Suchergebnisse

Despite several high-profile cases of cooperation between sanctioned states, little is understood about how being sanctioned affects target states' incentives to cooperate with one another and what forms that cooperation might take. I theorize that sanctioned states will tend to seek out sanctions-surviving assistance from nonsanctioned states in most cases. Being sanctioned constrains how much useful assistance that sanctioned states can provide to one another, as they suffer from similar trade constraints, levels of economic turmoil, and governmental resource limitations. I test my theory's predictions that sanctioned states are less likely to cooperate with one another via two different large-n tests involving cooperation via engaging in trade-based sanctions-busting and civil nuclear cooperation. Both of these distinct tests provide strong support for my theory. The final portion of the study conducts an exploratory analysis of why sanctioned states still sometimes cooperate with one another, finding that such cooperation may involve risky or taboo transactions, like arms sales, and that sanctioned parties have incentives to keep their cooperation a secret in such cases. These findings improve our understanding of the various cooperative strategies that states employ to survive sanctions.

What determines how US economic sanctions affect the international trade conducted with their targets? This article develops a liberal-based explanation for why economic sanctions increase their targets' trade with some third parties and decrease it with others. It is theorized that the effects of defense pact alliances between sender and third-party states are conditional upon the strength of the third parties' commercial dependence upon the target states. Third parties will cooperate with senders when the costs are low, but use their alliance relationships as cover to sanctions bust when the commercial benefits are high. This suggests that the United States can best gain the support of allies whose cooperation matters the least, while the allies whose support is most important tend to sanctions bust. It is also theorized that a target state's allies trade more with it than its nonallies. An empirical analysis of ninety-six episodes of US-imposed sanctions supports these hypotheses. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]

What determines how US economic sanctions affect the international trade conducted with their targets? This article develops a liberal-based explanation for why economic sanctions increase their targets' trade with some third parties and decrease it with others. It is theorized that the effects of defense pact alliances between sender and third-party states are conditional upon the strength of the third parties' commercial dependence upon the target states. Third parties will cooperate with senders when the costs are low, but use their alliance relationships as cover to sanctions bust when the commercial benefits are high. This suggests that the United States can best gain the support of allies whose cooperation matters the least, while the allies whose support is most important tend to sanctions bust. It is also theorized that a target state's allies trade more with it than its nonallies. An empirical analysis of ninety-six episodes of US-imposed sanctions supports these hypotheses.