Universities and the social circuitry of finance -- Our new financial oligarchy -- Bankers to the rescue : the political turn to student debt -- The top : how universities became hedge funds -- The bottom : a Wall Street takeover of for-profit colleges -- The middle : a hidden squeeze on public universities -- Reimagining (higher education) finance from below -- Methodological appendix : a comparative, qualitative, and quantitative study of elites.
AbstractI argue that growth in private equity and publicly traded ownership of US for-profit colleges has created new shareholder-value pressures for schools to maximize returns for investors. Privately held firms, which had long dominated the sector, were converted to private equity ownership through 88 buyouts since 1987. Private equity managers then used IPOs to establish 20 of 35 publicly traded firms that operated in the sector. I use longitudinal panel analyses of 14,212 federally qualified colleges to show that schools under these ownership forms featured unusually high debts and low graduation rates for students. The results (a) provide some of the most robust evidence to date that shareholder value strategies of cost-cutting and implicit contract violations can adversely affect non-labor stakeholders; and (b) help to theorize the growing but understudied role of private equity as a transitional ownership form that spreads shareholder value strategies to privately held firms.
Between 1980 and 2010 California's health care policy field shifted from a business-dominated, closed-door pattern of decision making to a more open political arena. Through this process, a wide-ranging and diversely resourced coalition advocating on behalf of beneficiaries became an accepted partner in policymaking. This article examines this transformation, considering its broader implications for the political dynamics of the public-private welfare state and the role of advocacy groups in defending beneficiary interests. We argue that multifaceted coalitions exploit three vulnerabilities of the public-private welfare state, which presents openings for advancing public priorities: 1) diverse and shifting interests, which allow advocates to build broad coalitions that include labor and some providers 2) service gaps that, when publicized, can generate public outrage; and 3) the hybrid institutional form of the public-private welfare state, which can connect service delivery organizations with a broader pro-public coalition.
Between 1980 and 2010 California's health care policy field shifted from a business-dominated, closed-door pattern of decision making to an open political arena in which a wide-ranging and diversely resourced coalition advocating on behalf of beneficiaries had become an accepted partner in policymaking. This article examines this transformation, considering its broader implications for the political dynamics of the public-private welfare state and the role of advocacy groups in defending beneficiary interests. Our argument emphasizes coalition-building, probing not just which interests combine forces, but also showing how coalitions can expand over time and build their range of capabilities. We focus on three processes that build effective coalitions to influence public private policymaking: 1) an initial link that joins previously unconnected groups in umbrella organizations; 2) resource expansion that enlarges the engaged base by funding more diverse groups and expanding alliances with those organizations; 3) institutionalization of coalitional engagement by changing the rules of the game using such policy levers as regular hearings, provisions for participation, and transparency. We conclude by showing how these capabilities have positioned California to implement the Affordable Care Act and consider the implications for other states.
Between 1980 and 2010 California's health care policy field shifted from a business-dominated, closed-door pattern of decision making to an open political arena in which a wide-ranging and diversely resourced coalition advocating on behalf of beneficiaries had become an accepted partner in policymaking. This article examines this transformation, considering its broader implications for the political dynamics of the public-private welfare state and the role of advocacy groups in defending beneficiary interests. Our argument emphasizes coalition-building, probing not just which interests combine forces, but also showing how coalitions can expand over time and build their range of capabilities. We focus on three processes that build effective coalitions to influence public private policymaking: 1) an initial link that joins previously unconnected groups in umbrella organizations; 2) resource expansion that enlarges the engaged base by funding more diverse groups and expanding alliances with those organizations; 3) institutionalization of coalitional engagement by changing the rules of the game using such policy levers as regular hearings, provisions for participation, and transparency. We conclude by showing how these capabilities have positioned California to implement the Affordable Care Act and consider the implications for other states.
Between 1980 and 2010 California's health care policy field shifted from a business-dominated, closed-door pattern of decision making to an open political arena in which a wide-ranging and diversely resourced coalition advocating on behalf of beneficiaries had become an accepted partner in policymaking. This article examines this transformation, considering its broader implications for the political dynamics of the public-private welfare state and the role of advocacy groups in defending beneficiary interests. Our argument emphasizes coalition-building, probing not just which interests combine forces, but also showing how coalitions can expand over time and build their range of capabilities. We focus on three processes that build effective coalitions to influence public private policymaking: 1) an initial link that joins previously unconnected groups in umbrella organizations; 2) resource expansion that enlarges the engaged base by funding more diverse groups and expanding alliances with those organizations; 3) institutionalization of coalitional engagement by changing the rules of the game using such policy levers as regular hearings, provisions for participation, and transparency. We conclude by showing how these capabilities have positioned California to implement the Affordable Care Act and consider the implications for other states.
AbstractWe integrate contemporary sociological scholarship on higher education to appraise universities as peculiar organizations, on three dimensions. Universities are positionally central to the institutional order of modern societies, providing working links between state, market, civil society, and private‐sphere organizations. Universities are polysemic, embodying civic, economic, and sacred meanings simultaneously. And universities are quasi‐sovereign, enjoying a substantial margin of jurisdiction over their own boundaries and internal affairs. These insights are harmonious with classic insights on the character of academic organization and offer concise dimensions for observing variation in higher education systems across space and time.
