This title was first published in 2002. This rich comparative analysis looks at security policy reorientation in four European states located at the periphery of the European continent. During the post-Cold War period, Greece, Bulgaria, Sweden and Finland conducted a security policy that was heavily influenced by their close proximity to the iron curtain. Probing this transition during a decisive phase of the post-Cold War reconstitution of the wider European security order, the author analyzes national security policy making from the standpoints of three international relations traditions - realism, institutionalism and political anthropology. This engaging work is invaluable for students, scholars and policy analysts working in the field of international relations and European politics.
The proliferation of minilateral summits in the twenty-first century is reshaping how security-related diplomacy and international cooperation works, yet it remains an understudied and poorly understood phenomenon. In this groundbreaking work, Kjell Engelbrekt contrasts these relatively informal summits with the more formal UN Security Council to provide an authoritative assessment of their relative effectiveness, compatibility, and their impact on international security institutions
Access options:
The following links lead to the full text from the respective local libraries:
The first part of this report provides an overview of the history of nuclear weapons doctrine, as it evolved in parallel to the practice of warfare and war planning in the mid-1940s and subsequently as an integral element of the cold war. A distinction is made between the early development of nuclear weapons doctrine, when United States held a dominant position in the field, and the near-parity situation that ensued in the late 1960s and onwards. The second part of the report consists of an analysis of American, British, French and Russian nuclear weapons doctrine between 1991 and 2018, illustrating how a period of low tension was gradually replaced with a reinvigoration of mutual suspicion after the year 2000. A third part briefly examines recent contributions to the American scholarly debate about the utility of nuclear weapons for strategic thought in a world moving toward polycentrism, as it revisits earlier theoretical insights and challenges conventional wisdoms. The fourth and final part elicits lessons for Sweden in particular. Overall, the report demonstrates that nuclear weapons consistently have represented an integral element of managing security risks in the Western hemisphere but that domestic political and defense industry considerations play in as well. It also suggests that doctrinal adjustments mirror the major concerns of policymakers in this regard and that nuclear powers are well aware of special obligations and privileges ascribed to them by countries that lack this category of weapons. A world in which the United States wields the greatest share of this power (unipolarity) will nonetheless be quite different from one in which two countries possess roughly the same capacity (bipolarity), and yet fundamentally different from one in which three or more countries compete to gain, or sustain, an edge toward others (multipolarity). To the extent that the world is moving toward greater security competition including the dimension of nuclear power, it will inevitably be more difficult for individual states to remain on the sidelines, unless they are ready to compromise their political autonomy. In terms of options for aligning Sweden with a broader security arrangement in the near future, there are only three feasible alternatives that may offset the risk of nuclear coercion: responding within the framework of the EU, forge closer ties to NATO, or build a bilateral relationship to the United States. Each such option comes with its own set of assets and liabilities, as does remaining a passive bystander. ; Transaltantisk och europeisk säkerhet , FORBE
The 2016 American presidential election has been described as 'a race like no other', with reference to the tone and nature of the campaign and the stark contrast between the policy platforms of the two main contenders, as well as the unusually high stakes involved for America, the transatlantic link, and beyond. The analysis contained in this memorandum discusses the foreign, security and defense policy platforms of Hillary Clinton and Donald J. Trump, the leadership styles of the two main candidates, and their respective approaches to transnational alliances and partnerships. In each of three areas of comparison Clinton emerges as the markedly more predictable, more competent and better prepared contender, also reassuringly focused on strengthening ties to close allies and partners in the coming years. From the vantage point of the global order, international trade, security and stability in Europe and the Baltic Sea region, Sweden is therefore significantly more likely to benefit from a Clinton presidency than from an administration led by Trump, and might even be in a position to forge closer ties to the United States in the realm of foreign, security and defense policy following a victory for the Democratic Party candidate on 8 November.
AbstractThe United Nations Security Council is the primary international body in charge of upholding international peace and security. Permanent and nonpermanent member states share in the responsibility to avert great power conflicts and thwart asymmetric disputes, regional instability and civil war, but the former task has priority and the prerogatives and therefore the obligations of the five permanent member states widely exceed those of countries that hold two‐year elected seats. The bifurcation of roles nevertheless produces 'responsibility shirking', which weakens Council performance on the latter type of tasks. This article suggests that responsibility shirking is underreported in the literature even though it is well known to diplomatic practitioners. It considers three types of remedies to the situation, arguing that amendments to the UN Charter or the Provisional Rules of Procedure are unlikely, but that piecemeal and pragmatic reform could precipitate a change of mindset. In particular, allowing nonpermanent member states to co‐chair the drafting of resolutions is likely to engage all member states in the core business of the Council.
It is well known that the US-Russian dialogue was 'reset' in 2009 under US President Obama and his Russian counterpart Medvedev although it is doubtful whether this symbolic commitment really created conditions for better, or closer, intergovernmental relations. In the following, I analyse how signs of renewed cooperation emitted by the respective political leaderships reflected on multilateral fora in which both the United States and Russia are represented, with a particular emphasis on the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the UN Security Council. The overall impression is that US-Russian diplomatic collaboration in 2009-2011 remained limited and focused on fewer issues, but that both sides deliberately avoided 'disturbing' each other's priority interests. A specific observation from the OSCE is that Russia's diplomatic initiatives were better prepared than previously and in the future may carry greater weight, at least on the European mainland. Unlike the United States, which acts through the Security Council when it believes that it can forge a coalition to pursue a particular objective, in 2009-2011 Russia's UN diplomacy still remained defensive. Adapted from the source document.
