of ballot initiative context on generalized trust.

Over the past thirty years, the cumulative effects of direct democracy have served to decrease both levels of taxation and spending in the American states. Yet conservative budgetary policy measures passed during this time period were likely to occur in liberal states. Using data on over thirty separate ballot issues, the author offers a solution to this puzzle, demonstrating that distrusting government serves as a consistently robust predictor of conservative policy choice. The implication of this finding is that citizens often choose conservative policy outcomes because they believe that government is functionally incapable of giving them what they want. Adapted from the source document.

Over the past thirty years, the cumulative effects of direct democracy have served to decrease both levels of taxation and spending in the American states. Yet conservative budgetary policy measures passed during this time period were likely to occur in liberal states. Using data on over thirty separate ballot issues, the author offers a solution to this puzzle, demonstrating that distrusting government serves as a consistently robust predictor of conservative policy choice. The implication of this finding is that citizens often choose conservative policy outcomes because they believe that government is functionally incapable of giving them what they want.

An abundance of recent research has suggested that direct democracy institutions, such as the initiative and referendum, craft an environment ripe for encouraging better democratic citizenship. High and frequent exposure to ballot measures has been shown to increase the awareness, efficacy, political participation, and even the general level of happiness of citizens. In contrast to these studies, I develop and test a theory that the use of ballot initiatives undermines the ability of government to prove themselves trustworthy. Using data from two surveys, I demonstrate that ballot initiatives in the American states do indeed create an environment that encourages citizens to distrust their government. The findings have implications in assessing the positive externalities to direct legislation as well as in understanding policy choice made in these elections.

We explore the role of "political discontent" as a second dimension of American public opinion. Others have shown that a second dimension tends to capture social and/or racial attitudes. What happens when indicators of discontent are included in such analyses? Using data from two surveys and the ordered optimal classification (OOC) procedure, we scale seven items from the "discontent" literature alongside a larger set of questions that has been shown to capture the two-dimensional structure of mass opinion. Discontent items dominate the second dimension in both data sets. Further, five of the seven items predict voting for "insurgents" in the 2016 presidential primaries. Second-dimension attitudes matter in elections and concern the political system writ large. By extension, the liberal-conservative heuristic gives an incomplete picture of mass political behavior.

Americans born before 1980, called Millennials, are repeatedly treated as a singular voting bloc, but much like the Baby Boomers, have been socialized across a series of very different elections. We develop a theory of millennial political socialization that argues that older Millennials are more tied to the Democratic party and more liberal than their younger counterparts. We use the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study and an original survey of 1274 Americans conducted before the 2016 elections to test this theory. We find some support for our theory; in addition, we find that younger Millennials are socialized by issues of identity politics and culture – specifically on issues of immigration and the role of race in society. This implies a generation that largely favors Democrats, but whose Republicans are more culturally conservative than middle aged Republican voters.

This article uses relatively novel techniques (geographic information systems, spatial regression) to provide counterevidence to the reasoning voter hypothesis in previous studies of direct democracy. We apply these methods to voting data in relation to the spatial implications of Proposition 83, a 2006 California ballot initiative that set residency restrictions upon felons convicted of sexual offenses to 2,000 feet beyond the boundaries of parks and schools. We apply a theoretical framework that argues that geographic/spatial awareness is often subject to affective responses. Our hypothesis suggests that, in the absence of clear costs/benefits and without explicit cues concerning the complexity of the spatial environment, voters' abilities to place self‐interested votes become more susceptible to affect and symbols. Our models support this idea: partisan, ideological, and affective determinants dominate the model, while geographic self‐interest is unrelated to voting behavior on Proposition 83.Related Articles:"Citizen Trust, Political Corruption, and Voting Behavior." (2010) http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2010.00267.x/abstract"Community Policing, Trust, and Muslim Communities in Relation to "New Terrorism." (2010)http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2010.00258.x/abstract"Moral Values and Vote Choice in the 2004 U.S. Presidential Election." (2007)http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2007.00058.x/abstractRelated Media: Video Clip: "Jessica's Law Dilemma: Homeless Sex Offenders." (ABC7News 2010) http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=news/iteam&id=7245220Este artículo usa técnicas relativamente nuevas (SIG, regresión espacial) para proveer un contraargumento a la hipótesis del elector racional en estudios previos en democracia directa (e.g., Lupia 1994). Aplicamos estos métodos a información electoral en relación a las implicaciones espaciales de la Proposición 83, una iniciativa de California en 2006 que estableció restricciones de residencia para personas sentenciadas por delitos sexuales a mantener una distancia de 600 metros de los límites de parques y escuelas. Aplicamos un marco teórico donde argumentamos que la conciencia geográfica/espacial está sujeta a respuestas afectivas frecuentemente. Nuestra hipótesis sugiere que, en la ausencia de costos/beneficios explícitos y sin una indicación clara acerca de la complejidad espacial del entorno, la habilidad de los electores para votar en su propio interés se vuelve más susceptible a emociones y símbolos. Nuestros modelos apoyan esta idea: determinantes partidistas, ideológicos y afectivos dominan el modelo, mientras que interés individual geográfico no está relacionado al comportamiento electoral en la Proposición 83.