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New Developments in Revealed Preference Theory: Decisions Under Risk, Uncertainty, and Intertemporal Choice
In: Annual Review of Economics, Band 12, S. 299-316
SSRN
Contracts versus Salaries in Matching
In: American economic review, Band 102, Heft 1, S. 594-601
ISSN: 1944-7981
Firms and workers may sign complex contracts that govern many aspects of their interactions. I show that when firms regard contracts as substitutes, bargaining over contracts can be understood as bargaining only over wages. Substitutes is the assumption commonly used to guarantee the existence of stable matchings of workers and firms. JEL: C78, D86, J31, J41
Cohesion, Insurance and Redistribution
In: Quarterly journal of political science: QJPS, Band 2, Heft 4, S. 287-305
ISSN: 1554-0634
Information is not about measurability
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 47, Heft 2, S. 177-185
Monotone Preferences over Information
In: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Band 1, Heft 1
ISSN: 1935-1704
Abstract
We consider preference relations over information that are monotone: more information is preferred to less. We prove that, if a preference relation on information about an uncountable set of states of nature is monotone, then it is not representable by a utility function.
Revealed preference theory
In: Econometric society monographs 56
A Characterisation of 'Phelpsian' Statistical Discrimination
In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 131, Heft 637, S. 2018-2032
ISSN: 1468-0297
Abstract
We establish that a type of statistical discrimination—that based on informativeness of signals about workers' skills and the ability appropriately to match workers to tasks—is possible if and only if it is impossible uniquely to identify the signal structure observed by an employer from a realised empirical distribution of skills. The impossibility of statistical discrimination is shown to be equivalent to the existence of a fair, skill-dependent, remuneration for workers. Finally, we connect the statistical discrimination literature to Bayesian persuasion, establishing that if discrimination is absent, then the optimal signalling problem results in a linear pay-off function (as well as a kind of converse).
How to Control Controlled School Choice
In: American economic review, Band 105, Heft 8, S. 2679-2694
ISSN: 1944-7981
We characterize choice rules for schools that regard students as substitutes while expressing preferences for a diverse student body. The stable (or fair) assignment of students to schools requires the latter to regard the former as substitutes. Such a requirement is in conflict with the reality of schools' preferences for diversity. We show that the conflict can be useful, in the sense that certain unique rules emerge from imposing both considerations. We also provide welfare comparisons for students when different choice rules are employed. (JEL D47, H75, I21, I28)
Cohesion, Insurance and Redistribution
In: Quarterly journal of political science, Band 2, Heft 4, S. 287-305
ISSN: 1554-0626
Governments use redistributive policies to favor relatively unproductive economic sectors. Traditional economic wisdom teaches that the government should instead buy out the agents in these sectors, and let them relocate to more productive sectors. We show that redistribution to a sector whose agents have highly correlated incomes generates an insurance value. Taking this insurance value into account, a buy-out is not sufficient to compensate the agents in the sector for relocating. In fact, it may be efficient for the government to sustain agents in an activity that, while less productive, is subject to correlated income shocks. US data suggests that indeed, sectors that receive transfers are subject to more correlated income shocks than others. Adapted from the source document.
Constrained Pseudo-Market Equilibrium
In: American economic review, Band 111, Heft 11, S. 3699-3732
ISSN: 1944-7981
We propose a pseudo-market solution to resource allocation problems subject to constraints. Our treatment of constraints is general: including bihierarchical constraints due to considerations of diversity in school choice, or scheduling in course allocation; and other forms of constraints needed to model, for example, the market for roommates, combinatorial assignment problems, and knapsack constraints. Constraints give rise to pecuniary externalities, which are internalized via prices. Agents pay to the extent that their purchases affect the value the of relevant constraints at equilibrium prices. The result is a constrained-efficient market-equilibrium outcome. The outcome is fair to the extent that constraints treat agents symmetrically. (JEL D47, D61, D63, I11, I21)
The perception-adjusted Luce model
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 93, S. 67-76
Approximate Expected Utility Rationalization
In: CESifo Working Paper No. 7348
SSRN
The Money Pump as a Measure of Revealed Preference Violations
In: Journal of political economy, Band 119, Heft 6, S. 1201-1223
ISSN: 1537-534X
The Axiomatic Structure of Empirical Content
In: American economic review, Band 104, Heft 8, S. 2303-2319
ISSN: 1944-7981
We define the empirical content of an economic theory as the least restrictive observationally equivalent theory. We show that the empirical content of a theory is captured by a certain kind of axiomatization, with axioms that are universal negations of conjunctions of atomic formulae. (JEL B41, D01, D11)