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Abstract
In the context of decreasing media trust as well as the rise of populist movements in many Western Democracies, this study sets out to revisit the relationship between political preferences and perceived media bias. It investigates perceived bias of the entire media system, the perceived bias of individual outlets as well as perceived beneficiaries of this favorable coverage. Analyses are based on an online survey in Austria in 2015 (n ~ 1,679) and compare citizens' perceived biases towards eight newspapers and television outlets. Results show that media system bias in Austria is strongly related to right-wing but not to left-wing extremism. Furthermore, there are not only differences between single outlets but also between media genres, as particularly tabloids are less afflicted by right-wing perceptions of bias. Finally, there is evidence of hostile media perceptions irrespective of actual media exposure.

Processes of coalition government formation have recently become subject to increasing delay across Europe. There also appears to be a concurrent surge in the success of 'populist' challengers, who tend to reject key features intrinsic to pluralism such as elite bargaining and compromise. Against this background, this article investigates for the first time citizen preferences for which party should get the mandate to form the government and which parties should definitely be excluded from government formation. We focus specifically on the effect that political knowledge and populist attitudes have on citizen preferences for government formation. We find that both political knowledge and populist attitudes are essential in explaining voters' willingness or unwillingness to accept the fundamental prerequisite of coalition bargaining and political compromise. These findings have important implications for our understanding of citizens' attitudes and political representation.

Past research has shown that media coverage during election campaigns influences citizen preferences and expectations about parties and political candidates. Very little is known, however, about the effect of media coverage on post-electoral coalition preferences and expectations. This is surprising, given that speculations about post-electoral coalition building are an essential part of election campaigns in all multiparty systems. This paper investigates the consequences that coalitions' media saliency and tone have on voter preferences and expectations about these potential coalitions. Using media and panel data from the 2013 German and Austrian election campaigns, we find that media coverage has substantial effects on voter perceptions although the effects differ in strength between the two countries. These findings have important implications for our understanding of media effects, voter expectations and campaign strategies.

Why do populist citizens oppose climate change? Thus far, data constraints limited the ability to test different theoretical mechanisms against each other. We argue that populist attitudes affect climate attitudes through two distinct channels, namely institutional trust and attitudes towards science. The former argument focuses on political institutions as the central actors in implementing climate policy. Individuals who distrust these institutions are more sceptical about climate change. The latter argument claims that populists deny climate change because they distrust the underlying climate science. According to this view, populists would view climate scientists as part of the self-serving elite that betrays the people. Utilising data from the Austrian National Election Study and structural equation modelling, we find strong support for the relationship of populism and climate attitudes via attitudes towards science and institutional trust. Populists systematically hold more negative attitudes towards science and political institutions, and consequently deny climate change.

In spite of broad interest in internal party dynamics, with previous literature relatedly demonstrating that voters are not oblivious to party infighting, very little attention has been paid to the antecedents of voter perceptions of intra-party conflict. This article addresses this research deficit with the support of empirical evidence gathered over the course of the 2017 Austrian national election campaign. The study examines variations in perceived intra-party conflict over time, both across parties and within the same party. We find that although voter perceptions largely mirror actual distinctions in intra-party fighting, conspicuous individual-level variations can also be identified owing to attention to the election campaign and motivated reasoning in information processing. These results have important consequences for our understanding of voter perceptions of intra-party conflict and the role of election campaigns, with potential implications for party strategies during election campaigns.

The internet in general and social networks such as Facebook or Twitter in particular have opened up new ways of using media and exchanging content in the context of televised political events. The internet and social networks now challenge the established image of televised events and their analysis. In an internet-oriented subpopulation, televised political events are no longer watched via a single medium, the television screen. Instead, their consumption passes through numerous information channels such as social networks, political web forums, blogs and online media coverage. Yet, these channels are often not included in conventional empirical methods. This descriptive study shows how the potential audience of televised political events extends far beyond its TV audience, which is why the impact and the methods of analysis of these events need to be discussed anew. The basis of this article is an online survey of students at the University of Vienna about the ORF-Sommergesprache (summer talks) 2012. Adapted from the source document.

"Im Kontext politischer TV-Ereignisse eröffnen sich über das Internet im Allgemeinen und Social-NetworkSites wie Facebook oder Twitter im Speziellen neue Möglichkeiten des Medienkonsums und der Anschlusskommunikation, die das klassische Bild von TV-Ereignissen und deren Analysen infrage stellen. Politische TV-Ereignisse werden nicht mehr primär über ein einziges Medium, das Fernsehen, wahrgenommen. Ihr Konsum verläuft in einer internetaffinen Subpopulation viel eher über eine Mehrzahl an Informationskanälen, die in gängigen empirischen Methoden nicht alle berücksichtigt werden. Wir befinden uns in einer Ära der E-Merging Media und des Second Screen, in welcher Social-Network-Sites, Online-Foren, Blogs und auch die Medienberichterstattung im Internet einen vielfältigen Medienkonsum und eine breite Anschlusskommunikation zu TV-Ereignissen erleichtern. Die vorliegende explorative Studie untersucht, inwieweit das potenzielle Publikum von politischen TV-Ereignissen weit über das Fernsehpublikum hinaus reicht, und kommt dabei zur Erkenntnis, dass der Einfluss- und Analysebereich von TV-Ereignissen neu diskutiert werden muss. Grundlage der Untersuchung ist eine Online-Befragung von Studierenden der Universität Wien im Rahmen der ORF-Sommergespräche 2012." (Autorenreferat)

Background: Vaccination is considered to be a key public health intervention to end the COVID-19 pandemic. Yet, the success of the intervention is contingent on attitudes toward vaccination and the design of vaccination policies. Methods: We conduct cross-sectional analyses of policy-relevant attitudes toward COVID-19 vaccination using survey data of a representative sample of Austrian residents collected by the Austrian Corona Panel Project (ACPP). As outcomes, we examine the individual readiness to get vaccinated, the support for compulsory vaccinations, and the preference for making the vaccine available free of charge. The independent variables include demographics, objective and perceived health risks, and social and political factors. Results: Although there is broad public support for making the vaccine available free of charge, vaccine hesitancy and the opposition to a vaccine mandate are widespread. The protective function of the vaccine for the individual only motivates limited support for vaccinations. Opposition to COVID-19 vaccination also stems from a lack of sense of community and an ongoing politicization of the issue through conspiracy theories and party politics. Conclusion: We propose that overcoming the inherent free-rider problem of achieving sufficiently high vaccination rates poses a potential dilemma for policymakers: Given the politicized nature of the issue, they may find themselves having to choose between making vaccinations compulsory at political costs and a lingering pandemic at high costs for public health and the economy. We propose that promoting a sense of community and addressing potential practical constraints will be key in designing an effective COVID-19 vaccination policy.

Media coverage can influence how citizens think about their political leaders. This study explores how three types of media bias (visibility bias, tonality bias, and agenda bias) affect voter assessments of politicians' traits. Bias effects should be stronger for political traits (such as competence) than for nonpolitical traits (such as likability). Biases may also interact in their effects: Specifically, visibility bias should moderate the impact of tonality bias. Combining media, party, and survey data through manual content analysis of newspaper coverage ( N = 2,680) and party press releases ( N = 1,794), as well as a three-wave voter survey ( n = 927) during the 2013 Austrian election campaign, we find substantial effects of tonality bias and agenda bias on political trait perceptions. The effects are less clear for nonpolitical trait perceptions. Although visibility bias has no direct impact, there is evidence that it moderates effects of tonality bias on candidate perceptions.