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Dynamic Pivotal Politics
In: American political science review, Band 112, Heft 3, S. 580-601
ISSN: 1537-5943
We analyze a dynamic extension of a parsimonious model of lawmaking in which preferences evolve over time and today's policy becomes tomorrow's status quo. Unlike in existing models of pivotal politics, policy makers' voting behavior depends on the institutional environment and on their expectations about future economic and political shocks. Relative to sincere voting, the equilibrium behavior exhibits a strategic polarization effect, which increases with the degree of consensus required by the institution, the volatility of the policy environment, and the expected ideological polarization of the future policy makers. The equilibrium behavior also exhibits a strategic policy bias, which works against any exogenous policy bias embedded in the voting rule. Our analysis implies that the existing literature underestimates the inertial effect of checks and balances and overestimates the impact of institutional biases such as fiscally conservative budget procedures.
Dynamic pivotal politics
In: American political science review, Band 112, Heft 3, S. 580-601
ISSN: 0003-0554
World Affairs Online
Dynamic Pivotal Politics
SSRN
Working paper
Dynamic pivotal politics
We analyze a dynamic extension of a parsimonious model of lawmaking in which preferences evolve over time and today's policy becomes tomorrow's status quo. Unlike in existing models of pivotal politics, policy makers' voting behavior depends on the institutional environment and on their expectations about future economic and political shocks. Relative to sincere voting, the equilibrium behavior exhibits a strategic polarization effect, which increases with the degree of consensus required by the institution, the volatility of the policy environment, and the expected ideological polarization of the future policy makers. The equilibrium behavior also exhibits a strategic policy bias, which works against any exogenous policy bias embedded in the voting rule. Our analysis implies that the existing literature underestimates the inertial effect of checks and balances and overestimates the impact of institutional biases such as fiscally conservative budget procedures. ; Loeper gratefully acknowledges support from the Ministerio Economía y Competitividad (Spain), Grants No. RYC-2015-18326, No. ECO 2013-42710-P, No. MDM 2014-0431, and Comunidad de Madrid, MadEco-CM (S2015/HUM-3444)
BASE
Communication with Detectable Deceit
SSRN
Working paper
Dynamic Collective Choice with Endogenous Status Quo
In: Journal of political economy, Band 124, Heft 4, S. 1148-1186
ISSN: 1537-534X
Dynamic Collective Choice with Endogenous Status Quo
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Working paper
Voting Rules in a Changing Environment
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Working paper
Dynamic collective choice with endogenous status quo
This paper analyzes an ongoing bargaining situation in which preferences evolve over time and the previous agreement becomes the next status quo, determining the payoffs until a new agreement is reached. We show that the endogeneity of the status quo exacerbates the players' conflict of interest and decreases the responsiveness of the bargaining outcome to the environment. In some cases, it can lead the negotiations to complete gridlock. Compared to a bargaining protocol with an exogenous status quo, the status quo stays in place more often and equilibrium welfare is lower. In a legislative setting, this model shows that the inertial effect of the endogenous status quo can be mitigated by concentrating decision power, and can be eliminated by sunset provisions.
BASE
Political Scandal: A Theory
In: American journal of political science, Band 65, Heft 1, S. 197-209
ISSN: 1540-5907
AbstractWe study a model that characterizes the conditions under which past misbehavior becomes the subject of present scandal, with consequences for both the implicated politician and the parties that work with him. In the model, both authentic and fake scandals arise endogenously within a political framework involving two parties that trade off benefits of continued collaboration with a suspect politician against the possibility of reputational fallout. Rising polarization between the two parties, we show, increases the likelihood of scandal while decreasing its informational value. Scandals that are triggered by only the opposing party, we also find, are reputationally damaging to both parties and, in some instances, reputationally enhancing to the politician. The model also reveals that jurisdictions with lots of scandals are not necessarily beset by more misbehavior. Under well‐defined conditions, in fact, scandals can be a sign of political piety.
Political Scandal: A Theory
In: University of Chicago, Becker Friedman Institute for Economics Working Paper No. 2020-17
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Working paper
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Partisan Traps
In: University of Chicago, Becker Friedman Institute for Economics Working Paper No. 2023-145
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