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Arguing that globalization will bring new forms of "nonterritorial" governance, implications for local cultures & for cultural diversity are considered. Globalization is used here to refer to "increasingly widespread awareness of other parts of the world," making diverse cultures or groups available to all others. On the other hand, globalism is defined in terms of "ever-more-encompassing units of governance" that are increasingly nonterritorial in nature; several examples are provided. Neither force necessarily leads to cultural homogenization, however. Factors that threaten vs sustain local cultures & cultural diversity are identified. The creation of nonterritorial cultural identities is envisaged, linked by digital technologies & social relationships created by nonterritorial groups, networks, & organizations. 5 References. K. Hyatt Stewart

Ethnic communities have been constructed over time, and they may evolve in the future. This article describes and assesses technological developments which may serve as the framework for new ethnic communities, for strengthening existing ethnic communities, or for a new type which the author calls a "virtual ethnic community." The key to these uses of telecommunications technology lies in recognizing that mass media are being replaced by targeted or "addressable" media with specialized and more homogeneous audiences. In particular, these technologies allow ethnic communities to find ways to support their diaspora and retain their culture and language. These means of persistence and governance include "deathstar" satellites with several hundred broadcast channels, e-mail, the Internet, the World Wide Web, and other devices still being created. National borders and physical distance need no longer pose barriers to regular and "dense" interactions, especially as costs come down with the spread of technology. With global coverage, variations in media exposure will occur as much within territorial states as between them, with each individual or family choosing those messages they wish to receive.

Territorial states have evolved over several centuries into all-purpose political units, sharing sovereignty only with other states. Non-territorial forms o f political, economic, or religious organizations are increasingly performing state functions, leading to "government a la carte" and thereby to a wider sharing o f sovereignty than at any time since the medieval period. Nation-states will not disappear, indeed they will continue to increase in number; but they will be forced to share the world stage with supple and adaptable non-territorial, transnational organizations. The rise o f the territorial nation-state to become the universal standard o f political organization brought some well-known benefits (including individualism, personal rights, and economic development) and curses (including totalitarian regimes, colonialism, and destruction or assimilation o f other political forms). Technological developments, especially in electronics and telecommunications, have shifted the balance away from purely territorial political forms towards a greater role for non-territorial organizations and their associated identities and loyalties. These new forms and forces constitute a new "logic" which opens up possibilities unknown or unimagined or unattainable until now.

AbstractThe Canadian Constitution contains several distinctive rights not found in the United States Constitution. Indeed, the collective and community-based rights Canadians take for granted are inimical to American liberal traditions. Negative rights or interpretive provisions, such as thenon obstanteclause, are unique to Canada among Western democracies. The author argues that these rights derive from the country's historical concerns with religious and linguistic communities—especially in Quebec—and that they in turn condition how politics must be conducted in Canada.

Features of political culture and tradition which are recognized in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms; address.

THIS ARTICLE ADDRESSES THE SUBJECT OF CANADIAN POLITICAL CULTURE AND TRADITIONS, AND IN PARTICULAR EMPHASIZED THAT SOME DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF CANADIANNESS ARE REVEALED IN THE CONCEPTION OF RIGHTS WHICH IS ENTRENCHED IN THE CHARTER OF FREEDOM AND RIGHTS. THE CANADIAN CONSTITUTION CONTAINS SEVERAL DISTINCTIVE RIGHTS NOT FOUND IN THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. INDEED, THE COLLECTIVE AND COMMUNITY-BASED RIGHTS CANADIANS TAKE FOR GRANTED ARE INIMICAL TO AMERICAN LIBERAL TRADITIONS. NEGATIVE RIGHTS OR INTERPRETIVE PROVISIONS, SUCH AS THE NON OBSTANTE CLAUSE, ARE UNIQUE TO CANADA AMONG WESTERN DEMOCRACIES. THE AUTHOR ARGUES THAT THESE RIGHTS DERIVE FROM THE COUNTRY'S HISTORICAL CONCERNS WITH RELIGIOUS AND LINGUISTIC COMMUNITIES--ESPECIALLY IN QUEBEC--AND THAT THEY IN TURN CONDITION HOW POLITICS MUST BE CONDUCTED IN CANADA.

Concepts are like wines; some do not travel well. Thus, a frequent problem concerns whether phenomena with the same label in two societies are really the same. Party identification is a concept which is particularly interesting in this regard. The effect of party identification on voting decisions has been examined in more than a dozen countries, and the data have evoked controversy about the concept's utility, especially in Canada. Although this paper will focus on the term's usefulness in Canada compared to the United States, the arguments are sufficiently general to have implications for analysis elsewhere.

Decisions about the similarity of party identification as a process affecting voting patterns in various countries should be based on the relationship between the strength of identification & party loyalty. Hypotheses about the nature of party identification, either as an affective tie or as a stabilizing force, are neither corroborated nor refuted by data concerning absolute levels of identification, defection, or vote switching, since these rates depend on many factors other than party identification. In Comment: The Filling of Wine Bottles Is Not Easy, Jane Jenson (Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario) faults Elkins's analysis for lacking a theory of voting within which the concept of party identification could be described. Elkins mistakenly treats two notions of 'change' as if they were equivalent, treating as 'change' both the voter's decision to vote for a political party other than the one with which he is identified, & his decision to change that identification. 3 Tables. S. Karganovic.

La perception ordonnée de l'idéologie des partis politiques canadiensLa plupart des chercheurs acceptent comme évident l'énoncé selon lequel les partis politiques canadiens peuvent être ordonnés selon le critère droite-gauche : lendpétant perçu comme étant à gauche, le Parti libéral au centre, le Parti progressisteconservateur à droite et le Crédit social à l'extrême droite. La présente étude a pour objet de vérifier la véracité de certaines propositions implicites à cette approche : (1) un seul critère suffit pour situer les partis les uns par rapport aux autres; (2) ce critère est applicable de pareille façon partout au Canada; (3) l'appartenance à un parti n'influence pas la perception ordonnée des partis.A l'aide de données provenant de sondages effectués en 1965 et en 1968, il est démontré qu'aucune de ces propositions n'est valide. S'il apparait que les électeurs ont une perception relativement claire d'un continuumnpd–Libéral–Conservateur, ils ne s'entendent pas sur la place à assigner aux Créditistes. De plus, les résidents de la Colombie Britannique et des Prairies ont une égale tendance à concevoir les Conservateurs comme situés à gauche des Libéraux, et les Libéraux comme à gauche des Conservateurs. Enfin, certains partisans politiques (et notamment ceux dundp)ordonnent les partis d'une façon différente des autres.L'auteur en conclut que le critère droite-gauche, bien que pertinent, ne saurait décrire à lui seul les perceptions spatiales globales de l'idéologie des partis. Il propose que le critère centre-périphérie soit utilisé comme seconde dimension des perceptions idéologiques ordonnées.

Most measures of party competition were designed for the United States or other two-party systems. The measure proposed here is intended for multiparty as well as two-party systems. It is a formalization of the notion of uncertainty: election outcomes are competitive to the degree we are uncertain who will win. By ascertaining through survey research the degree of party loyalty over time, one can calculate the chances of alternative outcomes in hypothetical replications of any given election. Since the chance that a losing party might have won is one measure of the importance of that party, this approach to party competition also provides a precise indicator of the number of parties in the system (i.e., whether it is two-party, three party, etc.). The method is applied here to data on Canadian federal elections in 1965 and 1968.